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ABSTRACT 
vi 
Abstract 
Politicians worldwide have adopted the use of social media platforms, such as 
Facebook and Twitter, to gain attention in the networked public sphere. To date, scholars 
have focused on either politicians’ communication or their platform structures while 
neglecting to examine the dynamic and reciprocal interaction between the two. To bridge 
this research gap, I complement the networked public sphere with Giddens’s (1984) 
theory of structuration. The structuration of the networked public sphere focuses on the 
interplay between platform structures and user behavior, thereby overcoming the 
dichotomy of focusing on only one of these, and adds an explanatory perspective to the 
descriptive models. 
I apply this theoretical framework to undertake an empirical study of politicians’ 
social practices in the networked public sphere. Because social practices depend on three 
modalities (interpretive scheme, facility, and norms), my analysis connects three research 
strands: politicians’ communication behaviors, their use of authoritative and allocative 
resources, and their compliance with the norms of platforms.  
Using qualitative network analysis, quantitative content analysis, and 
computational methods, I analyze politicians’ social practices, which reveal their strategic 
targeting of highly influential accounts (e.g., other politicians’ or journalists’); their likely 
use of an emotional communication style, which triggers reactions; their need for 
allocative resources, which is manifested in an active digital followership; and the 
possible use of social bots to artificially increase politicians’ popularity. 
Because platforms serve as intermediaries in democratic societies, this synopsis 
aims to stimulate future research into the structuration of the networked public sphere, 
which focuses on the interplay between platforms and their users, the emerging social 
practices, and the unintended consequences that may require regulation so as not to 
endanger democracy but, rather, strengthen it.  
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
vii 
Zusammenfassung 
PolitikerInnen auf der ganzen Welt nutzen Social Media Plattformen wie 
Facebook und Twitter, um Aufmerksamkeit in der vernetzten, politischen 
Öffentlichkeitsphäre (networked public sphere) zu gewinnen. In der Forschung wurde 
jedoch bisher die dynamische und reziproke Interaktion der Kommunikation von 
PolitikerInnen mit den Plattformstrukturen vernachlässigt. Um diese Forschungslücke zu 
schliessen, komplementiere ich die “networked public sphere” mit die Theorie der 
Strukturation von Giddens (1984): Die Strukturation der “networked public sphere” 
fokussiert auf die (bisher vernachlässigte) Interaktion und ergänzt das bisher deskriptive 
theoretische Modell um eine erklärende Perspektive. 
 Das Modell wird angewendet, um die sozialen Praktiken von PolitikerInnen 
empirisch zu untersuchen. Da soziale Praktiken drei Modalitäten umfassen (interpretative 
Schemata, Fazilitäten und Normen) verbinde ich drei Forschungsstränge: Wie 
PolitikerInnen kommunizieren, autoritative sowie allokative Ressourcen einsetzen und 
die Normen der Plattformen einhalten. Mittels qualitativer Netzwerkanalyse, 
quantitativer Inhaltsanalyse und computergestützten Methoden konnte ich aufzeigen, wie 
PolitikerInnen, strategisch einflussreiche Nutzer ansprechen (bspw. JournalistInnen oder 
PolitikerInnen), einen Reaktionen auslösenden, emotionalen Kommunikationsstil 
verwenden (werden), eine aktive, digitale Anhängerschaft benötigen und Social Bots 
einsetzen (könnten), um ihre Popularität zu steigern. 
 Plattformen können als Intermediäre fungieren, um das Funktionieren der 
Demokratie sicherzustellen. Diese Synopse zielt darauf ab, dass der vorgeschlagene 
theoretische Rahmen in zukünftiger Forschung genutzt wird, um die Interaktionen 
zwischen NutzerInnen und Plattformen, soziale Praktiken und die unbeabsichtigten 
Konsequenzen zu untersuchen, die möglicherweise Regulationen fordern, damit die 
Demokratie nicht in Gefahr gerät, sondern gestärkt wird. 
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1 Introduction 
Politicians around the globe have adopted social media platforms such as Facebook and 
Twitter in order to gain attention in the networked public sphere (e.g., Davis, Holtz-
Bacha, & Just, 2017). To date, the research has focused either on politicians’ 
communication to gain attention (Bene, 2017; Borah, 2016; Heiss, Schmuck, & Matthes, 
2018; Hemsley, 2019; Larsson, 2015; Xenos, Macafee, & Pole, 2017), or on how platform 
structures moderate the distribution of attention (Gillespie, 2018; Just & Latzer, 2017; 
Nieborg & Helmond, 2019; Pariser, 2012). Yet, since attention is distributed through 
reactions such as ‘likes’ on Facebook or ‘retweets’ on Twitter (e.g., van Dijck & Poell, 
2013), the extent of attention depends on the interactions between politicians’ 
communication and the specific structure of each platform (Bucher & Helmond, 2018; 
Klinger & Svensson, 2015; van Dijck & Poell, 2013), which unfortunately has not yet 
been investigated. 
To address this research gap, I first expand the theoretical framework of the 
networked public sphere with the theory of structuration (Giddens, 1984), which 
complements the networked public sphere with a focus on the interactions between 
politicians’ actions and platforms’ structures. Through such interaction, social practices 
emerge that should attract attention in the networked public sphere. I then empirically 
apply the expanded theoretical framework – which I call the structuration of the 
networked public sphere – to politicians on Facebook and Twitter so as to investigate the 
emerging social practices to attract public attention in the networked public sphere. 
I have conducted four empirical studies, focusing on the three modalities of social 
practices: The interpretive scheme is analyzed by whom politicians talk and listen to and 
by the use of four communication styles (Keller, under review; Keller & Kleinen-von 
Königslöw, 2018b). I analyze facility by asking which allocative and authoritative 
resources (e.g., financial resources and large followership) lead to attention (Keller & 
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Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2018a). I investigate norms via the question whether politicians 
have turned to the manipulative use of social bots so as to attract attention (Keller & 
Klinger, 2019).  
My analysis of the interpretive scheme showed that politicians are neither unaware 
of platforms’ interactive potential nor that they do not interact with anyone on them, but 
that their communication reflects their decision to maximize their attention: They favor 
addressing highly influential users (e.g., journalists) over less influential ones (e.g., lay 
citizens) (Keller, under review) and may in future use a reaction-triggering style rather 
than a discursive communication one (Keller & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2018b). 
Studying the facility has shown that politicians’ offline power to dominate attention (e.g., 
mirrored in their domination of traditional media coverage) is reflected online, but only 
to an extent, owing to platforms’ unique specificities; the key is to attract a large and 
active online followership (Keller & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2018a). The analysis of 
norms has shown that political accounts have artificially increased their popularity, and 
platforms seem reluctant to enforce their terms of service (ToS) (Keller & Klinger, 2019), 
possibly leading to the use of artificial popularity to attract genuine attention.  
This synopsis contributes to future research into the networked public sphere – 
especially to politicians’ social practices in the networked public sphere – theoretically, 
empirically, methodologically, and with implications for society and possible regulation 
for platforms: Theoretically, this synopsis contributes by expanding the theoretical 
framework of the networked public sphere with the theory of structuration (Giddens, 
1984), thereby responding to the call for a platform-sensitive approach by focusing on the 
interplays between platforms’ structures and users’ actions. Empirically, it provides 
explanations for politicians’ social practices regarding three major research areas in the 
field of political communication in the networked public sphere: the interactive potential 
of platforms and how politicians communicate, the democratization of the networked 
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public sphere and which resources lead to attention, and the use of social bots to attract 
genuine public attention. Methodologically, various methods – from qualitative network 
analysis to computational methods – serve as guidance for future studies of social 
practices in the networked public sphere. Finally, the insights from the empirical findings 
have implications for society and possible regulation for platforms that provide the 
structures of the networked public sphere.  
In this synopsis, I start by addressing the questions how the emergence of the 
Internet and social media platforms have required scholars to rethink how the ‘new’ 
public sphere is constituted and how its logic demands studying the reciprocal dynamics 
between platforms’ structures and their users. I then introduce the theory of structuration 
and apply its key elements to the networked public sphere. Public attention is presented 
as the main driver of the dynamics of the structuration of the networked public sphere, 
and the roles of reactions such as likes or retweets are discussed. I then focus on the 
empirical application of the theory of structuration of the networked public sphere, i.e. 
how the dynamic between politicians’ communication behaviors with the goal of 
attracting maximum public attention and platforms’ structures produces social practices 
in the networked public sphere. I discuss the results and put them in a broader, 
international context. In the final section, I address limitations and propose a future 
research agenda. 
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2 The Emergence of the Networked Public Sphere 
Theories of the public sphere focus on communicative spaces in which different 
actors with different experiences, arguments, ideas, and opinions can discuss politically 
relevant issues and form public opinion (Dahlgren, 2005; Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1993; 
Rauchfleisch & Schäfer, 2015; Wessler & Rinke, 2013). This includes that political 
actions such as proposing a modification to a law, the subsequent discussion about it, and 
the possible outcome in the form of a new law are publicly visible to others in such a 
communicative space (Gerhards, 1994; Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1993). In doing so, 
communicative spaces allow democratic societies to form collective binding decisions for 
society, that is, to function (e.g., Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1993).  
Communicative spaces are differentiated by three levels: medially constructed 
public spheres (e.g., print news media, radio, or TV), topical public spheres (e.g., 
demonstrations), and encounter public spheres (e.g., incidental encounters with people on 
the street) (Jarren & Donges, 2011; Neidhardt, 1994). However, the emergence of the 
Internet and, later, social media platforms have made it increasingly important to reflect 
on how the online public sphere can be described (e.g., Dahlgren, 2005): is it yet another 
medially constructed public sphere? 
Although the differentiation of communicative spaces can still account for online, 
social media platforms converge the three levels: First, and similar to mass media, a 
platform (e.g., Facebook) offers a medially constructed public sphere by connecting 
people and algorithmically distributing their content. Further, and second, these platforms 
provide opportunities to create topical public spheres via the aggregation of voices for 
instance with the same hashtag (Small, 2010). Third, they show users messages from 
users they do not know, providing incidental exposure to other political voices at the 
encounter level (Kaiser, Keller, & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2018; Yonghwan Kim, Chen, 
& Gil de Zúñiga, 2013). Thus, platforms are not just a new medially constructed public 
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sphere, but offer opportunities for topical public spheres and encounter public spheres at 
the same time, and can therefore be labeled as a new public sphere.  
 
2.1 Labeling the New Public Sphere: The Networked Public Sphere 
Many labels have been proposed to capture and differentiate this ‘new’ public 
sphere from the ‘old,’ which included traditional media such as printed newspapers, radio, 
or television (for an overview, see Schäfer, 2015). The terms ranged from general terms 
also used to describe the World Wide Web, for instance, the online, virtual, or digital 
public sphere (Gerhards & Schäfer, 2010; Papacharissi, 2002; Schäfer, 2015), to more 
specific terms such as “public sphere 2.0” (Ruiz et al., 2011) or the “networked public 
sphere” (Benkler, 2006; Benkler, Roberts, Faris, Solow-Niederman, & Etling, 2015).  
In this synopsis, the label networked public sphere (Benkler, 2006) is used for 
three reasons. First, compared to the aforementioned terms (e.g., virtual), networked 
stresses the shift from a mass-mediated public sphere to the distribution of information 
through a network – a key element of this new public sphere. Second, the term 
acknowledges “[…] the increasing freedom individuals enjoy to participate in creating 
information and knowledge […]” (Benkler, 2006, p. 10) without normatively promoting 
or predicting the participatory culture that emerges from it such as terms as “public sphere 
2.0” (Ruiz et al., 2011).1 Third, the networked public sphere is broadly defined as “[...] 
the range of practices, organizations, and technologies that have emerged from networked 
communication as an alternative arena for public discourse, political debate, and 
mobilization alongside, and in interaction with, traditional media” (Benkler et al., 2015, 
p. 596), offering opportunities for future platforms based on information distribution 
                                                 
1 Public sphere 2.0 refers to the overarching concept of the “the next generation of software,” as introduced 
by O'Reilly (2005, p. 1) that technologically enabled social media platforms, according to Kaplan and 
Haenlein (2010). 
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through networks. Thus, the term is broad enough to serve as a definition for future 
platforms, yet still specific enough to be differentiated from the ‘old’ public sphere.  
 
2.2 The Dynamic of Two Forces in the Networked Public Sphere 
Not only did the convergence of the different levels of the public sphere to one 
provided by social media platforms lead to the need for a new label, it also introduced a 
different logic of how the networked public sphere is constituted (Klinger & Svensson, 
2015; van Dijck & Poell, 2013). Compared to the public sphere constituted by the mass 
media, the networked public sphere offers opportunities to be more democratic in the 
sense that every user can produce content and can publicly distribute it. However, such 
distribution is also influenced by a platform’s structure, especially its algorithms, which 
moderate whose content is visible to whom (Bucher, 2012; Oremus, 2016; Twitter, 2017; 
van Dijck, 2013). Thus, two research strands were established: scholars have focused 
either on users’ actions or on how platform structure distribute public attention2 in the 
networked public sphere.  
On the one hand, scholars have focused on users’ actions on platforms that 
constitute the networked public sphere. Since users’ posts are distributed by their 
followers, friends, subscribers, etc. to a secondary (tertiary, etc.) audience in the 
networked public sphere (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016; Klinger & Svensson, 2015; 
Puschmann & Peters, 2014), the importance of individual users has increased, because 
they decide whether to share a post and thereby increase its visibility. Thus, optimists 
point to the variety of citizen-initiated discussions about multiple political topics 
(Rheingold, 2000). They refer to examples in which these platforms are used to cooperate 
                                                 
2 I follow Webster (2011), who defined public attention as “the extent to which multiple individuals (i.e., 
agents) are exposed to cultural products across space and/or time” (p. 45). The definition is discussed in the 
section ‘Public Attention as Driver of the Structuration’. 
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with others so as to improve “[…] the practiced experience of democracy […]” (Benkler, 
2006, p. 9). They also point to the possibility of individuals going viral (Klinger 
& Svensson, 2015; Nahon & Hemsley, 2014), i.e. despite users’ limited followership 
(online and possibly offline), their messages can be shared across the network and can 
reach a larger public – similar to someone who may have invested much money to receive 
a similar amount of attention or is well known owing to their past actions. Such a 
redistribution of attention could lead to an equalization (e.g., Samuel-Azran, Yarchi, & 
Wolfsfeld, 2015) or a democratization of attention. Pessimists state that political 
involvement becomes polarized, because some users benefit from the greater choice of 
information and become knowledgeable, while others avoid political information 
altogether (Prior, 2005, 2010). Also, they say, these platforms further fragment the public 
sphere: the abundance of information can lead to an audience driven by the choices of 
users and, given that users want to avoid cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), they 
specifically select news they agree with, leading to echo chambers (Sunstein, 2009).  
On the other hand, however, not only do users’ actions decide what gains attention 
or not; platform structures and especially their algorithms do, too – they select specific 
posts that users are likely to read or react to (Bucher, 2012; Oremus, 2016; Twitter, 2017; 
van Dijck, 2013). That is, platform algorithms also decide which posts are further 
redistributed and gain public attention. Optimists stress that platforms enable users to 
produce and distribute content publicly and without the content being edited or put in 
context by a professional journalist (e.g., Dahlberg, 1998; Klinger & Svensson, 2015). 
Thus, they argue that, owing to the possibility of accessing abundant information across 
time and space, these platforms enable a more informed citizenry, similar to the Athenian 
Agora or the New England town hall meetings (Dahlberg, 1998). Pessimists counter 
among others that sociodemographic factors are reflected in the access to these platforms, 
creating a digital divide (e.g., van Dijk, 2005); also, these platforms serve primarily those 
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who are already invested, while those who are disengaged may lag behind even further 
(the so-called second-level digital divide and the democracy divide) (Min, 2010; Norris, 
2008). Further, those able to join a platform may encounter mostly content they agree 
with. That is, a platform’s algorithm would show personalized feeds, creating a filter 
bubble in which users find no news or posts from differing positions (Pariser, 2012).  
Given the scope of the networked public sphere and its two research strands, 
studies have remained primarily one-sided. Subsequently, researchers have described 
either how users do (not) engage in discussions across political ideologies (Barberá, Jost, 
Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015; Gruzd & Roy, 2014; Himelboim, McCreery, & Smith, 
2013) or they have called on platforms to update their structure (Pariser, 2012) or to at 
least change their moderation behavior (Gillespie, 2018). They do not focus on 
interactions between users’ actions and platform structures in the networked public 
sphere, yet this is key.3 
The networked public sphere is highly dynamic, since the platform structures are 
continually updated and their algorithms learn from the platform users’ behaviors, such 
as users’ decisions whom to follow and how they reacted (e.g., with a like, retweet, share, 
etc.) (Bucher, 2012; Oremus, 2016; Twitter, 2017; van Dijck, 2013). That is, the 
networked public sphere is subject to change with every user click and with every change 
to a platform. Thus, studying the networked public sphere requires a platform-sensitive 
approach (Bucher & Helmond, 2018) that focuses on the interplays between users’ 
actions and platform structures. However, to account for interactions, the theoretical 
                                                 
3 A noteworthy exception is the analysis of users’ and algorithms’ selection of ideologically varying content 
by Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic (2015): While users are exposed to ideologically discordant content on 
Facebook, their selection plays a larger role than Facebook’s algorithm to encounter news items with which 
they agree.  
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scope needs to be widened. I expand the networked public sphere with Giddens’s (1984) 
theory of structuration.4  
The networked public sphere can be linked to Giddens’s (1984) theory of 
structuration by its central elements, communicative spaces (i.e. structures) and 
individuals’ actions, and complemented by Giddens’s (1984) term of structuration. The 
structurational approach focuses neither only on platform’s structures nor only on user 
actions, but on the reciprocal process (i.e. structuration): users’ actions constitute and are 
guided by the communicative spaces and continuously (re)produce the networked public 
sphere. In a Giddensian spirit, guidance refers to both the facilitation and hindering of 
political actions. Thus, the connecting theorem (Gerhards, 1994) of the networked public 
sphere with the perspective of Giddens’s (1984) theory of structuration is: the networked 
public sphere consists of communicative spaces that guide and are constituted by 
individuals’ actions.5  
                                                 
4
 Gerhards and Neidhardt (1993), Gerhards (1994), Neuberger (2004), and Weder (2008), sought to 
complement (networked/non-political) theories of the public sphere with other actor-focused theories. The 
most similar attempt to mine was by Gerhards (1994), who combined theory of the public sphere with the 
rational choice model. His goal was to complement the descriptive strength of theories of the public sphere 
with the explanatory strength of actor-focused theory. However, many behaviors – especially in the 
networked public sphere – does not fulfill the premises of the rational choice model. The use of social 
media platforms may involve non-rational behaviors (e.g., day-to-day behavior) or may be driven by a 
moral decision (e.g., for politicians to keep close to citizens) – according to Blau (1997), Giannakos, 
Chorianopoulos, Giotopoulos, and Vlamos (2013), and Jungherr (2016). Thus, I selected a different actor-
focused theoretical model with less controversial premises than the rational choice model and with a focus 
on the interplays between user actions and platform structures.  
5 For comparison, it was defined as “communicative spaces in which different actors with different 
experiences [...] can discuss politically relevant issues and form a public opinion” in the beginning of the 
section. “Individual actions” now subsumes the former statement of discussing politically relevant issues 
and forming a public opinion. 
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3 The Structuration of the Networked Public Sphere 
Giddens’s (1984) theory of structuration has been used widely (for an overview, 
see Phipps, 2001). For instance, it was applied to complement the (non-political) public 
sphere theory (Weder, 2008), to enhance the systems theory of the media environment 
(Donges, 2008), to explain the media’s marketplace of attention (Webster, 2011), and to 
enhance understanding in management and organizational communications (Bachmann, 
2017; Braun, 2002; Röttger, 2015; Zerfaß & Möslein, 2009), especially in journalism and 
media companies (Altmeppen, 2006; Sydow & Windeler, 2004; Wyss, 2002, 2016). 
Structuration theory has also been applied to explain technologies generally (Orlikowski, 
1992), specifically to how different features of advanced technologies such as the group 
decision support system (GDSS) influences its users’ behaviors and how their behaviors 
shape the GDSS (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994), and on how online Q&A communities could 
be analyzed (Rosenbaum & Shachaf, 2010). However, to my best knowledge, no attempt 
has been made to complement the networked public sphere with structuration theory.  
Thus, I seek to demonstrate how Giddens’s (1984) theory of structuration can 
enhance the understanding of the constitution and dynamics of the networked public 
sphere and apply Giddens’s (1984) terms structures to social media platforms, agents to 
platform’s users, and structuration to the interaction between platforms and their users 
(for an overview of the elements and their interplays, see Figure 1 on page 15). 
 
3.1 Social Media Platforms as Structures 
Giddens loosely defines structures as “rules (and resources)” (Giddens, 1984, p. 
17). Rules are differentiated into rules that constitute signification (e.g., “the rule defining 
checkmate in chess is...” [p. 19]) and those constituting legitimization (e.g., “it is a rule 
that all workers must clock in at 8.00am” [p. 19]). Resources are grouped into 
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authoritative (e.g., power over others) and allocative resources (e.g., financial resources). 
Thus, structures also offer possibilities to dominate.  
Structures are “marked by an absence” (Giddens, 1984, p. 25) of agents and as a 
“source of constraints on the free initiative” of the agents (Giddens, 1984, p. 16), but also 
enable agents to perform certain acts. However, given structures can be results of agents’ 
previous actions (Giddens, 1984). That is, they exist without the presence of any agents 
and present the possibilities within an agent can act. Thus, structures can refer to 
language, technologies, institutions, or to the media landscape in which agents can choose 
their preferred channels and programs (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994; Giddens, 1984; 
Orlikowski, 1992; Webster, 2011) or a social media platform. 
Giddens’s term structures, applied to social media platforms, can be distinguished 
accordingly: a structure’s signification enables users to connect and interact with each 
other. It allows users to create a profile (anonymous or not), connect with others only with 
(e.g., Facebook friends) or without (e.g., followers on Twitter) the other’s consent, and 
offer interactions among users (e.g., public Wikipedia discussion pages and private 
chats).  
A structure’s legitimization manifests itself in platforms’ terms of service (ToS). 
For instance, Facebook’s “mission is to give people the power to build community and 
bring the world closer together” (Facebook, 2019c, p. 1) and, if necessary, to sanction 
behaviors that violate its ToS, for instance by “removing content” (p. 1) or “blocking 
access to certain features” (p. 1).  
Structure’s possibilities to dominate allow users to execute power: either by 
increasing users’ status (i.e. authoritative resources) or enabling them to spend financial 
resources (i.e. allocative resources). On Wikipedia, for instance, users are only allowed 
to create new Wikipedia pages if they have edited at least 10 other Wikipedia pages 
(Wikipedia, 2019), or users on reddit can be upgraded to “moderators” who then are 
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empowered to moderate a subreddit (i.e. to remove content, close threads, etc.), which 
separates them from other users (reddit, 2018). In both cases, users’ power vary, 
depending on their status on the platform. But users do not only differ in their power (i.e. 
authoritative resources), but also in their possibilities to spend allocated resources. For 
instance, users can spend money to buy adverts that are shown to a specific audience on 
Facebook and Twitter (Young Kim et al., 2018; Kreiss & McGregor, 2018; 
Papakyriakopoulos, Hegelich, Shahrezaye, & Serrano, 2018).  
Thus, platforms as structures point to the features they offer (i.e. platforms’ 
signification), to the platform’s intended use (i.e. its legitimization), and to possibilities 
to take actions (i.e. domination).  
 
3.2 Social Media Platforms’ Users as Agents  
Agents have three key characteristics (Giddens, 1984): They have practical 
knowledge that relates to what is done, but is hard to express (e.g., how to chat with 
someone). This is reflected in their daily communication. They have discursive 
knowledge, which refers to the capability to explain their actions and whether this would 
lead to sanctions (e.g., how someone stopped chatting because they had been offended). 
Finally, they have agency, i.e. the power to take actions (e.g., the time and ability to chat).  
Agents are “highly ‘learned’” (Giddens, 1984, p. 22) in the sense of the knowledge 
they possess and apply in daily encounters, although it is mostly practical knowledge. 
However, their “knowledgeability is always bounded” (Giddens, 1984, p. 27), because 
their actions can yield unintended consequences. They reflexively observe their actions – 
including the unintended consequences of their actions – and are thus informed for future 
actions (Giddens, 1984). Motivations for actions are the “wants which prompt it” 
(Giddens, 1984, p. 6) and differ to reflexive monitoring and rationalization. While 
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motives mostly supply overall plans or programs, most day-to-day behaviors are not 
directly motivated (Giddens, 1984).  
The agents on social media platforms are these platforms’ users. Given that users 
have the power to join a platform, they possess the practical knowledge to connect with 
others and to redistribute content on a platform and the discursive knowledge to not post 
illegal content on the site that would get them sanctioned.  
Platform users’ actions can have various unintended consequences. For instance, 
when users create and share content, they do not know who exactly will receive their 
messages (Bucher, 2012; Litt & Hargittai, 2016; Marwick & boyd, 2011; van Dijck, 2013; 
van Dijck & Poell, 2013), or they may publish a controversial post that gains traction and 
is followed up in traditional media, with serious consequences, such as the end of a 
political career (e.g., Fontana, 2015). Also, users monitor others’ behaviors in their 
newsfeed on platforms such as Facebook or Twitter and can adapt their actions to what 
they have learned from others (e.g., not to post illegal, career-ending posts on Twitter).  
Despite that motivations to join a platform can be assessed, for instance, people 
who adopt Facebook have a desire to belong or a need for self-representation (Nadkarni 
& Hofmann, 2012) or the motivation to adopt Twitter is explained by the need for news 
and to track real-time events (Kwak, Lee, Park, & Moon, 2010), their uses can become a 
daily habit (Giannakos et al., 2013) or transform into the need for academic success 
(Searles & Krupnikov, 2018).  
Thus, platform users, as agents, relate to their uses of a platform (i.e. their 
communication), to their compliance with a platform’s ToS (i.e. their sanction), and to 
their agency on a platform (i.e. their power). 
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3.3 The Interactions in the Networked Public Sphere as Structuration 
Structuration refers to the interplays between agents and structures (Giddens, 
1984). The continuous interaction between agents’ actions and structures becomes visible 
in social practices (Giddens, 1984). Social practices are observable by the interplays 
between three modalities (see Figure 1): the interpretative scheme reflects the interactions 
between agents’ communication and structures’ signification, facility the interplays 
between agents’ power and a structure’s domination, and norms the interaction between 
agents’ sanctions and a structure’s legitimization (Giddens, 1984).6  
A prerequisite for the structuration of the networked public sphere is that users 
join the platform, connect with others, and create content because platform providers do 
not create the content for them.7 If users only published content that contravenes the 
platform’s ToS (i.e. reflected in the modality of norms), had no agency to publish posts 
(i.e. facility), or had such agency but published no content at all (i.e. interpretive scheme), 
the networked public sphere could not be constituted. Given users join a platform, connect 
with one another, and create or redistribute content on the platform, the networked public 
sphere is constituted in a structurational process (see Figure 1).  
Structuration is a dynamic and reciprocal process between a platform’s structures 
and users’ actions. Especially since most platforms have implemented algorithms to sort, 
rank, and make some of the vast number of possible posts accessible to their users 
(Bucher, 2012; Klinger & Svensson, 2015; van Dijck, 2013; van Dijck & Poell, 2013), 
posts are also updated depending on users’ actions: users can react to posts with platform 
features such as a like, which can be interpreted as a positive evaluation of the algorithm’s 
                                                 
6 Whether agents or structures are more powerful in shaping the other remains unclear. Orlikowski (1992) 
argued that agents influence a structure in the early stages stronger than their actions are shaped by a 
structure, but “rigid and routinized views of, and interactions with, technology develop later” (p. 408), 
which cement a structure and make it harder to change by agents behaving differently. 
7 Exceptions include descriptions of features or their terms of services. 
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decision to show a post. Yet users can also report posts, which indicates a negative but 
nonetheless useful response for the algorithm, because it serves as additional information 
about users’ preferences of what types of posts they wish to encounter. Thus, every user 
action and reaction influence a platform’s structure, which selects the posts a user is likely 
to react to. Thus, the interplays between user actions and platform structures are highly 
dynamic and reciprocal; thereby, social practices emerge.  
 
 
Figure 1. The Elements of the Structuration of the Networked Public Sphere (adapted 
from Braun, 2002, p. 97 and Giddens, 1984, p. 29) 
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Two examples demonstrate how structuration can lead to different social practices 
on platforms: First, Wikipedia offers the largest online encyclopedia only thanks to the 
continuous creation and revisions via individuals’ interactions with its structure (i.e. 
interpretive scheme and facility) (e.g., Shaw & Hargittai, 2018). Also, these individuals 
follow the platform’s ToS and create content, which is discussed by and accessible to 
others for free (i.e. norms). These social practices enable Wikipedia to serve as an online 
encyclopedia. Second, the social network Gab was created as a platform with the stated 
goal of, above all, protecting free speech (i.e. norms) (Gab, 2019). Gab attracted 
especially alt-right supporters, conspiracy theorists, and trolls, who create and distribute 
content (i.e. interpretive scheme and facility) (Zannettou et al., 2018). Thus, it serves as 
a platform for users who have been banned from other platforms, of which some even 
face federal charges for racist posts, which led to the public criticism that Gab would fuel 
radicalization (Timberg, Harwell, Dwoskin, & Brown, 2018). That is, which social 
practices emerge depends on the interactions between a platform’s structures and users’ 
actions, i.e. structuration. 
Since structuration is highly dynamic and reciprocal, it can have unintended 
consequences that spark debates to change a platform’s structures or users’ behaviors. 
For instance, in 2008, Facebook removed pictures showing women breastfeeding their 
children, which led to protests and public discussions on and beyond the platform; this 
growing public pressure forced it to change its rules in 2014 (Facebook, 2019a; Gillespie, 
2018). It is not only users who initiate changes to the platform’s structure; the structure 
is also shaped to nudge users’ behaviors (cf. Bucher & Helmond, 2018; Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2009). While platform engineers change the calculations of their algorithms, 
for instance to increase or decrease the visibility of news outlets’ posts (Levy, Newman, 
Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, & Nielsen, 2018), they also adjust visible features. For 
instance, Twitter’s ‘favorite’ button (in the shape of a star) was changed to a ‘like’ button 
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(in the shape of a heart) in November 2015. This was intended to make the button’s 
function easier to understand for new users (Kumar, 2015). However, long-time Twitter 
users reacted with disbelief and sadness (Bucher & Helmond, 2018). That is, while the 
favorite button was used as a bookmark symbol and others used it as to say, “I agree,” the 
like button was seen as too generic (Bucher & Helmond, 2018). Thus, structuration can 
have unintended consequences that may change user behaviors or a platform’s structures; 
it seeks to facilitate new social practices.  
Thus, the structuration of the networked public sphere refers to the dynamic and 
reciprocal process between platform structures and user actions. Social practices emerge 
in the structuration of the networked public sphere and become visible in three modalities 
(interpretive scheme, facility, and norms). Unintended consequences by emerging social 
practices can lead to changes initiated by users’ calls for adjusting platform structures, 
but also by platform structures’ adjustments to change users’ behaviors.  
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4 Public Attention as Driver of the Structuration  
While the theory of structuration focuses on the modalities to explain social 
practices (Phipps, 2001), it does not postulate what fuels structuration. I will now argue 
that public attention is the main driver of those who offer platform structures, those who 
use a platform, and – subsequently – the structuration of the networked public sphere.  
Webster (2011) has defined public attention as “the extent to which multiple 
individuals (i.e. agents) are exposed to cultural products across space and/or time” (p. 45). 
Cultural products can be posts on social media platforms, news stories, video clips, or 
websites; exposure points to an individual’s contact with such a product – whether 
incidental or intended, long or short, following a reaction or not – across space and time, 
indicating loosely connected or organized audiences and the single or repeated use of a 
product.  
Since primarily commercial platforms offer structures for the constitution of the 
networked public sphere, gaining public attention is crucial for their business; they 
compete for the attention of individuals with other media companies such as broadcasting 
stations or newspapers (for an overview, see Webster, 2011). The platforms seek to 
provide individuals with information that lead them to spend time on the platform, which 
enables platforms to show their users paid adverts, similar to how the traditional media 
want individuals watch their television program or read their newspaper (Gillespie, 2018; 
van Dijck, 2013; Webster, 2011). Thus, public attention is necessary to keep the platforms 
online.  
While there are various motivations for people to join platforms, for instance, the 
need to belong (Nadkarni & Hofmann, 2012) or the need to track live news (Kwak et al., 
2010), people also join for the purpose of self-representation (Nadkarni & Hofmann, 
2012) and attention-seeking (Vaterlaus, Patten, Roche, & Young, 2015; Wohn & Na, 
2011). Especially in the political networked public sphere, gaining attention for oneself 
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and one’s arguments is needed if one is to exert social influence (e.g., Gerhards, 1994; 
Webster, 2011) and should therefore be a main reason for political actors to use a 
platform.  
The double need for attention goes hand in hand with structuration of the 
networked public sphere: Since platforms do not create the content on them, they rely on 
their users’ actions and offer their users opportunities to attract public attention for their 
posts in return (boyd & Ellison, 2007). However, not everyone attracts the same amount 
of public attention. How much attention a user attracts depends on the interplays of users’ 
actions and platform structures. 
Users’ actions show to whom or to which posts they want to pay attention, via two 
features of platforms (Keller & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2018a): Users can connect with 
one another and can thereby attract followers, friends, or fans (i.e. a followership). 
Followership is the first audience of a user post. The larger their followership, the more 
public attention a user is likely to attract (Karlsen & Enjolras, 2016; Keller & Kleinen-
von Königslöw, 2018a). Also, platforms enable followers to react to a post on different 
levels: Low-threshold reactions such as a like on Facebook or Twitter show positive 
acknowledgement of a post, a share on Facebook, or a retweet on Twitter redistribute a 
post to a network; high-threshold reactions include a comment or a reply, which allow 
users to respond in their own words (Keller, under review; Larsson, 2017a).8 Each of 
these reactions indicate that a user paid attention to a post and that they shared it to their 
                                                 
8 While each reaction can be counted as an indicator of attention, the interpretation of what a user intended 
to express with a certain reaction differs from person to person and situation to situation, as shown by 
Porten-Chée, Haßler, Jost, Eilders, and Maurer (2018). For instance, the like button on Facebook can be 
used to express emotional expressions such as excitement, agreement, or compassion, according to Gerlitz 
and Helmond (2013), but also less emotional ones such as to present oneself as responsible, to show others 
that one has read the article, according to Gao (2016), or simply as part of a routinized behavior, according 
to Brandtzaeg and Haugstveit (2014). Similarly, Twitter users gave 25 different answers to the question 
why they favorited (now liked) a tweet, according to Meier, Elsweiler, and Wilson (2014): the answers 
ranged from author-centered reasons such as it was from a family member or a celebrity, to content-focused 
reasons such as when a tweet reflects one’s opinion, to the intention of a first step to engage with someone, 
to simply a way to bookmark a tweet, or to enter a competition and possibly win a prize. 
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network. Thus, users’ actions decide which posts gain (more) attention in the networked 
public sphere. 
However, it is not only users who decide which posts attract public attention; 
platform structures and especially their algorithms do, too. They use hundreds of 
indicators based on users’ actions to decide whether to show a certain articles to someone 
and, if so, in what order (Oremus, 2016; Twitter, 2017): For instance, they rely on a post’s 
content, such as whether it is a picture or a video, the connection between the sender and 
the recipient of a post, such as how often they chat, the recipient’s past behaviors, 
including whether they have often reacted to similar posts in the past (Bucher, 2012; 
Oremus, 2016; Twitter, 2017). The weighting of the indicators and their calculation about 
whether or not to further redistribute a post enables an algorithm to influence the amount 
of public attention a user or a post attracts. A platform’s algorithm does not distribute 
posts equally, but in a distribution resembling a power-law function, i.e. it redistributes 
posts that have already gained much attention rather than posts that did not.9 Such a 
distribution has been detected in the networked public sphere10: very few politicians 
receive the majority of visits, fans, followers, and views on their websites, Facebook 
                                                 
9 It may be that a platform’s algorithm infers a post’s public relevance from the number of reactions it has 
already received and decides to redistribute it further.
 
This may follow the same logic of user actions or 
may even be determined by users actions to an extent: since the number of one’s follower and the reactions 
to one’s posts are public, they serve as cues for other users, as shown by Porten-Chée et al. (2018). That is, 
if a post has received many reactions, users infer that it must be worth reading (the so-called bandwagon 
effect), according to Sundar and Nass (2001). In this line, for example, Messing and Westwood (2014) 
showed that many reactions to an article (i.e. random numbers from max. 1,000 recommendations vs. a 
random number over 10,000) trumped the ideologically misaligned source as relevance cue and, therefore, 
could reduce political polarization. However, the effect sizes varies along users’ individual personalities, 
as shown by Margetts, John, and Hale (2016), such as the need for orientation, according to Matthes (2005), 
the information processing type, according to Lee and Jang (2010), or the need for optimal distinctness, 
according to Brewer (1991), and does not necessarily change users’ perceptions of issues according to Peter, 
Rossmann, and Keyling (2014). Thus, a platform’s algorithm may reflect users’ focus on already popular 
posts and may therefore redistribute popular posts further than unpopular ones. 
10 Such a distribution is in line with the overall structure of the World Wide Web as a scale-free network, 
according to Barabási and Albert (1999) and Adamic and Huberman (2000). Further, Adamic (2009) found 
this distribution in viral marketing and social persuasion efforts, Yim (2003) in audience concentration for 
magazines, cable television networks, radio networks, and broadcast television networks, and Ding et al. 
(2011) in the attention for YouTube uploaders. 
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pages, Twitter accounts, and YouTube pages, while the majority of politicians receive 
little attention (Benkler et al., 2015; Keller, under review; Larsson, 2017b; Nielsen & 
Vaccari, 2013). Thus, although platform algorithms are ‘black boxes’ and are informed 
by users’ actions, they further redistribute already popular posts rather than unpopular 
ones.  
Thus, the goal of attracting maximum attention guides adjustments of platform 
structures (e.g., their algorithms) and user actions. Although user actions determine the 
amount of public attention a user or a post attracts and inform platform algorithms, 
platform algorithms also act – they are programmed to prioritize certain posts. This leads 
to a power-law distribution of attention for users and posts. Thus, given the double need 
for public attention, the structuration of the networked public sphere should reflect social 
practices that improve the odds of attracting public attention. 
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5 Politicians’ Social Practices to Attract Attention 
To empirically analyze such a structuration, the researcher must create a break in 
the process (Phipps, 2001) – “intellectually freezes the ongoing course of structuration” 
(Cohen, 1989, p. 146), and must focus on emerging social practices. I focus on 
politicians’ social practices on Facebook and Twitter in order to empirically investigate 
part of the structuration of the networked public sphere.  
Politicians are one of many groups of individuals that form part of and seek to 
attract attention in the networked public sphere (Benkler et al., 2015; Jarren & Donges, 
2011; Keller, under review). Although they can use these platforms to determine what 
society considers to be politically relevant (Jungherr, 2014), or to differentiate their 
political programs from political competitors (Gerhards, 1994), their primary goal is to 
gain attention in order to persuade citizens to vote for them (Gerhards, 1994). Politicians 
have adopted two platforms in particular to attract public attention: Facebook and Twitter.  
Since the successful campaign of the 44th U.S. president, Barack Obama, also 
known as the “social media president” (Katz, Barris, & Jain, 2013), politicians from 
around the world have followed his lead and have joined Facebook: For instance, already 
in New Zealand’s 2011 national elections, 77% of members of parliament (MPs) used 
Facebook as a campaign tool (Ross, Fountaine, & Comrie, 2015); in 2011, each of the 
seven parties’ two top candidates in five large and medium-sized Norwegian 
municipalities were active on Facebook (Enli & Skogerbø, 2013); in the ‘routine phase’ 
of 2015 in Switzerland, 24% of the candidates used Facebook pages (Keller & Kleinen-
von Königslöw, 2018a); in Norway and Sweden in 2013, 24% and 19% respectively 
curated Facebook pages (Larsson & Kalsnes, 2014).  
Politicians have adopted Twitter, too (for an overview, see Davis et al., 2017). For 
instance, one-third of all parties and 13% of all party leaders represented in Canada’s 
parliament already adopted Twitter in 2009 (Small, 2010). In Switzerland, the Twitter 
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adoption rate among MPs rose steadily to 44% in 2015 (Keller & Kleinen-von 
Königslöw, 2018a; Klinger, 2013; Rauchfleisch & Metag, 2016). In 2014, 351 candidates 
used a Twitter account to win one of the 222 seats in Australia’s parliament (Bruns & 
Moon, 2018). In Norway and Sweden in 2014, 57% and 58% MPs respectively had a 
Twitter account (Larsson & Kalsnes, 2014). In the Netherlands, in 2016, 96% of all MPs 
had a Twitter account (Spierings, Jacobs, & Linders, 2018).  
Politicians’ high Facebook and Twitter adoption rates indicate that the structures 
of these two platforms may serve their goal of attracting public attention. However, since 
public attention is distributed unequally in the networked public sphere, certain social 
practices may establish that increase the odds of attracting maximum public attention. 
Thus, I ask: Which social practices attract public attention in the networked public 
sphere? 
Social practices have three modalities: the interpretive scheme, facility, and 
norms. Although the three modalities are linked to produce social practices, they can be 
analyzed separately (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994; Orlikowski, 1992; Rosenbaum 
& Shachaf, 2010; Wyss, 2016). The three modalities’ foci shed light on different angles 
to answer the overall research question (for an overview, see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. The Three Modalities to Analyze Politicians’ Social Practices (adapted from 
Giddens, 1984, p. 29) 
 
5.1 Interpretive Scheme: Politicians’ Interpretations of Platforms 
The first modality, the interpretive scheme, focuses on the interactions between a 
structure’s signification and politicians’ communication. Thus, it points to how politicians 
interpret a platform’s meaning, given its structural features, and is reflected in their 
communication.  
In interviews, politicians state more nuanced reasons for having adopted Facebook 
or Twitter, thereby interpreting the platforms’ meanings, rather than focusing on their 
overall goal of gaining attention so as to win voters. Their reasons can be grouped into 
two categories. First, they want to stay close to people – for instance, to talk to citizens 
directly, to be reachable for suggestions from citizens, and to interact with them (Brändli 
& Wassmer, 2014; Jungherr, 2014; Larsson & Skogerbø, 2018). Second, they use the 
platforms for self-representation; for instance, they want to be seen to be modern and to 
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report on their political achievements (Anstead & O'Loughlin, 2015; Jungherr, 2014). 
Given Facebook’s and Twitter’s structures, politicians are enabled to achieve these 
intended activities.  
However, the reasons for using these platforms may not be reflected in their 
activities, because their day-to-day actions do not necessarily reflect their motivations. 
Especially if politicians’ communication aims for maximum attention, they may behave 
differently, in two ways. Instead of staying close to citizens and interacting with them, 
they may primarily address opinion leaders such as journalists or other relevant actors in 
a network (Graham, Broersma, Hazelhoff, & van 't Haar, 2013; Spierings et al., 2018). 
For instance, politicians’ communication can address a media organization or can refer 
to their reporting, which may appear in the next day’s news coverage (Metag & 
Rauchfleisch, 2017; Parmelee, 2014). They may also adapt their communication style to 
the logic of the networked public sphere rather than that of the traditional media. Instead 
of objective reporting, their communication should trigger reactions such as likes, which 
spread their posts to a secondary audience (Bene, 2017; Heiss et al., 2018; Hemsley, 2019; 
Jacobs & Spierings, 2016). To assess how politicians interpret platform structures’ 
meanings, I ask: 
RQ1a: Who do politicians talk and listen to so as to attract public attention?  
RQ1b: Which communication styles do politicians use to attract public attention?  
 
5.2 Facility: Politicians’ Uses of Resources  
The second modality, facility, focuses on the interplays between the ways to 
dominate presented by structures and politicians’ authoritative and allocative resources 
(i.e. power). Thus, facility focuses on how politicians use platform structures to dominate 
attention in the networked public sphere. 
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Since users decide which politicians they follow and which posts they react to, the 
distribution of attention in the networked public sphere may be a democratic decision (the 
so-called equalization or democratization thesis) (see Dahlberg, 1998; Keller & Kleinen-
von Königslöw, in press; Larsson & Kalsnes, 2014; Rheingold, 2000; Samuel-Azran et 
al., 2015). However, politicians do not enter these platforms as unknown actors; those 
who are already well known owing to for instance their long-term incumbency in 
parliament or because they are often covered in the traditional media may find a larger 
followership online than those who are less often covered in the media and have fewer 
financial resources (the so-called normalization thesis) (Margolis & Resnick, 2000; 
Williams & Gulati, 2013). Further, politicians’ financial resources may allow them to buy 
adverts, which are shown to a specific subset of users on Facebook or Twitter (Young 
Kim et al., 2018; Papakyriakopoulos et al., 2018). That is, politicians’ allocative resources 
may influence how much attention they attract online. 
However, authoritative resources may also increase the odds of attracting 
maximum attention. Politicians may benefit if they can attract a large followership (e.g., 
fans or followers) to which they can broadcast their messages. If their followers react to 
a post with a like or a retweet, the message spreads even further to a secondary audience 
(Jacobs & Spierings, 2016) and even may go viral (Klinger & Svensson, 2015; Nahon 
& Hemsley, 2014; Puschmann & Peters, 2014). Thus, politicians may not need to spend 
their allocative resources if they can attract an active followership, which serves 
politicians as an authoritative resource. This raises the question: 
RQ2: Which politicians’ authoritative and allocative resources lead to more 
public attention? 
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5.3 Norms: Politicians’ Compliance with Platforms’ ToS 
The third modality, norms, focuses on the interactions between structures’ 
legitimization and politicians’ sanctioning. Thus, norms focus on how politicians comply 
with platforms’ ToS to achieve their goal of attracting public attention. 
Facebook and Twitter’s ToS demand authenticity of its users, including for 
instance the use of one’s real name (Facebook, 2019b; Twitter, 2019); however, they are 
reluctant to enforce their ToS (e.g., Gillespie, 2018).11 Thus, politicians may exploit grey 
areas in platforms’ ToS or may even violate them in order to attract public attention.  
Since platforms’ algorithms rely on the number of reactions as indicators of the 
popularity of a user or a post (Bucher, 2012; Twitter, 2017), and further redistribute posts 
that have already gained more traction than others, politicians may artificially increase 
their popularity or that of their posts via social bots so as to attract genuine public 
attention. Social bots are (semi-)automated computer programs that mimic humans and 
human behaviors (e.g., Ferrara, Varol, Davis, Menczer, & Flammini, 2016; Wagner, 
Mitter, Körner, & Strohmaier, 2012; Yang et al., 2019). Bots have been detected to 
artificially increase the popularity of politicians and their posts in debates in the 
networked public sphere (for an overview, see Woolley & Howard, 2019). For instance, 
they have been detected to support the ‘leave’ side in the Brexit debate (Bastos & Mercea, 
2019; Howard & Kollanyi, 2016) and to have increased the popularity of the Republican 
candidate in the 2016 U.S. presidential election (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016; Kollanyi, 
Howard, & Woolley, 2016; Woolley & Howard, 2016). Whether politicians know about 
their artificial popularity, or even took part in the implementation of social bots, remains 
                                                 
11 First, platforms would require spending resources to enforce their ToS by for instance hiring moderators 
to screen the content on a platform (e.g., Gillespie, 2018). Second, platforms position themselves as neutral 
intermediaries under the Safe Harbor provisions and are not liable for copyright infringement if they follow 
the requirements, such as not directly profiting from the infringing material and take down the infringing 
material immediately, because they do not create the content on their platforms, according to Buchwald 
(2017) and Helberger (2018). 
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unknown. However, given social bots’ prevalence in political debates in the networked 
public sphere, politicians may use social bots to trick platforms’ algorithms, which should 
further redistribute posts and should thereby attract (genuine) public attention. Thus, I 
ask:  
RQ3: How prevalent are social bots in politicians’ networks?  
 
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION: RESULTS 
29 
6 Results from Four Empirical Studies 
I have conducted four empirical studies to answer these four questions: Studies 1 
and 2 focus on the interpretive scheme and thus on politicians’ interpretations of a 
platform’s meaning: While Keller (under review) shed light on who politicians talk and 
listen to, Keller and Kleinen-von Königslöw (2018b) analyzed which communication 
styles politicians use and which of them have increased the odds of attracting more public 
attention than other styles. Study 3 focuses on facility and, thus, how politicians use their 
resources: Keller and Kleinen-von Königslöw (2018a) investigated which authoritative 
and allocative resources of politicians increase public attention. Study 4 focuses on 
norms, shedding light on whether political parties use social bots to artificially increase 
their popularity and to attract genuine public attention (Keller & Klinger, 2019). I will 
now briefly address the four studies’ primary results and will then compare them to other 
studies. 
 
6.1 Interpretive Scheme: Politicians’ Communication Behaviors  
Platforms enable politicians to stay close to the public, interact with lay citizens, 
and post status updates about their achievements. Although politicians’ motivations for 
interacting with lay citizens and for self-representation match a platform’s affordances, 
their communication behaviors paint a different picture (Keller, under review; Keller 
& Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2018b).  
On the one hand, politicians primarily address other politicians instead of 
interacting with lay citizens, moving their discussions from parliament to the ‘modern’ 
online sphere (Keller, under review). Also, they target journalists rather than lay citizens, 
since they may hope to influence the media’s reporting and to increase their own visibility 
beyond a platform. On the other hand, a pseudo-discursive communication style (which 
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satisfies the expectation for the interactive use of a platform) is predominantly used 
(Keller & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2018b); however, this style does not serve the purpose 
of attracting maximum attention. While on Facebook, an entertaining, mobilizing, and 
emotional style increases politicians’ visibility, only an emotional style serves to achieve 
this goal on Twitter.  
Thus, politicians’ communication behaviors reflect a desire to look ‘modern’ and 
move discussions (primarily among politicians) online. Although they use a pseudo-
discursive communication style, their goal of reaching maximum attention in the 
networked public sphere is either served by targeting highly influential users such as 
journalists in their communication or via an emotional, reaction-triggering 
communication style.  
 
6.2 Facility: With Which Resources Politicians Dominate Attention 
Platforms provide opportunities for politicians with fewer resources to overcome 
their attention deficit in the traditional media. However, politicians who already dominate 
offline attention may use their advantaged position to also dominate online.  
Keller and Kleinen-von Königslöw (2018a) found that media coverage in 
traditional media corresponds to the attention politicians receive on Facebook and 
Twitter; yet, other resources did not help them to attract attention online. For instance, 
holding a key political position and having attracted a large electorate led to fewer 
reactions on Twitter, and more financial resources led to a smaller Facebook followership. 
However, the strongest predictor for triggering reactions is to attract a large Facebook 
followership.  
That is, advantages in resources do not per se translate into public attention on 
Facebook and Twitter; they can even lower the odds of gaining attention and differ by 
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platform. The most beneficial resource is an active followership. Thus, the specificities 
of platforms must be considered, and an active followership is required to dominate 
attention in the networked public sphere. 
 
6.3 Norms: Increased Attention by Tricking the System 
Political parties may benefit from an artificially increased followership, because 
this makes them look more popular than they really are and can let them attract genuine 
public attention. However, platforms’ legitimization (i.e. ToS) prohibit the use of social 
bots and threaten such behavior with sanctions.  
Keller and Klinger (2019) analyzed the followership of the seven parties 
represented in Germany’s national parliament, and found that the prevalence of social 
bots increased from 7% during the non-election period to almost 10% in the campaign 
phase of the 2017 federal election. Although these bots primarily did not tweet about 
German politics, they actively entered political discourses regarding other countries such 
as France, the U.S., and Nigeria. Thus, they are used to bloat popularity by (inactively) 
following political actors and messages, and by (actively) (re)tweeting in political 
discourses around the globe. Their increased presence also indicates how platforms 
neglect the enforcement of their ToS by failing to remove social bots.  
Although platforms’ ToS strictly forbid the manipulative use of social bots to 
artificially increase one’s popularity, they fail to fully enforce their ToS. Thus, politicians 
may benefit from social bots to attract genuine public attention in the networked public 
sphere.
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7 Discussion: Politicians’ Social Practices to Attract Attention  
The four empirical analyses point only to a certain group of political actors (i.e. 
Switzerland’s MPs and Germany’s parties) at a certain time (e.g., the 2015 Swiss national 
election) with a focus on a single modality. Thus, these four studies should be compared 
to similar studies that focus on one of the three modalities, and because the three 
modalities interrelate, their interdependence must be considered. I link the reluctance of 
politicians to debate with citizens to politicians’ communication styles, to politicians’ 
uses of allocative and authoritative resources, and to the prevalence of social bots in 
politicians’ followership to other empirical findings in order to ascertain politicians’ 
social practices to attract public attention in the networked public sphere.  
 
7.1 Selected Interactions and Communication Styles  
Given the abundance of the posts politicians receive and their lack of resources 
for instance to hire a professional social media team (Giacobbo, 2018; Keller, under 
review; Klinger & Russmann, 2017), politicians cannot engage in discussions with 
everyone in the networked public sphere. Also, other users do not expect politicians to 
reply to them, and politicians know that they do not have to reply to everyone (Tromble, 
2018). Despite the fact that platforms’ signification and legitimization support 
interactions, the normative expectation that politicians should continually interact with 
lay citizens is neither demanded by lay citizens; further, given their limited resources, 
these cannot be met in the networked public sphere. 
Additionally, politicians consider discussions with unknown actors to be risky: 
they fear losing control of the communication situation (Kalsnes, 2016; Stromer-Galley, 
2000). Thus, it is safer for them to debate with people they are familiar with, such as other 
politicians and journalists who likely discuss in a serious way, because they represent 
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another party or a media outlet (Keller, under review; Spierings et al., 2018). Discussing 
with journalists, politicians, and other highly influential persons also offer opportunities 
for politicians to reach a larger secondary audience. They may increase their visibility in 
a discussion with another politician, because this other politician’s followership may also 
encounter this interaction. When discussing with journalists, politicians may benefit from 
traditional media coverage and may even reach a secondary audience beyond the platform 
(Metag & Rauchfleisch, 2017; Parmelee, 2014). Thus, politicians select who to interact 
with, to increase their chances to attract public attention in or beyond the networked 
public sphere. 
However, politicians may turn their attention more to lay citizens during election 
campaign periods than non-election periods. For instance, UK MPs replied most often to 
lay citizens during the 2013 campaign (Graham et al., 2013). Such interactions can 
strengthen the connection between the two and can yield substantial benefits, such as an 
increased intention to vote for this politician, even if someone only observes how a 
politician interacts with someone (Lee & Shin, 2012; Tromble, 2018). That is, in 
campaign periods, politicians’ may discuss not only in highly influential accounts, but 
also take more time for lay citizens.  
While interactions are a specific mode of communication in the networked public 
sphere, the vast majority of politicians’ communication remains one-sided (Jackson & 
Lilleker, 2009; Jungherr, 2016; Keller & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2018b; Kreiss, 2012; 
Stromer-Galley, 2014), which serves their purpose of self-representation and gaining 
public attention. By broadcasting, they can represent themselves in the best light, look 
‘modern’ by communicating via social media platforms, and, at the same time, remain 
reachable and close to the public because they allow feedback to their messages. Such 
feedback serves as a proxy for public opinion (Jungherr, 2014). They may find positive 
or negative evaluations of a political statement in comments, a great number of likes 
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showing support for it, or large number of shares, indicating that this message is intended 
for a secondary audience.  
Given platforms’ algorithmic decisions to show posts that have already attracted 
much attention (i.e. reactions), not only shared or retweeted content ends up in the 
newsfeeds of a secondary audience, but also posts that have been liked or replied to. That 
is, every reaction increases attention. Thus, politicians have adapted their communication 
styles to increase their number of reactions. While these styles vary across platforms 
(Keller & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2018b), the one style that was found to work across 
platforms, countries, and over time is the emotional one (Bene, 2017; Dobele, Lindgreen, 
Beverland, Vanhamme, & van Wijk, 2007; Heiss et al., 2018; Keller & Kleinen-von 
Königslöw, 2018b; Wirz, 2018). Thus, politicians possibly change their communication 
behavior from a (pseudo-)discursive style to an emotional one if they seek to attract 
maximum public attention.  
Thus, politicians are not unaware of interactions’ potential; their interactions 
simply reflect their strategic decision to maximize their chances to gain public attention 
in resource-efficient ways. That is, politicians’ emerging social practice is to specifically 
select who they interact with and to possibly adapt their communication style so as to 
increase the odds of attracting maximum attention. 
 
7.2 Power to the Few Politicians who Attract the Most Users 
Although all politicians begin with a followership of zero users and posts with 
zero reactions, they do not enter the networked public sphere on equal footing. Some join 
the platform with a beneficial background (e.g., popular politicians) or with more 
financial resources than others. However, only some resources help them to attract public 
attention in the networked public sphere.  
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Politicians benefit from their popularity, generated by media coverage about them 
and, in some cases, benefit from more financial resources to attract public attention in the 
networked public sphere (Keller & Kleinen-von Königslöw, in press, 2018a; Williams 
& Gulati, 2013). Since platforms follow a commercial logic (e.g., van Dijck, 2013), they 
offer politicians paid adverts that are shown to specific groups of users (Young Kim et 
al., 2018; Papakyriakopoulos et al., 2018). Platform owners also cooperate with 
politicians to determine which functionalities politicians would need to expand their uses 
of a platform (for an overview, see Kreiss & McGregor, 2018). However, bought public 
attention is less persuasive than personal recommendations via reactions and may even 
be considered annoying or intrusive on Facebook (Beauchamp, 2012; Harris & Dennis, 
2011). Thus, politicians may use their financial resources to advertise their posts and 
increase their visibility, but still require other users to spread their posts genuinely so as 
to attract maximum public attention. 
Mobilizing messages, such as politicians asking their followers to share their posts 
(Keller & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2018b), or get-out-the-vote messages, must fall on 
fertile ground in order for a message to attract public attention.12 Thus, an active 
followership that spreads their messages through the network is the key resource (Heiss 
et al., 2018; Hemsley, 2019; Keller & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2018a).13 Politicians’ 
followers’ reactions signal a post’s public relevance to the platform’s algorithms, which 
                                                 
12  Margetts et al. (2016) showed that user decisions whether to react to a post varies along their personality: 
While initially, extroverts and those with high internal locus of control usually react to a post first, agreeable 
people tend to follow later. Thus, politicians benefit if they can attract users with differing personalities to 
start what Sundar and Nass (2001) called a “bandwagon effect” or what Nahon and Hemsley (2014) labeled 
as a post going viral.  
13 Although Keller and Kleinen-von Königslöw (2018a) indicated that an active followership was not 
necessary to reach many reactions on Twitter (because there was no positive relationship between 
followership and reactions), this result is likely outdated. Twitter (2017) has implemented an 
algorithmically moderated timeline after the authors’ data collection. Thus, the results may only be 
reproduced with users who opted back to the chronological timeline. Also, it is thus likely that the number 
of Twitter followers also explains the number of reactions if Twitter’s algorithm ranks tweets with similar 
indicators as Facebook’s algorithm does. 
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redistribute already popular posts even further, leading to a power-law distribution of 
attention: while most politicians and posts receive little attention, only a few attract the 
most attention (Benkler et al., 2015; Keller, under review; Keller & Kleinen-von 
Königslöw, 2018a, 2018b; Larsson, 2017b; Nielsen & Vaccari, 2013). Thus, the 
authoritative resource, an active digital followership, remains necessary for politicians to 
reach the top of the distribution of attention. 
That is, despite the fresh start for every politician who enters the networked public 
sphere, their personal background and spending of allocative resources may increase the 
odds of attracting public attention. However, politicians’ social practices require aiming 
for genuine reactions from an active digital followership (as an authoritative resource) if 
they are to dominate public attention in the networked public sphere.  
 
7.3 The Benefits to Politicians from Tricking the System 
If politicians cannot persuade users to follow them, and their communication 
triggers no reactions, they may choose to violate platforms’ ToS in order to attract public 
attention in the networked public sphere.  
While platforms’ ToS state that violation would lead to the deletion of posts or 
even exclusion from the platform (Facebook, 2019c; Twitter, 2019), platforms very 
seldom enforce their ToS. It has been shown that they do not have the capacity to remove 
social bots (e.g., Woolley & Howard, 2019) and are reluctant to spend resources on 
manual content moderation (Gillespie, 2018). Commercial logic may hinder them from 
enforcing their ToS: they benefit from artificial users and artificially created content 
because these increase the number of users and actions – two key figures for them, which 
enable them to increase their revenue.  
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Thus, politicians may benefit from platforms’ lack of policing and may violate 
ToS in order to increase their own visibility. The prevalence of social bots on Twitter for 
instance has been estimated at between 9% to 15% (Davis et al., 2016). Although it is 
unclear who has employed them, they have entered national political discourses around 
the world (Woolley & Howard, 2019): while bots were active in the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016; Kollanyi et al., 2016; Woolley & Howard, 
2016), in the Brexit debate (Bastos & Mercea, 2019; Howard & Kollanyi, 2016), in 
France’s 2017 presidential election (Ferrara, 2017), and in Germany’s 2017 federal 
election (Keller & Klinger, 2019; Neudert, Kollanyi, & Howard, 2017), their activities 
range from distributing non-political content to clearly favoring one side of a debate: In 
Germany’s 2017 federal election, for instance, although 10% of traffic were bot accounts 
following the seven parties and thus artificially increased these parties’ popularity, almost 
none of them were active, and the active ones did not interfere in the country’s election 
campaign – active bots primarily spread promotional tweets (Keller & Klinger, 2019). 
However, during the 2016 U.S. presidential election, 400,000 bots spreading roughly 3.8 
million tweets were identified and clearly favored one side; those linked to Trump were 
mostly tweeting positively about Trump, while those linked to Clinton were tweeting 
equally positively and negatively about her (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016). Although it is 
unclear who has employed social bots, and not all social bots engage politically, the 
platforms’ lack of policing leads to social bots favoring some politicians over others.  
Social bots have also been linked to the distribution of disinformation (Lazer et 
al., 2018; Shao et al., 2018). Although disinformation is not new, the amount of 
disinformation has grown in the past years (Vargo, Guo, & Amazeen, 2017). Besides such 
a message’s disinformational content, these messages tend to be formulated in a highly 
emotional style, which triggers users to react to them (e.g., Dobele et al., 2007; Keller 
& Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2018b). Overall, false stories such as disinformation spread 
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faster and further than other content (Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018). Although politicians 
may not want to be directly linked to the spread of disinformation, it is claimed that 
politicians or governments are the sources of this disinformation, especially in English-
speaking countries (Humprecht, 2018). This may affect election campaigns. For instance, 
in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, 27% of U.S. citizens visited one or more websites 
with disinformational content (Guess, Nyhan, & Reifler, 2018), and most of the ‘news’ 
on such websites favored Trump (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). Thus, bots not only 
artificially increased the popularity of some (messages of) politicians, they may also be 
employed to spread disinformation, to which users likely react, thereby increasing public 
attention. 
Given the need for public attention on these platforms and the lack of resources, 
bots may be a cheap way (Kollanyi, 2016) to artificially increase a politician’s popularity, 
to artificially increase support for their posts, or to negatively campaign against or even 
spread disinformation to undermine an opponent. Thus, the rapid increases in the number 
of reactions to politicians’ messages by bots have public relevance, set off a bandwagon 
effect, and human users may also spread the (artificially) popular messages across their 
networks. Although platforms’ legitimization is violated, platforms neither remove all 
social bots, nor sanction those who benefit from them. Thus, politicians’ social practices 
may include the use of social bots to artificially increase public attention in the networked 
public sphere. 
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8 Conclusion 
 In this synopsis, I have sought to complement the networked public sphere with 
Giddens’s (1984) theory of structuration. I have empirically applied the theoretical 
framework to study politicians’ social practices in the networked public sphere. The main 
argument is that both politicians’ actions and platform structures influence one another 
and that social practices emerge in their interplays. Since social practices depend on three 
modalities (interpretive scheme, facility, and norms), in the analysis, I have connected 
three research strands: politicians’ communication behaviors, how they use of their 
authoritative and allocative resources, and compliance with platforms’ norms. Given 
politicians’ goal of attracting maximum public attention, their social practices revealed 
their strategic targeting of highly influential accounts (e.g., other politicians or 
journalists), the likely use of an emotional communication style, which triggers reactions, 
the need for allocative resources, manifest in an active digital followership, and the 
possible use of social bots to artificially increase politicians’ popularity. 
 
8.1 Contributions to Communication and Media Research 
In this synopsis, I have contributed to future research into the networked public 
sphere – and especially on politicians’ social practices in the networked public sphere – 
theoretically, empirically, methodologically, and with implications for society and 
possible regulations. 
Expanding the networked public sphere with Giddens’s (1984) theory of 
structuration offers a vocabulary to explain how different moving targets (i.e. users’ 
actions and adjusting platforms’ structures) shape one another. This dynamic and 
reciprocal process produces social practices that account for the interplays between 
platform users’ actions and platforms’ structures. Thus, I have responded to the call for a 
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platform-sensitive approach (Bucher & Helmond, 2018), have overcome the dichotomy 
of focusing on either platform structures or user behaviors, and have added an explanatory 
perspective to the descriptive models of the networked public sphere.  
Given politicians’ goal of attracting maximum attention, certain social practices 
have emerged. I have empirically investigated social practices by focusing on the 
interpretive scheme, facility, and norms. Thus, I have linked three major research areas: 
the interactive potential of platforms and how politicians make use of them in their 
communication, the democratization potential of platforms and which politicians’ 
resources help to dominate attention, and how platforms’ ToS do or do not hinder the 
manipulative use of social bots to distort the distribution of attention. The findings reflect 
the strategic use of platforms to address other influential accounts, indicating the reaction-
triggering use of an emotional communication style, the need for an active digital 
followership, and the use of social bots to artificially increase politicians’ popularity.  
Since the theory of structuration does not demand a specific method (Giddens, 
1984), and possibly cannot be analyzed by the use of a single method, various methods 
have been used to analyze social practices: qualitative network analysis, quantitative 
content analysis, and computational methods such as an automated content analysis and 
bot detection tools. With the availability of digital behavioral data (i.e. trace data), new 
methods and approaches are needed, but also allow one to trace the de facto behaviors of 
users on platforms (González-Bailón, 2017), shedding light on how social practices are 
emerging in the structuration of the networked public sphere.  
Given the current prevalence of disinformation (e.g., Benkler, Faris, & Roberts, 
2018), social bots (e.g., Woolley & Howard, 2019), and ad campaigns that that indicate 
the violation of election laws (e.g., Young Kim et al., 2018), politicians may be acting on 
the edges of law and platforms’ ToS to reach their goal of attracting public attention. 
Countering these efforts requires regulations from inside and outside the platforms: First, 
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platforms could focus on oversight and could moderate the content on their sites 
(Gillespie, 2018). Further, they could increase the obstacles to employing social bots. 
However, given the platforms’ commercial interests and the legal freedom of the Safe 
Harbor law, they may further neglect these responsibilities (Buchwald, 2017; Helberger, 
2018; Helberger, Kleinen-von Königslöw, & van der Noll, 2015). Second, increased 
public pressure can help to regulate these platforms. To date, the largest impact has been 
the enactment of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)14, which protects EU 
citizens’ privacy from any country. Thus, it remains necessary to critically study how 
emerging social practices that undermine democracy can be addressed.  
 
8.2 Limitations and Future Research Agenda 
 This synopsis has limitations; these offer an agenda for future research. The 
limitations relate to Giddens’s theory of structuration, the theory’s empirical application, 
the blind spots when working with public measures offered by commercial companies, 
the definitions of politicians’ goal of attracting maximum attention, and the link to the 
overall media system. 
 
8.2.1 Further Improving the Theoretical Framework  
Giddens’s (1984) theory of structuration has been criticized early on (e.g., 
Bertilsson, 1984). I point to three disadvantages of his theory that affected my theoretical 
framework: the abundance of concepts and the theory’s overall complexity, the (stronger) 
focus on actors’ behaviors than on the overall structure, and the difficulty of empirically 
testing the theory. 
                                                 
14 See https://eugdpr.org/ (last accessed 8 March 2019). 
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Besides the difficulty of reading Giddens’s work, which he is aware of (e.g., 
Giddens, 1984, p. xxxv), his theory introduces multiple concepts (Giddens, 1984). These 
(re)definitions of concepts makes it hard to understand the interrelationships between 
these concepts and leads to contradictions (Kort & Gharbi, 2013). For instance, his 
definition of rules (Giddens, 1984, p. 19) builds on Wittgenstein’s categorization and 
encompasses four functions but does not specify which of them guides agents’ actions or 
how to account for them (Kort & Gharbi, 2013). Similarly, other key concepts remain 
vaguely defined and therefore open to interpretation. While this vagueness allows one to 
use his concepts in a broad range of research problems, it also fragments research, owing 
to the variety of interpretations. I followed a specific interpretation; those of previous 
studies of how individuals shape and are shaped by technologies (e.g., DeSanctis 
& Poole, 1994).  
The second criticism relates to the theory’s objective of overcoming the 
dichotomy of actor-focused and structure-focused studies by introducing the structuration 
process. In Giddens’s theory, agents’ actions and structures mutually constitute one 
another and produce social practices. However, according to Barnes (2001), Giddens 
focuses more on agents’ actions than on structures. Similarly, the empirical focus of the 
presented studies is more on politicians’ actions than on the dynamics of platform 
structures. While a platform-comparative approach allows one to account for structural 
differences’ impacts on users’ behaviors, researchers are encouraged to engage in a more 
elaborate discussion of platforms and their dynamics.  
The third criticism concerns the difficulties of empirically applying Giddens’s 
theory. The plethora of concepts and their interrelationships not only complicates 
empirical analysis; Giddens has also been criticized for his lack of assumptions and 
methodological guidelines (Kort & Gharbi, 2013). Indeed, Giddens does not “[...] mean 
to suggest that there is only one format of research which everyone henceforth should 
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adopt” (Giddens, 1984, p. 327), encouraging the use of his theory for a variety of research 
interests, without any clear guidelines or hypotheses to be tested. Thus, I have introduced 
the need for public attention as a driver of the structuration of the networked public 
sphere, which shed light on social practices fueled by the need for public attention. 
Additionally, I tied together the four empirical studies in the theoretical framework rather 
than testing a clear proposition, for instance, which aspects determine certain social 
practices.  
 
8.2.2 Future Empirical Applications of the Theory 
The empirical application of Giddens’s theory can be evaluated along the same 
five criteria Phipps (2001) used for his meta-analysis of other empirical applications of 
the theory: social behaviors, methodological bracketing, specific data, time-space, and 
the duality of structure.  
In my empirical analysis, I have sought to describe the “common factors in a wide 
range of human social behaviors” (Phipps, 2001, p. 192, my emphasis); thus, it is in line 
with the first criterion. It connects to previous research, mainly from organizational 
communication, in which the use of technologies produced certain social practices 
(DeSanctis & Poole, 1994; Orlikowski, 1992). Criteria 2 and 3, the methodological 
bracket and specific data used, can also be considered to be appropriate (Phipps, 2001): 
I analyzed the strategic use of platforms to identify social practices that are facilitated or 
hindered by structures. I analyzed data primarily quantitatively, which is also in line with 
Giddens (1984), who encouraged the use of both qualitative and quantitative data for 
analysis (e.g., Keller, under review). However, the criterion of time-space, i.e. how 
politicians are either exploiting or are restrained by structuration while transforming their 
spaces or places (Phipps, 2001), has not been accounted for beyond the reference of the 
study area (i.e. Facebook, Twitter, Switzerland). For instance, I did not include the 
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impacts of politicians’ communication behaviors on the use of other canvassing efforts, 
such as going door to door. I tested criterion 5, the consideration of the duality of 
structure, by the analysis of politicians’ social practices when aiming to attract maximum 
attention on two platforms.  
The main issue concerning the four empirical studies presented in this synopsis 
regarding the application of the theory of structuration is that they analyzed four different 
periods and focused on different modalities of the theory of structuration as well as 
different actors. Thus, I have demonstrated how different research areas’ threads interlink 
and may be considered when studying politicians’ social practices that aim to attract 
maximum attention, rather than a single paragon study of how to apply the theoretical 
framework.  
 
8.2.3 Additional Public Measures for Public Attention from Commercial Companies 
 The public number of followers, fans, or reactions served as proxies for public 
attention. Although this represents how many users reacted to them, it misses persons 
who encountered a post but did not react to it. Thus, this is a conservative estimate. 
However, the platform owners and the individual owners of a Facebook page or Twitter 
account receive statistics about how many users they have reached. These statistics tend 
to be overestimated owing to platforms’ commercial interests. For instance, users may 
scroll through their timeline without realizing that they encountered a post, but may 
nonetheless be counted as a reached user. That is, a post’s reported reach may be an overly 
liberal proxy. Still, an analysis of different politicians’ reported reaches may be a useful 
addition to the analysis of reactions when measuring public attention.  
Although platforms attract millions and billions of users, the users’ 
sociodemographics are not representative for any country and differ per platform (Blank, 
2017; Blank & Lutz, 2017; Hargittai, 2018; Wells & Link, 2014). That is, each platform 
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attracts a specific subset of the population. In the UK, for instance, Twitter users are 
younger than other social media platform users, who are again younger than Internet 
users, who are again younger than non-users (Blank, 2017); they are also better educated, 
more often single, and wealthier compared to the respective population (Blank, 2017; 
Blank & Lutz, 2017). Blank and Lutz (2017) showed that users’ sociodemographics differ 
between platforms and that no platform represents the UK’s population. Thus, one must 
ask what the characteristics of the users who follow and react to politicians’ messages on 
these platforms are. Does the public differ from topic to topic, even from post to post?  
 
8.2.4 Politicians’ Goals besides Public Attention 
I have argued that politicians’ primary goal for using platforms is to attract 
maximum public attention. In many cases, this hold true, for instance, when politicians 
seek to win seats in elections or to persuade citizens to vote in a referendum. Yet, there 
may be several occasions in which maximum attention may not be the goal of their 
communication. For instance, politicians may target their core voters to strengthen their 
own identity rather than win voters (e.g., Swiss member of parliament Cédric Wermuth 
claimed to use his Q&A interviews on Facebook for this purpose) (Endres & Zaugg, 
2018). Another reason for not needing maximum attention is to have achieved a certain 
position in politics. In Switzerland, for instance, the seven executive members of the 
Federal Council are elected by MPs. This does not require maximum attention from 
Switzerland’s population. Also, their function – as a seven-headed council – is to 
demonstrate consensus across party ideologies, which manifests in statements that 
represent neutral compromises rather than emotion-laden statements. Thus, there are 
communication goals other than maximum attention on these platforms, which possibly 
produce different social practices.  
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8.2.5 Links to the Hybrid Media System and (Normative) Public Sphere Theories 
While Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory seeks to overcome the micro-macro 
dichotomy, it primarily focuses on individuals’ behaviors rather than on the environment 
or on a given structure (e.g., Kort & Gharbi, 2013). Thus, I linked the theory of 
structuration to the networked public sphere. However, the theoretical framework needs 
to be further elaborated, in at least two directions.  
First, I only touched on the link between the networked public sphere and the 
traditional media system. Especially since traditional news providers use these platforms 
to not only distribute their information, but also compete for attention with them, 
platforms’ roles in the overall media system should be accounted for when investigating 
politicians’ social practices (Chadwick, 2013; Lilleker, Tenscher, & Štětka, 2014). 
Second, in this synopsis, I did not elaborate on the different (normative) criteria from 
theories of the public sphere (Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002). While I 
followed the theory of the public sphere proposed Gerhards and Neidhardt (1993) and 
Gerhards (1994), criteria from other traditions would offer new perspectives into how 
structures and agents’ actions must be adjusted in order to establish a certain social 
practice (e.g., discourses between lay citizens and politicians).  
 
Despite these limitations, this synopsis should stimulate future research into the 
structuration of the networked public sphere. Especially since the networked public 
sphere has become a key element in the functioning of democratic societies, scholars 
should further investigate the interplays between platforms and their users, the emerging 
social practices, and the unintended consequences that may require regulation to not 
endanger democracy but, instead, to strengthen it. 
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Abstract 
Politicians use social media platforms to connect with the public. However, who constitutes the 
public sphere to whom politicians actually talk and listen remains largely unknown, especially 
because the platform’s algorithm determines individuals’ visibility. Focusing on the Twitter 
network of all Swiss MPs, I identified 129,063 Twitter users with whom politicians connected 
(i.e., their follower–followee network) or to whom they talked and listened (e.g., [were] replied 
to or retweeted). I conducted a qualitative network analysis to describe the network and a semi-
automated content analysis of the Twitter users to classify them (N = 70.589). The results show 
that the network is dominated by a power–law distribution of attention and is clustered by 
national languages but not ideology. Politicians talk primarily to citizens, who also react most 
often to the politicians’ messages. However, politicians listen more often to actors close to 
politics and the media than to citizens. 
 
KEYWORDS: public sphere, Twitter, network analysis, semi-automated content analysis, 
Switzerland 
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To Whom Do Politicians Talk and Listen? 
Mapping Swiss Politicians’ Public Sphere on Twitter 
Politicians around the world have adopted social media platforms such as Twitter to connect 
and interact with the public (Davis, Holtz-Bacha, & Just, 2017). While cyber-optimists hoped 
that these platforms would enable more people to make their voices heard in political debates, 
and cyber-pessimists countered that various digital divides might hinder this (for an overview, 
see Schäfer, 2015), it remains largely unknown whom politicians actually encounter on Twitter. 
Especially because the platform’s algorithm strongly influences the extent to which actors are 
visible to each other, it might show that politicians connect only with other politicians, that they 
broadcast their messages primarily to lay citizens, and that they listen, for the most part, to 
journalists on Twitter.  
Previous research pointed to two key constraints introduced by the platforms’ networked 
public sphere: First, the attention for individuals and their posts follows a power-law 
distribution. That is, only very few posts receive a great deal of attention, while most of the 
others reach only a small audience (Barabási & Albert, 1999; Benkler, Roberts, Faris, Solow-
Niederman, & Etling, 2015; Nielsen & Vaccari, 2013). Second, because users react mainly to 
the posts with which they agree, they might find themselves isolated in ideological echo 
chambers (Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015; Gruzd & Roy, 2014; Sunstein, 
2009). These characteristics shape the overall structure of the network and might thereby hinder 
connections and debates between users.  
With the exception of one study (Benkler et al., 2015), previous research has not 
explored the question of how groups of actors are affected by the platform’s constraints. 
Overall, studies have seldom focused on who connects or reacts to politicians. To date, scholars 
have analyzed only the friends or followers of politicians, always focusing on specific reactions, 
such as to whom politicians reply (Ausserhofer & Maireder, 2013; Graham, Broersma, 
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Hazelhoff, & van ’t Haar, 2013; Spierings, Jacobs, & Linders, 2018; Vaccari & Valeriani, 
2015). Apart from one study on Netherland’s MPs’ Twittersphere (Spierings et al., 2018), these 
studies have also used only very broad categories of actors. For example, they have 
differentiated between politicians, journalists, experts and activists, and citizens only 
(Ausserhofer & Maireder, 2013). 
Solely a comprehensive analysis of the network structure’s effects on the myriad of 
groups of actors (e.g., executive politicians, scientists, social organizations, and lay citizens), 
stratified by those to whom politicians connect (i.e., follow and are being followed), talk (i.e., 
likes, mentions, replies, and retweets from users), and listen to (i.e., likes, mentions, replies, 
and retweets from a politician), allows for an assessment of whether the public sphere of Twitter 
enables a variety of actors to have a say and be heard. This is why I ask, How do network 
characteristics shape who politicians talk and listen to? 
This case study of Swiss politicians on Twitter enhances the understanding of the 
networked public sphere in three ways. First, this study combines the network’s characteristics 
with a detailed analysis of the group of actors affected by it. Given this combination, not only 
can the network be described on a macro-level, it also shows who is affected by it on the 
individual level. Second, by analyzing not only replies but also all other reactions, such as 
“likes” and “retweets,” it sets the threshold low with regard to taking part in political debates. 
It thereby also includes reactions which were more often used than others (e.g., retweets 
compared to replies) and users who invest less in political debates (e.g., with a like) than others 
(e.g., with a reply), which includes more voices than other approaches. Third, this analysis 
focuses on both sides of the politicians’ Twittersphere: On the one hand, politicians are being 
followed and reacted to, which indicates with whom they talk and who actively spreads their 
messages (Vaccari & Valeriani, 2015). On the other hand, politicians follow and react to others, 
which points to those whom they amplify and listen to (Benkler et al., 2015; Dobson, 2012; 
Spierings et al., 2018).  
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Two Characteristics of a Networked Public Sphere 
Public sphere theories focus on spaces in which different actors with different arguments 
can discuss politically relevant issues (Rauchfleisch & Schäfer, 2015). In all three dominant 
traditions within the public sphere theories (liberal, discursive, and constructionist), the 
question of which actors participate in public discourses plays a crucial role (Ferree, Gamson, 
Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002). However, the traditions differ when it comes to their normative 
assumptions regarding who should participate. In the liberal tradition, the public sphere should 
reflect and include the varied ideological positions and voices according to their 
proportionalities in society. In the deliberative tradition, all people (or at least their 
representatives) who are affected by political decisions should participate; these include actors 
from the political periphery, such as citizens, and not only those from the political center, such 
as politicians. In the constructionist’s tradition, all citizens, especially marginalized groups, 
should be empowered to participate (Ferree et al., 2002; Wessler, 2008).  
The advent of the World Wide Web and later social media platforms brought into the 
limelight the question of who is participating in the networked public sphere. Scholars have 
attempted to predict whether these platforms have offered more actors opportunities to have a 
say and be heard (for an overview, see Schäfer, 2015). On the one hand, these platforms have 
been perceived as a “magic elixir” (Stromer-Galley, 2000, p. 113) that allows citizens from the 
political periphery to engage with politicians (e.g., Rheingold, 2000). On the other hand, 
scholars have stressed the possible colonization of the Web and social media platforms by 
capital (Dahlberg, 1998; van Dijck, 2013): Although these platforms allow users to connect, 
talk, and listen to politicians, the visibility of actors might differ significantly between those 
who have monetary resources and those who do not (e.g., Williams & Gulati, 2013).  
 Indeed, the algorithmically moderated share of attention in a networked public sphere 
is not distributed equally. It mostly follows a power–law distribution: While only very few 
receive most attention, most receive very few. This finding remains consistent since the early 
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days of the World Wide Web. Barabási and Albert (1999) modeled how networks expand 
continuously but link preferentially to sites that are already well connected. The same 
distribution was found for attention to US politicians’ websites, as well as their Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube accounts, in terms of number of followers (Nielsen & Vaccari, 2013) 
and reactions on Facebook and Twitter (Keller & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2018a). Thus, not 
only are the Internet and its link structure predestined for a power–law distribution of attention, 
but the platforms’ algorithms also strengthen this kind of distribution. Consequently, I 
hypothesize as follows for the case of Switzerland: The number of Swiss politicians’ 
connections and reactions follows a power–law distribution. (H1) 
Another concern regarding social media platforms’ networked public sphere related to 
their tendency toward “more of the same.” Based on the theory of cognitive consistency 
(Festinger, 1957), users tend to select the news items with which they agree (Iyengar & Hahn, 
2009). That is, they create ideological echo chambers (Sunstein, 2009). This might lead to an 
environment in which groups of different echo chambers might be hardly visible to others and 
debates across party lines remain scarce. Indeed, topic-specific echo chambers were found, for 
example, in the run-up to the 2011 Canadian elections (Gruzd & Roy, 2014). However, these 
networks were always flexible and situation-specific; that is, they were not impenetrable 
(Barberá et al., 2015). Because Switzerland is regarded as an ideal type of consensus democracy 
(Lijphart, 1999), actors can be expected to talk and listen to others across ideologies in a 
networked public sphere. The country, however, has four national languages: 63% of the Swiss 
population primarily speaks German, 23% French, 8% Italian, and half a percent Rhaeto-
Romanic (BFS, 2018). Thus, language differences might play a greater role than ideology in 
shaping the network’s structure (Arlt, Rauchfleisch, & Schäfer, 2018). Thus, I expect the 
following: Swiss politicians’ Twittersphere is clustered according to language rather than 
ideology. (H2) 
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To Whom Do Politicians Talk and Listen on Twitter?  
Despite the platform’s characteristics, politicians all over the globe have adopted social media 
platforms—especially Twitter—to connect with the public (Davis et al., 2017). In Switzerland, 
adoption rates of Twitter among MPs rose steadily from 2008 on to 30% in 2012 (Rauchfleisch 
& Metag, 2016). A total of 454 candidates in 2013 and 351 in 2014 used a Twitter account to 
win one of the 222 seats in the Australian parliament (Bruns & Moon, 2018). In the Netherlands, 
96% of all MPs had a Twitter account in 2016 (Spierings et al., 2018).  
Due to Twitter’s character limit for tweets and focus on news, the micro-blogging 
platform was adopted in particular by journalists, politicians, and other rather “elite” accounts 
(Ausserhofer & Maireder, 2013; Metag & Rauchfleisch, 2017). However, the platform can also 
serve as an expansion of the elite: parliamentary backbenchers, bloggers, comedians, and 
independent Twitter users dominated the group of most retweeted Twitter users during a routine 
three-week period in Norway (Rogstad, 2016). Spierings et al. (2018) showed that primarily 
lay citizens addressed Dutch MPs during a routine phase in 2016 (50% of all incoming replies), 
and yet, MPs replied more often to other political actors (26%) and people representing civil 
society and business interests (24%) than to lay citizens (23%), although the differences are 
minimal. Graham et al. (2013) found a different picture for the UK’s MPs during the 2010 
general election campaign: Of the total number of replies by UK’s MPs, 59% were directed to 
the public, accounting for the largest share, followed by other politicians (16%), and journalists 
(10%). Ausserhofer and Maireder (2013) showed that the political Twittersphere in Austria is 
dominated by politicians and journalists; citizens, conversely, played a minor role in the 
discourses. Vaccari and Valeriani (2015) analyzed the followers of the Italian party leaders 
during the 2013 general election and showed that most of their top followers were individuals 
(71%), male (78%), and Italian (62%). A third of those followers were part of the sports, show 
business, popular culture, or arts industry; 22% belonged to the media sector; and 3% were 
comedians (Vaccari & Valeriani, 2015).  
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While these studies focused on the followers or friends of and/or replies by politicians, 
they shed light on only a specific part of the politicians’ Twittersphere. The number of followers 
represents the potential audience but neglects all of those who react to politicians’ tweets yet 
are not followers and may belong to the secondary audience. The politicians’ friends and replies 
reflect the users to whom they have listened but ignore those whose tweets they have liked, 
retweeted, and mentioned. Thus, all four kinds of reactions need to be taken into account to 
assess the public sphere of politicians: When users reply and, thus, interact with someone; 
retweet a tweet to redistribute it; mention someone, which notifies and links to the mentioned 
user; and like a tweet to show support for or at least acknowledge a message (see also Larsson, 
2017). These connections and reactions are used bidirectionally. To assess the politicians’ 
Twittersphere, both the incoming connections (followers) and reactions (e.g., if a user retweets 
a politician’s tweet) and outgoing connections (friends) and reactions (e.g., if a politician 
retweets a user’s tweet) need to be analyzed.  
Incoming connections and reactions indicate who possibly receives the politician’s 
tweets and actively spreads his or her messages. They reflect the (active) audience of a politician 
and stand for the users to whom he or she talks. Due to the platform’s logic (Klinger & 
Svensson, 2015), it is in the interest of a politician to attract a large number of followers who 
will actively spread his or her messages to their respective networks (Keller & Kleinen-von 
Königslöw, 2018a). The higher the number of reactions to a tweet, the larger the audience it 
reaches (Karlsen & Enjolras, 2016; Klinger & Svensson, 2015). However, politicians might 
also benefit if highly influential accounts follow them and spread the politicians’ messages to 
their networks. For example, the “top followers” of the Italian party leaders are celebrities who, 
if they retweeted a politician’s tweet, might reach lay citizens who might otherwise not engage 
with politics (Vaccari & Valeriani, 2015). Whether politicians’ tweets reach a large audience 
or highly influential accounts, mere exposure to them has been shown to result in a more 
positive attitude toward the politicians and leads to a heightened feeling of social presence, in 
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turn causing a favorable impression and stronger voting intentions (Kobayashi & Ichifuji, 2015; 
Lee & Jang, 2013; Lee & Shin, 2014). It remains unknown, however, whether Swiss politicians 
reach potential voters—as opposed to only other political actors, such as party accounts—and 
who spreads the politicians’ tweets. Consequently, I ask: To whom do Swiss politicians talk on 
Twitter? (RQ1) 
Outgoing connections and reactions indicate to whom politicians listen. Listening is a 
concept that is seldom under investigation, although its role in increasing legitimacy and 
improving understanding between politicians and citizens is as important as that of talking 
(Dobson, 2012). To listen, MPs follow other users. The news that MPs find in their news feed 
serves as a proxy for public opinion (Jungherr, 2016). However, they neither follow a 
representative sample of the Swiss population, which Twitter could not provide (Hargittai, 
2018), nor does a random sample of tweets end up in their news feed. They might specifically 
select whom they follow. Thus, politicians see very different news feeds on Twitter, depending 
on whom they follow, to which tweets their networks react, and finally, which tweets Twitter’s 
algorithm selects for them. They also react selectively to tweets and, thus, amplify them. If they 
retweet a lesser-known actor, he or she benefits from the followership of the politician. For 
example, during the SOPA–PIPA debate, a variety of individuals on the periphery played a 
crucial role when they were amplified by more visible actors (Benkler et al., 2015). Whereas 
MPs in the Netherlands listened primarily to actors close to the political system, UK’s MPs 
replied most often to the public (Graham et al., 2013; Spierings et al., 2018). Thus, I ask, To 
whom do Swiss politicians listen on Twitter? (RQ2) 
 
The Case of Switzerland 
Although the Swiss case has unique specifics, Switzerland is overall a comparable case 
regarding Internet penetration, as well as the role of Twitter in political communication and its 
political system: In general, nine out of ten members of the Swiss population (8.42 million) use 
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the Internet. A total of 16% of the Swiss population use Twitter, and 8% publish tweets actively 
(Latzer, Büchi, Festic, & Just, 2017). Twitter’s role in Switzerland, as in other countries, is 
characterized by its focus on the news (Levy, Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, & Nielsen, 
2018; Metag & Rauchfleisch, 2017). Switzerland’s political system is a multiparty system with 
a two-chamber parliament and a government coalition. In 2018, the members of eleven parties 
were represented in the parliament. With 69 representatives, the right-wing party SVP has the 
strongest representation in parliament, followed by the left-wing party SP (55); the liberal party 
FDP (46); the conservative party CVP (40); the Green party (12); the liberal center party BDP 
(8); and the green liberal party GLP (7). Two parties are represented by only two people (the 
right-wing party Lega and the conservative Protestant party EVP) and three by one person (the 
left-wing party PdA, the conservative party CSPO, and the right-wing party MCR).  
Three principles make the Swiss case stand out: the consensus principle, the militia 
system, and direct democracy (e.g., see Kriesi, 2008). First, parties from opposite sides work 
according to the consensus principle: For example, the Federal Council serves as the executive 
head of the government and consists of seven people, with members representing the left, 
center, and right parties. This is one reason why negative campaigning did not gain traction in 
Switzerland and political parties look for consensus across different ideologies (Keller & 
Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2018b). Second, Swiss politicians work in a militia system. 
Traditionally, politicians such as MPs worked on a volunteer basis, which meant that politics 
was their part-time job. Although this still holds true in principle, most MPs have become 
professional politicians. However, because the militia system is a key tradition in many parts 
of the Swiss (political) system (e.g., military), politicians are expected to be part of the industry 
and to keep close to the people. Another outcome of the militia system is that Swiss parties and 
the MPs themselves are less professionalized than in other countries. They have fewer 
resources, and their jobs are oftentimes undertaken on a volunteer basis. This is why most 
politicians have no professional support for running their social media accounts. This makes 
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the Swiss case especially interesting because MPs run their social media accounts by 
themselves. Third, the national parliament constitutes itself four times per year for three weeks 
in “sessions” to meet, debate, vote, and hand in parliamentary submissions. Because 
Switzerland is a direct democracy, Swiss citizens are called to the ballot box to vote for or 
against a referendum three to four times per year, which is why MPs try to stay close to the 
people.  
 
Methods 
The starting point of the study built the 156 (63%) Twitter accounts among the total 246 
members of the Swiss parliament on the first day of the fall session (September 10th–28th, 
2018) which were identified manually via Twitter search. Using the “rtweet” package (Kearney, 
2018), I downloaded all the followers and friends of the MPs (i.e., the users whom the MPs 
follow), including their profile descriptions, during the last two weeks of September. To 
ascertain who MPs reply to, retweet, mention, and like, all the timelines and liked tweets of 
each MP were downloaded, including the users’ profile descriptions. To determine who 
mentioned, replied to, or retweeted an MP, all tweets containing a political actor’s Twitter 
handle were downloaded via the search API, which also included the users’ Twitter profile 
descriptions. Due to Twitter’s API restriction, it was impossible to download information on 
who liked an MP’s tweet. Because of a few accounts’ privacy settings and the fact that some 
accounts were already removed from Twitter, the profile descriptions of 73 accounts (8 
accounts to which an MP replied, 17 to which an MP retweeted, and 48 to which an MP 
mentioned) could not be retrieved. In total, 129,063 unique accounts were identified and their 
account information downloaded. 
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Classification Categories 
An MP’s public sphere on Twitter consists of a variety of actors (Graham et al., 2013; 
Spierings et al., 2018; Vaccari & Valeriani, 2015). From an ideal–typical point of view, these 
actors can be categorized into four communicative stages in regard to politics: assert, aggregate, 
or articulate political interests – or report about politics (Jarren & Donges, 2011).  
The first group of actors asserts political interests at the local, regional, or national level. 
These actors are executive politicians, such as members of the federal council, mayors, or 
ministers. The second group consists of political parties and (non-MP) elected politicians. These 
actors have close ties to the political system and executive politicians. However, their main goal 
is to aggregate the political interests of their electorates. The third group comprises individuals 
and organizations that articulate their interests. These are NPOs, NGOs, or social movements 
(social organizations); profit-oriented businesses (private industry); the representatives of such 
organizations (e.g., leaders) or businesses (e.g., CEOs) or board members, scientists (e.g., 
professors, researchers, and universities), celebrities (e.g., comedians or sports personalities), 
and citizens (e.g., self-described citizens). The fourth group is composed of media organizations 
and journalists, who function as intermediates and commentators. These are bloggers, 
commentators, columnists, editors, and other people who are affiliated with news companies 
(Jarren & Donges, 2011).  
Two actor-specific actors invade political discussions: spam accounts that try to sell or 
promote their products using trending hashtags (Ausserhofer & Maireder, 2013) and automated 
programs called social bots, which imitate humans and human behavior (Davis, Varol, Ferrara, 
Flammini, & Menczer, 2016) 
 
Semi-Automated Twitter Account Analysis 
The semi-automated content analysis of Twitter profiles started with an automated, 
dictionary-based analysis. The unit of analysis was each user’s profile description and URL. 
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Following the approach and keyword lists of Spierings et al. (2018), I first generated lists of 
keywords and account handles for each category: The list of MPs was generated manually by 
searching for each MP on Twitter. The keyword lists of ministers and executive members of 
parliament (executive politicians), political parties, former and foreign politicians (non-MP and 
other politicians), and Swiss and other European media outlets stemmed from own previous 
research. I used the Twitter search to identify individual journalists who were affiliated with 
news companies, and I added them to the list of journalists. Lists containing various nonprofit 
and nongovernmental organizations, as well as social movements and their leaders (social 
organizations), profit-oriented businesses and their leaders (private industry), and celebrity and 
satire accounts were each manually created by searching accounts via the Twitter search and 
political hashtags. A list of keywords indicating the private use of Twitter, such as “citizen,” 
“father,” or “mother,” was used to identify citizens and other individuals. The list of spam and 
advertisement keywords was based on an Keller and Klinger’s study (Keller & Klinger, 2018). 
No keyword list of social bots was created because I relied on Botometer to test all 129,063 
accounts (Davis et al., 2016) (see Appendix A). 
The keyword lists were used to identify accounts by their public Twitter descriptions 
and Twitter screen names. Of the 129,063 accounts, only 70,589 had at least a description or a 
URL by which they could be identified. The other 58,474 were omitted from the analysis. After 
running the identification process, all accounts belonging to each category were checked 
manually by asking the following questions: Is the account classified correctly? If not, which 
keyword needs to be removed or adapted? A manual analysis of (a sample of) the results was 
conducted after each run. After several runs neither improved the number nor the correct 
classification, the automated analysis ended with 51% (36,243 accounts) identified (see 
Appendix B).  
Testing the reliability of the automated analysis, a second experienced coder classified 
a sample of 90 accounts containing at least 10 accounts from each category (most accounts fell 
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into multiple categories). The results showed satisfactory agreement (at least a Krippendorff’s 
alpha value above 0.79 for all categories). To test the validity of the automated analysis, the 
coder double-checked the classification of each account in a sample of 180 accounts, including 
at least 20 accounts from each category. At least 99.93% of positives per category were 
classified correctly.  
The automated classification may include biases because the keywords were based on 
the author’s and other researchers’ lists and not all users describe themselves using the same 
words; therefore, manual content analysis was also conducted. A stratified random sample of 
150 accounts per category (e.g., replies and retweets, total N = 1,287 accounts) was drawn from 
all the accounts that could not be classified automatically. The author and the trained coder 
conducted the manual content analysis. Each account’s Twitter screen name, description, and 
profile URL (if necessary, its linked content) were analyzed. The same categories that were 
used for the automated analysis were used for this process. Following Spierings et al. (2018), 
the results from the manual content analysis were extrapolated to the unclassified accounts, and 
the classification was used hierarchically to ensure the clear identification of actors (see 
Appendix C).  
 
Results 
The power–law distribution of attention with regard to the number of followers, friends, 
and tweets is striking. Only a small number of MPs have the most followers and friends, while 
most MPs have only a few followers (median = 1.545, mean = 3.501, max. = 46,004, min. = 
37) and friends (median = 314, mean = 591, max. = 4,570, min. = 0). Together, the three MPs 
with the most followers (Cédric Wermuth [SP]: 46,004 followers, Natalie Rickli [SVP]: 45,317, 
and Christian Levrat [SP] 33,802) have 23% of all followers, which is two to three times as 
many followers as the subsequent MPs combined  (Balthasar Glättli [Greens]: 17,876 and 
Jacqueline Badran [SP]: 16,055). The MP with the most followers also has more than the 68 
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MPs with the least number of followers combined. The same power–law distribution also 
applies to friends, although it is less extreme: Marco Romano (CVP) has the most friends, with 
4,570, which amounts to more than the 53 MPs with the fewest friends combined.  
At the level of tweets, the power–law distribution of attention dominates again (see 
Table 2). Roger Köppel (SVP) received the most incoming reactions: more than two third of all 
retweets (67%: 4,922 of 7,311), more than a third of all mentions (37%: 6,510 of 17,724), and 
more than a fourth of all replies (28%: 2,256 of 7,997). The MP with the second-most incoming 
reactions did not receive half as many as Roger Köppel. Although the same power–law 
distribution is shown to be true for outgoing reactions, Roger Köppel does not appear at the top. 
Claudio Zanetti (SVP) replied most often (26%: 186 of 710), retweeted most often (24%: 638 
of 2,702), and mentioned most often (21%: 675 of 3,190). Again, the MP who reacted to others 
most often was not half as active as Claudio Zanetti. Although less unequal, the same power–
law distribution is visible for likes: While Maya Graf (Greens) liked the most tweets, with 322, 
this figure accounts for only 6% of all likes (5,617). The likes of the 13 subsequent MPs each 
account for at least 3%. Overall, only a few MPs talk and listen to multiple times more users 
than most others. Thus, the Swiss MPs’ network is strongly characterized by a power–law 
distribution of attention (support for H1).  
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Table 1.  
Summary of MPs’ Networks, Numbers of Users Reacting to MPs’ Tweets, and Numbers of MPs 
Reacting to Users’ Tweets 
  
Unique 
users 
Mean 
users 
per MP 
Median 
users 
per MP 
Max. 
users  
per MP 
Min. 
users 
per MP 
Followers  117,393 3,501 1,545 46,004 37 
Friends  29,730 591 314 4.570 0 
Incoming Replies 2,506 37 10 961 1 
Incoming Retweets 2,821 52 11 1.768 1 
Incoming Mentions 4,976 66 24 2.167 1 
Outgoing Replies 396 7 2 102 1 
Outgoing Retweets 1033 16 7 329 1 
Outgoing Mentions 1510 32 15 415 1 
Outgoing Likes 1,843 33 17 187 1 
Note. A total of 156 MPs with Twitter accounts were included, of which 146 were replied to, 
65 were retweeted, and 155 were mentioned. A total of 73 MPs replied, 108 retweeted, 113 
mentioned, and 111 liked at least once. The number of unique users includes users without 
descriptions/profile URLs. 
 
Table 2.  
Summary of MPs’ Network, Number of Users Reacting to an MP’s Tweet, and Number of MPs’ 
Reacting to Users’ Tweets 
  
Sum of 
tweets 
Mean  
tweets  
per MP 
Median  
tweets  
per MP 
Max. 
tweets 
per MP 
Min.  
tweets 
per MP 
Incoming Replies 10,490 51 9 2,256 0 
Incoming Retweets 7,997 69 5 4,922 0 
Incoming Mentions 17,724 114 25 6,510 0 
Outgoing Replies 710 5 2 186 0 
Outgoing Retweets 2,702 17 4 638 0 
Outgoing Mentions 3,190 20 4 675 0 
Outgoing Likes 5,617 36 8 322 0 
Note. The note for Table 1 also applies here.  
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The reply network created using Gephi illustrates the power–law distribution of attention 
whether MPs react across party lines and overcome language barriers. Overall, the reply 
network of the Swiss MPs has a size of 2,956 nodes and 5,782 edges (density of 0.001; average 
path length of 5.3). The network has three distinct clusters (see Figure 1a and Appendix D).  
The largest distance is due to differences in language rather than ideology. Whereas the 
cluster on the left revolves around Francophone MPs, the cluster in the middle and on the right 
reflect German-speaking MPs. However, these clusters differ minimally by ideology. The key 
MPs in the French-speaking group are Philippe Nantermod from the liberal party FDP and Ada 
Marra from the left party SP. Both received more than 29 replies and replied more than nine 
times. The cluster, however, consists of MPs representing different ideologies—for example, 
from the liberal party (e.g., Isabelle Moret), Green party (e.g., Adèle Thorens), green liberal 
party (e.g., Isabelle Chevalley), conservative center party CVP (e.g., Guillaume Barazzone), 
and left party SP (Liliane Maury Pasquier). The two mostly German-speaking groups are 
divided due to a single Twitter user on the bottom right: right-wing MP Roger Köppel (SVP). 
Although he entered the political arena as a politician only recently, in 2015, he is well known 
due to his ownership of and articles in his weekly (political) magazine and his public talks. The 
main topics of his talks and his tweets relate to immigration, Islam, and Switzerland’s non-
membership of the European Union. Although SVP member Claudio Zanetti has a similar 
stance and agenda, he is in the midst of political discourses with MPs from other parties. He is 
the MP with the most outgoing replies, followed by Balthasar Glättli (Greens) and Gerhard 
Pfister (CVP). They are all part of the large middle cluster alongside politicians from the left, 
such as Cédric Wermuth (SP); from among the liberals, such as Petra Gössi (FDP); from the 
middle, such as Elisabeth Schneider-Schneiter (CVP); and from the right, such as Natalie Rickli 
(SVP). It can, thus, be stated that Swiss MPs debate across party ideologies and that the 
distinctions between the clusters is due to their different languages rather than to their ideologies 
(thereby supporting H2).  
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Figure 1a. Reply network of Swiss MPs’ Twittersphere during the fall session of 2018. 
 
Figure 1b. Reply network of Swiss MPs’ with lay citizens during the fall session 2018. 
Note. Twitter screen names are shown for only the MPs with an indegree (incoming replies) 
larger than or equal to 30 and an outdegree (outgoing replies) larger than or equal to 10. The 
larger the node, the greater its indegree, and the darker the node, the greater its outdegree. The 
network shows only the center of the graph, which was created using the “ForceAtlas 2” 
algorithm in Gephi.  
 
 
The qualitative analysis of the networks revealed no substantial differences between the 
clusters with regard to the groups of actors involved (see Appendix D for additional network 
analyses). For example, if only connections between MPs and lay citizens are shown, the reply 
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network still has all three clusters and shows a similar distribution of edges (see Figure 1b). 
This is why the MPs from the three clusters were reaggregated to determine to whom MPs talk 
and listen.  
Swiss MPs talk primarily to lay citizens, who account for over a third of all of their 
followers (37%) (see Table 3). The second-largest group is composed of social bots, which are, 
in this case, mostly inactive accounts (see Appendix B). The third-largest share comprises 
journalists (11%), followed by scientists (5%), and accounts representing private industry (4%). 
Those who not only follow but also actively spread MPs’ tweets again mostly comprise lay 
citizens, followed by journalists, individuals representing the interests of private industry, and 
non-MP politicians and other political accounts. More specifically, lay citizens’ replies, 
retweets, and mentions account for 52% of all incoming reactions and are, thus, vital multipliers 
for Swiss MPs. Of all the incoming reactions, 15% are from individuals who were close to the 
political system, such as executive politicians and political parties, as well as other political 
accounts. MPs also reply, retweet, and mention each other. However, their tweets account for 
only 2% of incoming reactions. The third-most active group comprises users from private 
industry or social organizations (11%). They are closely followed by users from the media 
sector: Of all the reactions that Swiss MPs received, 10% were from individual journalists, and 
merely 1% came from the accounts of media organizations. Other groups such as board 
members, scientists, or celebrities and comedians sent 7%. Thus, Swiss MPs’ multipliers are 
mostly lay citizens. However, inactive accounts, accounts run by journalists, and other political 
accounts make up for another large share of their (active) followers (RQ1).  
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Table 3.  
Swiss MPs’ Connections, Incoming Reactions, and Outgoing Reactions with Other Twitter 
Users 
 Followers Friends 
MPs 137 (0.2%) 140 (0.6%) 
Executive politicians 1,487 (2.5%) 972 (3.9%) 
Political parties 487 (0.8%) 466 (1.9%) 
(Non-MP) political accounts 1,177 (2.0%) 1,016 (4.1%) 
Media accounts 122 (0.2%) 425 (1.7%) 
Journalists 6,844 (11.4%) 4,374 (17.6%) 
Social organizations 2,150 (3.6%) 1,151 (4.6%) 
Private industry 2,609 (4.4%) 1,804 (7.3%) 
Board members 997 (1.7%) 748 (3.0%) 
Scientists 2,756 (4.6%) 1,417 (5.7%) 
Satire and celebrities 188 (0.3%) 268 (1.1%) 
Lay citizens  21,883 (36.5%) 9,407 (37.8%) 
Spam and advertisements 787 (1.3%) 274 (1.1%) 
Social bots 18,373 (30.6%) 2,404 (9.7%) 
N 59,997 24,868 
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Table 3 (continued). 
 Incoming 
Replies 
Incoming  
Retweets 
Incoming  
Mentions 
MPs 40 (2.0%) 50 (2.2%) 86 (2.1%) 
Executive politicians 79 (4.0%) 63 (2.8%) 140 (3.4%) 
Political parties 65 (3.3%) 70 (3.1%) 154 (3.8%) 
(Non-MP) political accounts 129 (6.5%) 167 (7.4%) 364 (8.8%) 
Media accounts 13 (0.7%) 40 (1.8%) 67 (1.6%) 
Journalists 207 (10.4%) 142 (6.3%) 450 (11.0%) 
Social organizations 85 (4.3%) 86 (3.8%) 282 (6.8%) 
Private industry 139 (7.0%) 144 (6.4%) 211 (5.1%) 
Board members 17 (0.9%) 36 (1.6%) 47 (1.1%) 
Scientists 127 (6.4%) 80 (3.6%) 189 (4.6%) 
Satire and celebrities 67 (3.4%) 20 (0.9%) 18 (0.4%) 
Lay citizens  985 (49.5%) 1.297 (57.7%) 2.030 (49.3%) 
Spam and advertisements 18 (0.9%) 12 (0.5%) 2 (0.1%) 
Social bots 19 (1.0%) 41 (1.8%) 81 (2.0%) 
N 1,991 2,246 4,121 
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Table 3 (continued). 
 Outgoing  
Replies 
Outgoing 
Retweets 
Outgoing  
Mentions 
Outgoing 
Likes 
MPs 37 (10.1%) 63 (6.3%) 105 (7.2%) 85 (4.9%) 
Executive politicians 24 (6.5%) 79 (8.0%) 138 (9.5%) 161 (9.3%) 
Political parties 10 (2.7%) 56 (5.6%) 114 (7.9%) 93 (5.4%) 
(Non-MP) political accounts 40 (11.0%) 124 (12.5%) 168 (11.5%) 192 (11.1%) 
Media accounts 10 (2.7%) 66 (6.7%) 140 (9.6%) 85 (4.9%) 
Journalists 84 (23.0%) 193 (19.0%) 226 (15.6%) 303 (18.0%) 
Social organizations 18 (4.8%) 133 (13.0%) 196 (13.5%) 158 (9.1%) 
Private industry 20 (5.5%) 38 (3.8%) 99 (6.8%) 100 (5.8%) 
Board members 6 (1.6%) 28 (2.8%) 42 (2.9%) 61 (3.5%) 
Scientists 15 (4.2%) 41 (4.2%) 64 (4.4%) 93 (5.4%) 
Satire and celebrities 4 (1.0%) 12 (1.2%) 24 (1.7%) 31 (1.8%) 
Lay citizens  96 (26.1%) 154 (15.5%) 121 (8.3%) 361 (21.0%) 
Spam and advertisements 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
Social bots 3 (0.8%) 6 (0.6%) 15 (1.0%) 9 (0.5%) 
N 366 993 1,452 1,732 
Note. N refers to all unique users with either a description or profile URL. This number may 
vary from the sum of all the extrapolated single numbers because the latter were rounded. 
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MPs connect with similar groups that follow them and, thus, show interest in listening 
to them. The largest share of the Swiss MPs’ friends are lay citizens (38%), followed by 
journalists (18%), social bots (i.e., mostly inactive accounts) (10%), and individuals 
representing private industry (7%). However, MPs do not react to these groups as often as they 
follow them. Although they most often reply and like (and second-most often retweet) tweets 
from lay citizens (26%, 21%, and 16%, respectively), if aggregated, they reacted most often to 
individuals who are close to the political system, such as other MPs and executive politicians, 
as well as political parties and other political accounts (32% of all outgoing reactions). Second 
most often, the MPs’ reactions addressed journalists and media accounts (25%). Accounts 
further away from the political system were included less often in MPs’ tweets: lay citizens 
were included in 18% of their tweets, social organizations and accounts representing the private 
industry were included in 16%, and other individual accounts—such as those of board members 
and scientists, as well as satire and celebrity accounts—were included in 9%. Thus, Swiss MPs 
connect with many lay citizens but reply, retweet, and like them less often than other politicians 
and journalists on Twitter (RQ2).  
 
Discussion 
From the perspective of public sphere theories, this study focused on how the network 
characteristics shape who politicians talk and listen to on Twitter. Overall, the politicians’ 
networked public sphere showed strong signs of a power–law distribution of attention. Twitter’s 
algorithm seems to favor the visibility of tweets and individuals who already received a great 
deal of attention. This favors only very few politicians who might crowd out other actors and 
opinions in the public sphere. However, the network did not indicate ideological echo chambers 
but, rather, language clusters. That is, the network characteristics did not hinder politicians from 
engaging in discussions across party lines; rather, the limitation was due to their language skills.  
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However, the platform’s characteristics did not seem to affect who politicians talk and 
listen to. The Swiss MPs were strongly connected with lay citizens, who accounted for more 
than a third of their followers and friends. As actors who are far away from the political center, 
lay citizens also played a vital role in spreading and reacting to political messages: They 
accounted for almost 58% of all retweets by MPs. Although MPs have the most connections to 
lay citizens, they reacted most often to users who are close to the political system, such as 
journalists and individuals running other political accounts: Of all the MPs’ replies, 10% were 
directed toward other MPs and every fourth toward someone from the media sector. That is, 
MPs connect with and benefit from lay citizens on the political periphery, as they serve as 
multipliers on Twitter; however, MPs’ tweets are more focused on other politicians and 
journalists. 
Although the focus of this study is on Switzerland, it is mostly in line with previous 
research regarding the network characteristics and actors in the Twittersphere of other 
countries. The network showed the power–law distributions of the numbers of connections and 
reactions. Regarding followers on various social media platforms (Nielsen & Vaccari, 2013), 
only very few Swiss MPs receive most attention. Additionally, the same language clusters were 
evident in the three-week period as during the national discussion about the Nuclear Withdrawal 
Initiative in 2016 (Arlt et al., 2018).  
As in the research conducted by Spierings et al. (2018), this study focused on a routine 
phase and included whom MPs follow and @-mention: As for the Netherlands’ MPs, lay 
citizens mostly reply to Swiss MPs, but MPs reply more often to other political accounts. 
Additionally, both countries’ MPs often retweet other political accounts and users from the 
media sector. However, while only 13% of the individuals in the Netherland’s MPs’ friends 
network consisted of lay citizens and almost never retweet them (Spierings et al., 2018), Swiss 
lay citizens account for over a third of Swiss MPs’ friends and are the group that is retweeted 
the third most often. Thus, although both countries’ MPs have similar networks and focus on 
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actors who are close to the political system (and the media), lay citizens are more often 
amplified by MPs in Switzerland than in the Netherlands. While these two studies focused on 
a routine period, Graham et al. (2013) focused on a campaign period. In that time, the UK’s 
MPs replied to 59% of all replies to members of the public, which is far less often than the 
replies to other politicians (16%) and journalists (10%). It might, thus, be that the Swiss MPs 
would reply even more often to lay citizens during the election period than in the routine phase. 
Valeriani and Vaccari (2015) analyzed the Italian party leaders’ followers during the 2013 
national election and found that most “top followers” were celebrities. However, in 
Switzerland, only very few celebrities were found in the routine period, and in addition, they 
did not have the most followers themselves. Again, it may be that celebrities with large 
followerships enter the political debate during election phases, thereby having a strong impact 
on the elections; however, this was not the case in the routine period under investigation.  
The deviating results can be explained by three specifics related to Switzerland. The 
country’s traditional militia system and direct democracy require Swiss MPs to stay close to 
the public. Indeed, even in a nonelection phase, Swiss MPs often connect and react to lay 
citizens: more than every fourth reply is directed to a lay citizen, and every fifth liked tweet is 
from a lay citizen. These reactions indicate that Swiss MPs read lay citizens’ tweets and engage 
in discussions with them, which might pay off. An MP’s replies may, in return, yield substantial 
goodwill, such as the increased intention to vote for him or her (Lee & Shin, 2012; Tromble, 
2018). Even if MPs only like lay citizens’ tweets, this might increase the citizens’ goodwill 
because it will show that the MP read, liked, and possibly agreed with the tweet and generally 
keeps close to users who are on the political periphery.  
This study has its limitations. Although the three-week period covered a representative 
routine phase of Swiss politics, it is not the only time that MPs need to talk and listen to groups 
on the political periphery, such as lay citizens. Apart from local and national elections, citizens 
are called to the ballots three to four times per year to have the final say on national votes. MPs 
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could play a crucial role in persuading citizens to vote yes or no in these votes – simply by 
amplifying other minor actors (Benkler et al., 2015). Additionally, the study did not focus on 
the content of tweets. Tromble (2018) found that politicians tend to go silent upon receiving 
negative replies, which might also be the case in Switzerland. Furthermore, because of Twitter’s 
API restrictions, it was not possible to ascertain who liked the MPs’ tweets. Because “likes” is 
the most used reaction, it remains unknown whether the groups close to the political system or 
those further away from it account for the largest number of those who like MPs tweets. 
Especially in the cases in which the number of reactions is used as an indicator of public opinion 
(Jungherr, 2016), it would be crucial to know whether this number reflects the views of the 
public or simply those of many politicians.   
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Supplemental materials 
 
A. Distribution of Botometer scores of the identified accounts 
Botometer generates over 1,200 features from a Twitter user (Davis et al., 2016). These 
can be grouped into network, user, friend, temporal, content, and sentiment features (Varol, 
Ferrara, Davis, Menczer, & Flammini, 2017). The tool calculates a probability score to indicate 
whether an account belongs to a human or a bot. Figure A1 shows the distribution of Botometer 
scores in the form of a density plot. A total of 361 accounts could not be analyzed because they 
had either been removed, had been set to “private,” or had never produced a tweet (Keller 
& Klinger, 2018). The threshold for being a bot was set conservatively at 0.76  (Keller 
& Klinger, 2018)—that is, users with scores above this threshold were classified as bots. 
Surprisingly, many accounts were labeled as bots, given their high Botometer scores 
(59,567 accounts with a probability greater than 76%) or even the more conservative CAP 
scores (55,233 accounts with a probability greater than 50%). The intersection of both scores 
revealed that 55,233 accounts had a high probability of being automated accounts.  
Undertaking a closer look at these bots, this finding points to the difficulty associated 
with the use of bot-detection tools: Bots account for 56% of all followers and 20% of friends 
but only 1% of active accounts. This indicates that bot accounts did not enter the political 
debates and were inactive during the fall session in 2018. Most of the active bots (N = 130) 
seldom tweeted (median = 2), indicating that despite the display of bot-like behavior, false 
positives were returned in this case. These were accounts that produced only a few tweets. Only 
two accounts were very active: one focused on US politics and the other one on pictures and 
videos of animals and landscapes. That is, although numerous accounts did receive a high 
probability score, suggesting that they were bots, these were mostly inactive accounts, and the 
few active bots did not engage in political debates. Thus, bots did not affect the political debates 
during the fall session in 2018.  
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Figure A1. Distribution of the Botometer scores/CAP scores of the identified accounts. 
Note. N = 128.342, bandwidth = nrd0 
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B. Summary statistics of the automated classification 
The automated analysis classified 51% (36,243 accounts) of all accounts with either a 
description or a URL. The analysis could classify only 33% of all users retweeting an MP and 
38% of users replying to an MP, but 68% of MPs addressed users in outgoing replies and 64% 
in outgoing retweets.  
 
Table B1.  
Summary Statistics of the Automated Classification 
 Total users 
(unique) 
With 
description or 
URL 
Automatically 
classified  
Followers  117,393 59,996 (51%) 32,683 (54%) 
Friends  29,909 24,867 (83%) 11,801 (47%) 
Incoming Replies 2,506 1,991 (79%) 760 (38%) 
Incoming Retweets 2,821 2,246 (80%) 749 (33%) 
Incoming Mentions 4,976 4,120 (83%) 1,742 (42%) 
Outgoing Replies 396 366 (96%) 248 (68%) 
Outgoing Retweets 1,033 993 (96%) 636 (64%) 
Outgoing Mentions 1,510 1,452 (96%) 897 (62%) 
Outgoing Likes 1,843 1,732 (94%) 1,073 (62%) 
N 129,063 70,589 36,243 
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C. Comparison between hierarchical and nonhierarchical classification  
Twitter users may fall into multiple groups. For example, one MP is a journalist and the 
CEO of a media outlet. Although it is interesting to compare how individuals represent different 
groups, in order to clearly categorize users into one group, the results were classified 
hierarchically (from top to bottom), following previous research (Spierings et al., 2018).  
 The largest difference resulting from the hierarchical classification occurred for the 
category of social bots (-9%). While many inactive accounts were labeled as bots and belong 
to followers, they could also be classified into other categories. The hierarchical classification 
also led to almost 4% fewer citizens. However, because almost all individual groups encompass 
citizens, this makes the results clearer. The difference of almost -3% of non-MP political 
accounts is based on the latter refinement of the political categories: The keywords of executive 
politicians and political parties were still included in the list of non-MP political accounts, 
which is why they were counted twice in the nonhierarchical classification.  
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Table C1.  
Comparison of Automated Classification Results Based on Multiple Classification and 
Hierarchical Classification Processes  
 
 Nonhierarchical Hierarchical Difference 
MPs 141 (0.39%) 141 (0.39%) 0 (0%) 
Executive politicians 793 (2.19%) 788 (2.17%) 5 (0.01%) 
Political parties 125 (0.34%) 123 (0.34%) 2 (0.01%) 
(Non-MP) political accounts 1,869 (5.16%) 939 (2.59%) 930 (2.57%) 
Media accounts 185 (0.51%) 183 (0.5%) 2 (0.01%) 
Journalists 6,044 (16.68%) 5,782 (15.95%) 262 (0.72%) 
Social organizations 755 (2.08%) 650 (1.79%) 105 (0.29%) 
Private industry 2,845 (7.85%) 2,419 (6.67%) 426 (1.18%) 
Board members 1,293 (3.57%) 850 (2.35%) 443 (1.22%) 
Scientists 4,275 (11.8%) 3,329 (9.19%) 946 (2.61%) 
Satire and celebrities 15 (0.04%) 9 (0.02%) 6 (0.02%) 
Citizens  3,702 (10.21%) 2,278 (6.29%) 1,424 (3.93%) 
Spam and advertisements 92 (0.25%) 69 (0.19%) 23 (0.06%) 
Social bots 21,912 (60.46%) 18,683 (51.55%) 3,229 (8.91%) 
N (unique) 36,243 36,243  
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D. Additional Network Analysis 
I used the Louvain algorithm in Gephi to identify the communities that guide the 
analysis of the reply network structure. The red cluster on the right side accounts for 26% of 
the entire network, the green on the left 11%, and the blue in the middle the remaining 63%.  
 
 
Figure D1. Three clusters in the reply network. 
Note. The network shows only the center of the graph, which was created using the “ForceAtlas 
2” algorithm in Gephi. 
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The reply network’s cluster structure remains robust, even when only journalists and 
MPs are included (see Figure D2). 
 
 
Figure D2. Reply network of MPs and journalists during the fall session of 2018. 
Note. Twitter screen names are shown only for MPs with an indegree (incoming replies) that is 
larger than or equal to 30 and an outdegree (outgoing replies) that is larger than or equal to 10. 
The larger the node, the greater its indegree, and the darker the node, the greater its outdegree. 
The network shows only the center of the graph, which was created using the “ForceAtlas 2” 
algorithm in Gephi. 
 
Overall, no cluster of the reply network had extraordinarily more contact with people 
further away from the political system than any other. Although numerous replies were sent 
from MPs to other MPs and other political accounts close to the political system (red), 
journalists (green), lay citizens (dark blue), and others (e.g., pink refers to social movements 
and private industry) are also a vital component of each cluster (see Figure C2). 
The retweet network shows a similar picture to the reply network but with three notable 
differences (see Figure C3): First, although Roger Köppel (SVP) again has his own cluster (the 
large one on the very left), Claudio Zanetti (SVP) is closer to his party colleague (the smaller 
cluster in the middle) than to the cluster on the right side. Due to their similar ideological 
positions, they possibly attract a similar audience who retweets them. Second, the other cluster 
now consists of the French-, Italian-, and German-speaking MPs. While MPs hardly replied to 
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the Francophone MPs, they retweeted them more often. Perhaps it is easier for them to retweet 
tweets in other languages than to reply in a different language. Third, the reply cluster on the 
right side is dominated by users close to the political system (red), while Köppel’s (and, to a 
lesser degree, Zanetti’s) cluster is far less dominated by them. Although many accounts were 
not analyzed (marked gray in the figures), the two SVP MPs retweeted and were retweeted by 
more lay citizens than the other MPs. Overall, the retweet network differs from the reply 
network in that the former has no clear distinction by language but, rather, is distinguished by 
Roger Köppel, Claudio Zanetti (both right-wing members of the right-wing party SVP), and the 
rest. This might indicate that the outer right-wing MPs detach themselves from the others, while 
the others continue to engage in retweeting across party lines (including MPs from right-wing 
parties).  
 
  
Figure D3. Reply network of Swiss MPs on Twitter during the fall session in 2018.  
Note. Red = MPs and other groups close to the political system; green = media and journalists’ 
accounts; light blue = board members, scientists, and celebrities; pink = social movements and 
private industry; dark blue = lay citizens; and gray = accounts not analyzed. 
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Figure D4. Retweet network of Swiss MPs on Twitter during the fall session in 2018  
Note. Red = MPs and other groups close to the political system; green = media and journalists’ 
accounts; light blue = board members, scientists, and celebrities; pink = social movements and 
private industry; dark blue = lay citizens; and gray = accounts not analyzed. 
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Abstract 
Political actors are adapting their communication styles to the network media logic of social 
media platforms with varying success. This study investigates the communication styles used 
during the Swiss national election 2015 and their success in triggering digital reactions. In a 
quantitative content analysis of the “top 20” most reacted to messages on Facebook (n = 2170) 
and Twitter (N = 1796) of 246 Swiss parliamentarians and 11 parties we analyzed the impact 
of a pseudo-discursive, mobilizing, emotional and entertaining communication style. Whereas 
the pseudo-discursive style is the most common on both platforms, it leads on Facebook to 
fewer interactions. The entertaining style fosters reactions on Facebook but not on Twitter. 
Though the emotional style is used the least, it is the most beneficial. The paper concludes by 
discussing how these four communication styles alter communication between political actors 
and citizens. 
 
KEYWORDS: Political communication, Facebook, Twitter, social media, Switzerland, 
quantitative content analysis 
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Political actors have embraced social media platforms as a promising way of 
circumventing traditional gatekeepers to reach citizens directly. But how do they communicate 
on these platforms? Do they try to engage their followers in serious debate, or do they simply 
aim to entertain them? And how successful are these new styles of communication in motivating 
citizens to react to politicians’ activities on various social media platforms? From the 
perspective of network media logic (Klinger & Svensson, 2015, 2016), this quantitative study 
investigates which communication styles political actors used on social media platforms during 
the 2015 Swiss national election and how these styles fostered digital reactions on Facebook 
and Twitter.  
Previous research shows that discussions between political actors and citizens on social 
media platforms are rare (Kalsnes, 2016), and if they do occur, they seldom constitute 
deliberation (Wessler, 2008). However, citizens very commonly react to politicians’ public 
messages (e.g., public Facebook posts or tweets on Twitter) with a like, share, comment, or 
retweet, mirroring the general user habits on these platforms (Puschmann & Peters, 2014). 
These reactions, even without a response from the political actor, have the potential to spread 
messages virally through the network (Klinger & Svensson, 2015).  
Political actors seek to obtain as many of citizens’ reactions to their posts and tweets as 
possible for three main reasons. First, on social media platforms, such as Facebook, a large 
number of reactions increase the likelihood that political actors’ posts will be seen by their 
followers and fans because of the algorithm that organizes the news stream (whereas on Twitter, 
most tweets are shown in the order in which they were sent (van Dijck, 2013)). Second, each 
reaction from a fan or follower to a political actor’s post or tweet further circulates the post 
through the fan’s or follower’s network. These networks are likely to include citizens with 
similar interests and political positions and who are comparatively likely to be persuaded by 
the politicians’ posts to become fans themselves. Third, exposure to a politician’s tweet has 
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been shown to have strong effects on voting intentions (Kobayashi & Ichifuji, 2015) and 
political participation (Dimitrova, Shehata, Stromback, & Nord, 2014).  
Therefore, this study explores whether political actors have successfully adapted to 
network media logic by using styles of communication that generate the maximum number of 
reactions. Although network media logic is an established theoretical concept, few studies have 
explored its impact on political actors’ communication styles. In our empirical study, we thus 
focus on the content of political actors’ public social media messages and the digital reactions 
they generate.  
We investigate the use of the following four distinctive communication styles that are 
particularly well suited to network media logic (Klinger & Svensson, 2015): pseudo-discursive, 
mobilizing, emotional, and entertaining. We conducted a quantitative content analysis of the 
posts and tweets of all 246 elected members of the Swiss Parliament that received the most 
reactions on Facebook (N = 1,796) and Twitter (N = 2,170). These posts and tweets received 
the most reactions between six months before and ten days after the 2015 Swiss national 
election, and the purpose of choosing them is to identify how successful the aforementioned 
communication styles are in provoking reactions.  
 
Political Actors on Social Media Platforms 
Previous studies on the behavior of political actors on social media platforms have found 
that most of them fail to exploit the interactive potential of Web 2.0 platforms; they mainly 
broadcast information (Filimonov, Russmann, & Svensson, 2016; Graham, Broersma, 
Hazelhoff, & van 't Haar, 2013) and rarely debate with users. They use such platforms in a Web 
1.5 manner (Jackson & Lilleker, 2009): Regardless of how lively citizens’ comments on their 
posts may be, political actors seldom respond, let alone engage in a serious exchange of 
thoughts or opinions.  
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These findings are often framed negatively based on the normative expectation that 
political actors should embrace this chance to debate with citizens. However, previous research 
has shown that politicians lack the resources (such as time or a social media team) to cope with 
the flood of comments on social media; they fear losing control over the communication 
situation, which might trigger offensive online behavior and negative media attention, 
particularly because their original statements may become more politically controversial with 
the ensuing discussions (Coleman & Blumler, 2009; Stromer-Galley, 2000). Furthermore, 
citizens are not used to receiving responses from political actors, which means that politicians 
are not punished for restricting themselves to top-down communication and thus do not feel 
obliged to respond to citizens’ comments (Tromble, 2016).  
Nevertheless, Facebook and Twitter users themselves also shy away from discussions 
on these platforms. About 90% of online communities consist of lurkers who read other 
members’ posts but do not comment on or react to the posts (Schneider, Krogh, & Jäger, 2013). 
For these reasons, even the widespread adoption and use of important social media platforms, 
such as Facebook and Twitter, have not led to more public debates between political actors and 
citizens.  
As political actors do not want to spend many resources when responding to comments, 
and users—most of whom are lurkers—do not strongly demand conversation, the one-sided 
communication from political actors provokes one-sided responses from users. We argue that 
these digital reactions (e.g., likes, comments, retweets, etc.) by fans on Facebook and followers 
on Twitter are a better reflection of users’ general social media habits than the expectation of 
vibrant public political debates. 
A like on Facebook does not remain a simple sign of acknowledgement (Larsson, 2015); 
the liked post also spreads through the network of the one who liked it. The same applies to 
other reactions, such as a comment or share on Facebook or a like, retweet, or reply on Twitter. 
Although these may represent different qualities of interactions between politicians and 
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citizens, we consider them all to be reactions because they all increase the visibility and reach 
of the original public messages within the networks.  
If multiple users react to a post or tweet, the original message can go viral (Klinger 
& Svensson, 2015) and reach even those people who are not fans or followers of the political 
actor who wrote it (Vaccari & Valeriani, 2015). Depending on individual users’ habits and on 
Facebook and Twitter newsfeed algorithms, not all fans and followers will see all the posts a 
friend reacted to, but the larger is the overall volume of reactions, the higher are the chances 
that they will (Karlsen & Enjolras, 2016).  
Studies of politicians and parties that rely heavily on social media platforms—and thus 
on their potential to spread posts and tweets virally—have highlighted the impact of successful 
communication on these platforms (e.g., Casero-Ripollés, Feenstra, & Tormey, 2016). 
Especially in combination with other media, such as television, the potential of these platforms 
can be exploited to achieve political success (Chadwick, 2013). Mere exposure to a politician’s 
tweet has been found to generate a more positive attitude toward the political actor (Kobayashi 
& Ichifuji, 2015). Previous experiments have found that tweets have a more positive impact 
compared with newspapers or television coverage: exposure to politicians’ tweets heightens 
citizens’ feeling of social presence, which leads to a favorable impression and stronger voting 
intention (Lee & Jang, 2013; Lee & Shin, 2014).  
The use of social media also has a stronger effect on political participation than the use 
of online news sites, party websites (Dimitrova et al., 2014), and websites without social 
information has (Margetts, John, Hale, & Yasseri, 2016). Therefore, political actors are eager 
to spread their posts and tweets to as many citizens as possible, particularly throughout the 
networks of their fans and followers, where their messages are more likely to fall on fertile 
ground (because these networks tend to consist of like-minded peers; see Klinger & Svensson, 
2015). As political actors are interested in triggering as many digital reactions as possible with 
their public messages, we define the success of posts and tweets as the total number of reactions.  
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Political Actors’ Communication Styles on Social Media Platforms 
Political actors have historically adjusted their communication strategies, of which 
communication styles are an important part, to traditional media logic to ensure that journalistic 
gatekeepers include them in their reporting and that they reach a large audience (Altheide & 
Snow, 1979). While these gatekeepers are absent on social media platforms, politicians 
nevertheless face substantial obstacles to achieving their goal of reaching “maximal attention” 
(Klinger & Svensson, 2015, p. 1247). Because of the vast number of posts and tweets on social 
media platforms, a popularity score, which is reflected in, for example, the number of fans, 
likes, or retweets, moderates the visibility of an actor and his/her posts while enabling him/her 
to spread messages (van Dijck & Poell, 2013). Thus, social media communication needs to be 
adapted to network media logic (Klinger & Svensson, 2015, 2016). That is, political actors need 
to adjust their communication styles to platforms’ unique characteristics and to the expectations 
and motivations of their users in order to reach their target audience via (many) reactions to 
their posts and tweets. Focusing on the successful social media contributions of political actors, 
we therefore pose our first research question, which is as follows: To what degree do political 
actors use four possible social media communication styles (pseudo-discursive, mobilizing, 
emotional, and entertaining) on Facebook and Twitter? 
The two platforms differ in their user community, as well as in their users’ motivations 
for using the platform and for reacting to social media contributions. Facebook is the largest 
social network site in Western society (Newman, 2017). Its user community encompasses 
slightly more younger than older Internet users, but due to its enormous size, it represents 
Internet users better, overall, than any other platform does (Gruzd, Jacobson, Mai, & Dubois, 
2018; Kovic, Rauchfleisch, Metag, Caspar, & Szenogrady, 2017; Pew Research Center, 2016). 
By contrast, in many countries, such as Switzerland, for example, Twitter users are a more 
specific community: they tend to be younger, better educated, and more media savvy; they 
oftentimes belong to a political or economic elite or to the media sector, and they commonly 
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use Twitter in a professional capacity (Davis, Holtz-Bacha, & Just, 2017; Metag & 
Rauchfleisch, 2016; Pew Research Center, 2016). In other countries, such as in the UK, it is 
used by a broader population (Graham, Jackson, & Broersma, 2014). To our knowledge, 
however, in most countries, the user community of Twitter is not as representative of the general 
population as that of Facebook is. Users’ motivations and expectations differ, as well: Facebook 
use is mostly determined by the desire to belong and the need for self-presentation (Nadkarni 
& Hofmann, 2012); correspondingly, digital reactions on social network sites are mainly 
explained by the need to be a part of a group (Ho & Dempsey, 2010). By contrast, Twitter use 
is explained by the need for news and for tracking real-time events (Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 
2012). It is often used by journalists to observe political actors and gather quotes and 
information for their articles (Parmelee, 2014). Tweets are shared (retweeted) to amplify a 
message or to publicly agree with someone (boyd, Golder, & Lotan, 2010). The general use of 
Facebook and Twitter and the reactions to posts and tweets are thus triggered by quite different 
motives. The success of the messages posted by political actors on both platforms, i.e., whether 
these messages will reach as many people as possible by being spread via digital reactions, 
seems to strongly depend on the fit between the message and the motives of the platform users. 
Our second research question therefore explores how the four aforementioned communication 
styles differ between Facebook and Twitter.  
 
Pseudo-discursive communication style 
Given the interactive potential of social media platforms, their rise sparked the hope that 
political actors and citizens would use them to debate political issues as they did on the Athenian 
Agora (e.g., Coleman & Blumler, 2009). However, empirical research has found that political 
actors’ proclamations on the potential for debates on social media platforms are mostly 
symbolic (Jungherr, 2016). In practice, cyber-rhetoric is common (e.g., Stromer-Galley, 2014), 
i.e., the debates tend to be staged by political actors and their close supporters to help spread 
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their message. For the most part, traditional top-down communication dominates: social media 
platforms are used as just another website to disseminate information. Politicians’ use of Web 
2.0 platforms in such a Web 1.0 manner has christened the term “web 1.5” style of use (Jackson 
& Lilleker, 2009). However, political actors are aware of the discourse potential of these 
platforms, as well as the democratic hopes and expectations connected to them (e.g., Enli & 
Skogerbø, 2013). Responding to citizens on these platforms can lead to substantial goodwill 
and to positive responses (Lee & Shin, 2012; Tromble, 2016). Yet political actors shy away 
from public online interactions because of time constraints or their fear of losing control 
(Kalsnes, 2016; Stromer-Galley, 2000). Thus, we argue that they use certain communicative 
elements to make it at least look as though they are willing to engage in public debates on these 
platforms, i.e., they use a pseudo-discursive communication style. 
For instance, they address other political actors or journalists in their posts. As the 
addressed person will be notified of this, opportunities for debate are created; even more 
importantly, doing so signals a willingness on their part to enter into a political discourse. In 
reality, however, mentioning other politicians is most often used as a form of negative 
campaigning (Druckman, Kifer, & Parkin, 2010). Political actors might also address the media 
directly to deliver quotable statements, especially on Twitter, or to try and set the media agenda 
(Jungherr, 2016; Parmelee, 2014). They respond and comment to media coverage to correct or 
spin the news in their favor (Lischka, 2017). Political actors may also address citizens in their 
posts and tweets to ask for feedback or support, attempting to get a better feel of their concerns 
and opinions in order to win their votes (Jungherr, 2016).  
Given the different user structures (the general public on Facebook vs. a high proportion 
of professional users on Twitter) and usage motivations (need to belong vs. observe news and 
political actors), we expect the demand for the pseudo-discursive style to be higher on Twitter. 
Additionally, we assume that this style is more appreciated by users on Twitter in the form of 
digital reactions than on Facebook.  
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H1a: The pseudo-discursive communication style is found more often on Twitter than 
on Facebook.  
H1b: The pseudo-discursive communication style leads to more digital reactions on 
Twitter but not on Facebook.  
 
Mobilizing communication style 
Social media platforms offer politicians a very useful channel for their mobilization 
attempts, which were previously mostly limited to interpersonal canvassing and restrained by 
their financial resources. Free social media platforms with a large user community are thus used 
extensively to mobilize for protests, national elections, and other events (Bennett & Segerberg, 
2012; Bond et al., 2012). A mobilizing post or tweet can consist of a call for action, such as a 
reminder of an upcoming national referendum or election (e.g., ‘Vote for the social democrats!’, 
‘Don’t forget to vote!’, or ‘It is your decision—go vote!’). It can also encompass the key points 
of why people should vote for a specific politician or party (e.g., supports green energy, lowers 
taxes, or fights for more social security) and thus reinforce the importance of casting one’s vote. 
These reminders may not only activate those using social network sites for political reasons 
(Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012) but also convince past non-voters to vote, especially 
if they receive the message from a friend, for example, via a share or a like (Baek, 2015). These 
calls for action can be decisive in a tight race: citizens who receive a mobilizing message are 
reminded of their civic duties and are more likely to vote. This effect is comparable to those of 
traditional get-out-the-vote tactics (Teresi & Michelson, 2015) and also influences offline 
participation (e.g., Vissers & Stolle, 2014). Another way of mobilizing is to include calls for 
digital action, such as likes and retweets. We expect that users do their part and react to a 
message when a political actor they follow publishes a mobilizing post or tweet.  
As Facebook has a larger user community (5.24 million Swiss users) than Twitter has 
(1.42 million Swiss users), we assume that politicians will focus their mobilization efforts on 
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the platform where these efforts are likely to reach more citizens. We also expect this to lead to 
more digital reactions because of the larger secondary audience on Facebook than on Twitter.  
H2a: A mobilizing communication style is more often found on Facebook than on 
Twitter. 
H2b: The mobilizing communication style leads to more digital reactions on Facebook 
but not on Twitter.  
 
Emotional communication style 
Political actors have historically used emotions to make their communication to the 
public more effective and persuasive, particularly on platforms without gatekeepers. Political 
communication has long involved public displays of emotion (Richards, 2004). Social media 
platforms invite an emotional communication style: they have no professional gatekeepers 
imposing the use of a more professional language; posts and tweets are expected to be 
composed quickly using authentic and informal language. Although users do turn to social 
networks for information, emotional motives also play a major role (Nadkarni & Hofmann, 
2012). Correspondingly, previous research has already pointed out that emotional messages are 
more likely to go viral (Dobele, Lindgreen, Beverland, Vanhamme, & van Wijk, 2007).  
An emotional communication style is characterized by posts and tweets that focus more 
on emotions than on political issues: they are more concerned about conveying an emotional 
state than an issue. That is, they can contain information on political issues, such as 
immigration, but they try to persuade citizens by focusing on the emotions connected to these 
issues, such as fear (e.g., connecting immigrants to crime rates or lowering taxes to 
unemployment). This emotional framing of political issues is one reason why populist parties’ 
messages can persuade citizens and make their parties successful (Wirz, 2018). Another less 
political way of focusing on emotions is the use of (phatic) expressions; for example, a cheering 
political actor might tweet, “Thank you so much for all your votes! I love you all!” (Miller, 
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2008). Emotions are often shown online with emoticons or emojis, which are understood by the 
recipients as clarifying the message intent (Thompson & Filik, 2016). Therefore, emoticons 
also signal an emotional communication style.  
As political actors adjust their communication style to the platform involved, they 
should use an emotional style more often on Facebook than on Twitter because of Twitter users’ 
higher interest in news-like information. Nevertheless, as emotions can cause a message to go 
viral independent of the platform involved, we expect that the emotional style used leads to 
more digital reactions on both platforms.  
H3a: An emotional communication style is more often found on Facebook than on 
Twitter. 
H3b: The emotional communication style leads to more digital reactions on both 
Facebook and Twitter.  
 
Entertaining communication style 
Political actors have long used entertainment as a tool to reach a broader audience. 
Hybrid television shows opened doors for political actors to inform and entertain at the same 
time (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999). Politicians appear in late-night shows (e.g., The Tonight 
Show) and are frequently the subject of political satire shows (Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2013). 
Humor has become a part of their communication strategy: they use humor in their political ads 
and statements, and they appear in political comedy shows to be laughed at and to laugh with 
the host and the viewers. Furthermore, humorous content is particularly suited to social media 
platforms: it allows the easy posting of funny snippets from political actors’ appearances in 
late-night shows or similar events, which can spread more easily through supporters’ networks 
(Dobele et al., 2007).  
But an entertaining communication style does not need to be humorous. A more 
conventional approach may be to use two forms of personalization: individualization and 
POLITICIANS’ COMMUNICATION STYLES 
lxxxiii 
privatization. By focusing on themselves (and not on the party as a whole or on political issues), 
political actors may aim to make their posts and tweets more accessible (individualization, van 
Aelst, Sheafer, & Stanyer, 2012). They might publish statements outlining their personal 
opinions or post pictures as they canvass in the streets. They may also include details from their 
personal lives to stress that they are normal citizens who lead normal lives (privatization, van 
Aelst et al., 2012). For example, they can show pictures or videos of themselves celebrating at 
a fair or in a beer tent. As previous research has shown, these forms of soft news are more often 
shared on social media platforms than hard news is (Imhof, 2015). 
Political actors may choose to talk about everyday or currently popular non-political 
topics in order to appear more like a normal citizen. They may simply post a beautiful landscape 
or seasonal messages, such as “Best wishes from Lake Zurich” (so-called phatic 
communication, see Miller, 2008), to keep in touch with their followership. Such contributions 
will stand out among their more on-topic posts, but at the same time, these do not feel out of 
place to their social media audience, which sees many similar posts from their non-political 
friends.  
We assume that we will find this entertaining communication style more often on 
Facebook than on Twitter because we expect political actors to have adapted their style to 
Facebook users’ interest in entertaining posts (compared with Twitter users’ expectations of 
more news-like information). Furthermore, we expect users to reward these entertaining posts 
more on Facebook, where they more closely correspond to the general tone of the platform.  
H4a: An entertaining communication style is more often found on Facebook than on 
Twitter. 
H4b: The entertaining communication style leads to more digital reactions on Facebook 
but not on Twitter.  
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Table 1. Four communication styles of political actors on social media platforms  
Communication style Indicator 
Pseudo-discursive style Addressing political actors 
 Addressing journalistic actors 
 Addressing citizens 
Mobilizing style Call for digital action 
 Call for action 
 Election 
 National referendum 
Emotional style Emotionalization 
 Emoticons 
Entertaining style Individualization  
 Privatization 
 Humor 
 Non-political topics 
 
These four communication styles might occur in different combinations. For example, 
the mobilizing style could be complemented with the emotional style to stress the importance 
of voting, or the pseudo-discursive style might be combined with some entertaining elements 
showing how a political actor is affected personally by an issue. While other combinations are 
possible, we focus on the ones that often occur together in the most successful posts. Therefore, 
our third research question is as follows: Which combinations of communication styles occur 
most often in the most successful Facebook posts and tweets, and do they lead to more 
reactions? 
 
Methods 
To address our research questions, we conducted a quantitative content analysis of the 
most successful social media posts of political actors in Switzerland. We chose Facebook and 
Twitter because they are considered the most important social media platforms for political 
communication in many Western democracies (e.g., Larsson & Kalsnes, 2014), especially in 
Switzerland (Authors, 2015). About 63% of the resident population of Switzerland (8.33 
million) use Facebook, and about 17% use Twitter (Latzer, Büchi, & Just, 2015). For both 
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platforms, the user share is higher among the younger cohorts: among 14- to 19-year-olds, 79% 
use Facebook, whereas 24% use Twitter; the usage is even higher among 20- to 29-year-olds 
(FB: 88%, Twitter: 25%). In the older age brackets, the share of Facebook users is still rather 
high and consistently higher than that of Twitter users (for 30- to 49-year-olds, FB: 62%, 
Twitter: 16%; for 50- to 69-year-olds: FB: 43%, Twitter: 12%; for 70- to 84-year-olds, FB: 16% 
and Twitter: 11%) (Latzer et al., 2015). Whereas Facebook represents the broader Swiss public, 
Twitter can be considered more as a network for professional users, particularly journalists and 
politicians (Kovic et al., 2017; Metag & Rauchfleisch, 2016). However, it should be noted that 
not all of these users are Swiss citizens, as foreigners make up about a quarter of the total 
population of Switzerland (Federal Statistical Office, 2016). However, we assume that these 
foreigners are less likely to be among the followers and friends of Swiss political actors than 
their Swiss neighbors are and, more importantly, that Swiss political actors tailor their 
communication to the potential voters among their followers and friends. In fact, Swiss political 
actors consider these platforms to be increasingly important (Brändli & Wassmer, 2014). The 
country’s political system of direct democracy leads to multiple referenda per year, encouraging 
permanent campaigning by political actors for which social media are a convenient, cheap, and 
useful tool to be close to voters continuously.  
 
Sampling procedure. We searched Facebook and Twitter for the pages and accounts of 
all 246 elected members of the Swiss Parliament and all 11 parties represented therein; we 
identified 104 Facebook fan pages (41%) and 126 Twitter profiles (49%). With the aid of R and 
the packages Rfacebook (Barberá, Piccirilli, Geisler, & van Atteveldt, 2015) and twitteR 
(Gentry, 2015), we downloaded all their posts from six months before until ten days after the 
election (April 1, 2015 to October 28, 2015) in the first week of November 2015. Within this 
time period, there was also a national referendum on four issues (a federal law for radio and 
television, inheritance tax, reproductive medicine, and scholarships). On average, Swiss 
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political actors posted 88 Facebook posts (SD = 105, median = 51), drawing about 51 reactions 
per post (SD = 75, median = 25). Even with retweets excluded, politicians were more active on 
Twitter publishing, on average, 187 tweets (SD = 289, median = 75), yet they are receiving 
only 3 reactions per tweet, on average (SD = 3, median = 2). We took a sample of the top 20 
posts of each actor on each platform (the ones that generated the most reactions in terms of 
likes, shares, and comments on Facebook and in terms of favorites and retweets on Twitter; 
posts with no reactions were excluded). Not all Swiss political actors published 20 posts or 
tweets in the election campaign which received at least one digital reaction: 24 Facebook users 
only posted between 2 and 19 posts, and 36 Twitter users posted only between 1 and 19 tweets, 
leaving us with a final sample of 1,796 Facebook posts and 2,170 tweets. Other studies have 
shown that the distribution of (politicians’) online activity and popularity is heavily skewed 
with a long tail (Nielsen & Vaccari, 2013), with only a few political actors usually responsible 
for the majority of activities and reactions. Thus, not only the activity of politicians but also the 
number of reactions to their top 20 messages differs strongly, ranging on Facebook from 1 to 
3,043 (mean = 143, median = 49) and on Twitter from 1 to 195 (mean = 13, median = 7). 
Although posts and tweets with only one reaction are not particularly successful, this range 
enables us to find differences in the impact of specific communication styles.  
 
Measures. Our dependent variable is the number of digital reactions per post and tweet, 
respectively. The sums of all likes, comments, and shares and the sums of all likes and retweets 
were calculated for each post and tweet, as we were interested in determining which of them 
triggered any form of reaction (and thus increased their visibility on the platform) and not in 
identifying the type of reaction they triggered. Replies to tweets were ignored because they 
could not be downloaded with the package twitteR. Basing on previous research, we included 
the number of fans and followers (e.g., Heiss, Schmuck, & Matthes, 2018), whether the party 
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belongs to the ideological right or left wing (e.g., Gibson & McAllister, 2015; Larsson, 2014), 
and if the Facebook post or tweet had a picture in it (e.g., Bene, 2016) as control variables.  
We developed a coding book to identify the differences in the communication styles 
used in the most successful posts and tweets. For the pseudo-discursive style, we coded whether 
the post/tweet addressed a political actor, journalist, or citizen. The mobilizing elements were 
calls for action, calls for digital action, or references to the national election and to the national 
referendum. For the entertaining style, we coded non-political topics, individualization, 
privatization, and humor. Finally, the emotional style consisted of emotionalized posts, as well 
as posts with emoticons (see Appendix A).  
Three student coders with previous content analysis experience learned the codebook 
and were trained in five sessions. They received their sample in an Excel spreadsheet that 
contained the original Facebook post and/or tweet, including the URL, so that they can see the 
message on Facebook/Twitter in its original environment. They were instructed to base their 
coding decisions only on the content of the Facebook post and the tweet, respectively. The 
reliability test based on a coding of 10% of the sample showed satisfactory results: the variables 
for the pseudo-discursive style reached a Krippendorff’s alpha of 0.71; mobilizing style, 0.9; 
emotional style, 0.89; and entertaining style, 0.78. The variables humor and addressing citizens 
were just below the established threshold, with a Krippendorff’s alpha of 0.65. However, 
considering the high level of complexity of these two variables, we considered the achieved 
alpha values as just acceptable (see Appendix B). 
 
Results 
The pseudo-discursive style is used most commonly in successful public messages on 
Facebook and Twitter (75% of all messages, see Table 2). Politicians address one another to 
counter their arguments, thank citizens for their votes, or address journalists in order to 
comment on the latest news in over half of all posts and tweets that received the most reactions 
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(Facebook: 52%, Twitter: 53%). Whereas in Facebook posts, politicians also speak to citizens 
more often than they do on Twitter (39% to 29%), such as to thank them for their support or to 
appeal to them directly, journalists are more frequently addressed in tweets (16% to 9%) in the 
hope of triggering more media coverage or to spin the news in their favor. In sum, the pseudo-
discursive style appears especially often on Twitter: in 79% of all successful tweets, a politician, 
journalist, or citizen is addressed (compared with 70% on Facebook, supporting H1a).  
On Facebook, the entertaining style is found just as often as the pseudo-discursive style 
is (70% of all successful posts in the sample). The posts are often individualized, with a focus 
on single politicians (65%), they address non-political topics, such as sending best wishes for 
Easter or birthday greetings or giving comments on sports events (20%), and they less often 
contain privatization, i.e., information on politicians’ private life (4%), or humor (3%); thus, 
they mirror the hybrid character of communication on Facebook. In the Twittersphere, it is also 
the second most frequently found communication style (47% of the successful posts in the 
sample, supporting H4a). Most of the entertaining tweets contain individualization (37%) or 
non-political topics, such as tweets about eating national dishes (14%); privatization and humor 
are, again, rare (1% and 3%, respectively).  
Although the study period includes only two relevant dates for mobilization—the 
national referendum on June 14, 2015 and the national election on October 18, 2015—
mobilizing posts and tweets are rather ubiquitous: 48% of the most successful posts on 
Facebook and 34% of those on Twitter contain a mobilizing element (supporting H2a). The 
most frequent mobilizing element was references to the national election (which include 
statements explaining why someone is running for office, reminders to vote, and public 
messages thanking people for all the votes after the election), with 40% on Facebook and 26% 
on Twitter. More specifically, calls for action offering arguments on why citizens should vote 
for the respective candidate/party are the second most frequent mobilizing element (17% on 
Facebook and 7% on Twitter). References to the national referendum are rarely found in the 
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most successful posts (4%) and tweets (5%), indicating that voters were focused on the national 
election. In addition, calls for digital action, such as sharing the post or tweet in one’s own 
network, do not appear often in these Facebook posts (4%) or on Twitter (1%).  
An emotional style occurs the least often on both platforms, which is 31% of Facebook 
posts and 20% of tweets (a total of 25% of all successful messages). The content of these posts 
strongly focuses on emotions instead of issues, especially on Facebook (30%) (Twitter: 19%, 
supporting H3a). For example, politicians accused their opponents of showing their ugliest side 
in a debate or emphasized a statement about human rights with several exclamation marks. 
Emoticons (6% and 4%) do not often appear in the posts and tweets in the sample. All Facebook 
posts and tweets contain at least one element of a communication style.  
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Table 2. Occurrence of media elements and pseudo-discursive, entertaining, mobilizing, and 
emotional communication style in the most successful public messages on Facebook and 
Twitter  
 Facebook  
posts (%) 
(N=1,796)  
Twitter  
tweets (%) 
(N=2,170) 
Total  
messages (%) 
(N=3,966) 
Χ2 
Media elements     
Text*** 87 99 93,5 254 
Picture*** 53 30 40 216 
Video*** 5 1 3 54 
Hashtag*** 8 31 21 315.2 
Link 41 42 41 0.1 
Pseudo-discursive style*** 70 79 75 40 
Addressing 
political actors 
 
52 
 
53 
 
53 
 
1.3 
journalistic actors*** 9 16 13 41.7 
citizens*** 39 29 34 42.9 
Entertaining style*** 70 47 58 219.4 
Individualization*** 65 37 50 304 
Privatization*** 4 1 3 26,9 
Humor 3 3 3 1.6 
Non-political topics*** 20 14 17 24.9 
Mobilizing style*** 48 34 40 84.8 
Call for digital action*** 4 1 3 95.3 
Call for action*** 17 7 12 46.5 
Election*** 40 26 34 86.3 
National referendum 4 5 4 1.3 
Emotional style*** 31 20 25 64.1 
Emotionalization*** 30 19 24 58.4 
Emoticons* 6 4 5 4.3 
Notes. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 (Chi-squared test). Communication styles 
summarize the subsequent variables below and are counted if at least one variable is present. 
All variables were dichotomized (present or not present). Numbers are rounded.  
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A cluster analysis for each platform revealed which communications styles are often 
combined. Whereas the pseudo-discursive style is often combined with an entertaining style on 
Facebook, the mobilizing style is often used with the emotional style in successful posts on both 
platforms (research question 3). That is, 59% (N = 1,740) of all pseudo-discursive messages 
contain entertaining elements, and 52% (N = 515) of all emotional messages contain mobilizing 
elements. These combinations illustrate the special communicative potential of these platforms: 
because politics is publicly visible in an environment where private, public, political, and 
entertaining elements collide, political communication has to adapt and stand out to achieve 
reactions. Discussions, combined with entertaining elements, represent a low-threshold 
opportunity for fans and followers to react. Combining mobilizing communication with 
emotion adds importance and urgency to the calls for political participation.  
To determine which style produces the most reactions, we conducted a negative 
binomial regression analysis using the number of reactions as our dependent variable; the 
number of reactions per post/tweet is an over-dispersed count variable. The four negative 
binomial regression models showed a goodness of fit between 1.785 and 2.449 (Pearson chi-
square), the omnibus test revealed significant likelihood ratio chi-squares between 719 and 
1.548, and neither of the parameters’ 95% confidence intervals included zero, suggesting over-
dispersion, which supported the decision to conduct negative binomial regressions. As a 
robustness check, the models were also run separately for likes, comments, and shares on 
Facebook and for likes and retweets on Twitter, and no contradictory results were found (see 
Appendix C). 
On Facebook, each additional 100 fans produce a 2.57% increase in the expected 
number of reactions (Exp(B) = 1.000257, SE = 0.000008, p < 0.001, see model 1 in Table 3), 
regardless of whether the message includes a picture or is posted by a wing party member. The 
entertaining style increases the number of reactions by 12.7% (Exp(B) = 1.127, SE = 0.048, p 
= 0.026), the mobilizing style by 33.8% (Exp(B) = 1.338, SE = 0.048, p < 0.001), and the 
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emotional style by 36.3% (Exp(B) = 1.363, SE = 0.051, p < 0.001, supporting H2b, H3b, and 
H4b). By contrast, the pseudo-discursive style has no significant impact (Exp(B) = 0.925, SE = 
0.054, p = 0.149), thus rejecting hypothesis 1b.  
In model 2, interaction effects are included for the often-combined communication 
styles (see Table 3). Neither the entertaining–pseudo-discursive style nor the mobilizing–
emotional style has a significant impact on the number of reactions. Yet the mobilizing style 
still has robust positive main effects of 37.5% (Exp(B) = 1.375, SE = 0.058, p < 0.001) and, for 
the emotional style, 42.8% (Exp(B) = 1.428, SE = 0.075, p < 0.001).  
 
Table 3. Estimating the impact of different communication styles of Swiss political actors on 
the number of social media reactions on Facebook during the 2015 national election 
 Model 1: 
Facebook  
Exp(B) (SE) 
Model 2: 
Facebook 
Exp(B) (SE) 
Fans  1.000*** (0.000) 1.000*** (0.001) 
Picture 1.022 (0.048) 1.023 (0.048) 
Wing party 1.063 (0.047) 1.066 (0.047) 
Pseudo-discursive 0.925 (0.054) 0.903 (0.088) 
Entertaining 1.127* (0.048) 1.104 (.086) 
Mobilizing 1.338*** (0.048) 1.375*** (0.058) 
Emotional 1.363***(0.051) 1.428*** (0.075) 
Pseudo-discursive*Entertaining - 1.033 (0.105) 
Mobilizing*Emotional - 0.919 (0.1) 
Intercept 30.75*** (.058) 30.77*** (0.067) 
Goodness of fit (Chi-Square) 2.447 2.449 
Omnibus test (Chi-Square) 1,548*** 1,548*** 
95% Wald CI 0.794 and 0.897 0.794 and 0.897 
N 1,748 1,748 
Notes. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 (negative binomial regression). Dependent variable: 
digital reactions. Odds ratios and standard errors are displayed. 
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On Twitter, the number of reactions increases by 1.07% per additional 100 followers 
(Exp(B) = 1.000107, SE = 0.000005, p < 0.001, see model 1 in Table 4). Uploading a picture 
also increases the number of reactions by 36.5% (Exp(B) = 1.365, SE = 0.044, p < 0.001). Of 
the four communication styles, only the emotional style stimulates reactions significantly 
(Exp(B) = 1.180, SE = 0.049, p < 0.001, supporting H3b but rejecting H1b). Whereas on 
Facebook, the entertaining and mobilizing styles increased reactions, on Twitter, entertainment 
(Exp(B) = 0.759, SE = 0.041, p < 0.001) and mobilization (Exp(B) = 0.904, SE = 0.042, p = 
0.015) decreased the sum of reactions by a factor of 0.76 and 0.9, respectively (supporting H2b 
and H4b).  
For model 2 in Table 4, the interaction effects between the mobilizing and emotional 
styles as the most common style combination were added to the model. The number of followers 
(Exp(B) = 1.000116, SE = 0.000005, p < 0.001) and a tweet containing a picture (Exp(B) = 
1.375, SE = 0.044, p < 0.001) increase the number of reactions. The negative impact of the 
entertaining style also persists (Exp(B) = 0.752, SE = 0.041, p < 0.001). Mobilizing elements 
still hinder reactions by 14.2% (Exp(B) = 0.858, SE = 0.047, p = 0.001), and the emotional style 
is no longer significant (Exp(B) = 1.076, SE = 0.073, p = 0.238). However, the combination of 
these styles changes by 26.3% (Exp(B) = 1.263, SE = 0.098, p = 0.018), i.e., the decrease in 
reactions from a mobilizing tweet without an emotional element of 14.2% becomes 26.3% less 
negative when emotions are added.  
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Table 4. Estimating the impact of different communication styles of Swiss political actors on 
the number of social media reactions on Twitter during the 2015 national election  
 Model 1: 
Twitter 
Exp(B) (SE) 
Model 2: 
Twitter 
Exp(B) (SE) 
Follower  1.000*** (0.000) 1.000*** (0.000) 
Picture 1.365*** (0.044) 1.375*** (0.044) 
Wing party 0.999 (0.039) 1.002 (0.039) 
Pseudo-discursive 1.035 (0.047) 1.035 (0.047) 
Entertaining 0.759*** (0.041) 0.752*** (0.041) 
Mobilizing 0.904* (0.042) 0.858** (0.047) 
Emotional 1.180*** (0.049) 1.076 (0.062)  
Mobilizing*Emotional - 1.263* (0.098) 
Intercept 7.609*** (.054) 7.753*** (0.055) 
Goodness of fit (Chi-Square) 1.785 1.789 
Omnibus test (Chi-Square) 719*** 725*** 
95% Wald CI 0.647 and 0.735 0.645 and 0.733 
N 2,170 2,170 
Notes. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 (negative binomial regression). Dependent variable: 
digital reactions. Odds ratios and standard errors are displayed. 
 
Discussion and Further Research 
Analyzing four communication styles in the successful posts on social network 
platforms enhances our knowledge of how political actors adapt their communication to 
network media logic and prompt digital reactions (e.g., likes or retweets) from their fans and 
followers to spread their public messages. The dissemination of these messages exposes social 
media users to more posts and tweets from political actors, which, in turn, may influence their 
political participation and voting intention (Dimitrova et al., 2014; Kobayashi & Ichifuji, 2015). 
Although we found empirical support for all four communication styles among the posts and 
tweets most reacted to on Facebook and on Twitter, respectively, the usage and impact of these 
styles vary significantly.  
The pseudo-discursive style is most commonly used in posts and tweets with the most 
reactions. However, although the posts and tweets include discursive style elements, political 
actors rarely follow up on them in their comment sections. This finding represents a neglected 
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opportunity for political actors to sharpen their political profile. Furthermore, despite its 
omnipresence, the pseudo-discursive style is not very successful at generating reactions: on 
Facebook, it appears to be the least successful of the four styles, whereas on Twitter, it is at 
least more successful than the emotional or mobilizing style in motivating users to react.  
Even if cyber-rhetoric (Stromer-Galley, 2014), symbolic use (Jungherr, 2016), and Web 
1.5 communication (Jackson & Lilleker, 2009) are common on these platforms, on the basis of 
on our results, the pseudo-discursive communication style should not be seen only in a 
pessimistic way: it might serve as the happy medium for political actors between ignoring and 
reacting to all input from other political actors, journalists, and citizens. In the long run, this 
pragmatic pseudo-discursive style may pay off for political actors by increasing their vote 
shares. Or other political actors might turn to a fully discursive communication style, 
particularly for newer political actors aiming to sharpen their profile, as British and Dutch 
Members of Parliament discussed with citizens during the 2010 election (Graham et al., 2013). 
The pseudo-discursive style should thus remain on our research agenda.  
The second most often used communication style among the posts and tweets most 
reacted to consists of entertaining elements; individualized, privatized, and humorous posts and 
tweets or posts on non-political topics occur in more than half of all messages in the sample. 
The human side of a political actor, in particular, generates reactions on Facebook but not on 
Twitter. This result emphasizes the differences between social media platforms and how 
political actors need to adjust their communication styles to suit users’ motivations in using a 
specific platform. Whereas entertaining elements as a part of one’s self-representation are 
widely used and accepted on Facebook, they lower the number of reactions on Twitter because 
they do not correspond to the platform users’ dominant need for news and live events.  
In particular, posts and tweets focusing on individual politicians or containing private 
information about politicians, which are indicators of the entertaining communication style, are 
worthy of further investigation because social media platforms appear to increase the reach of 
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such public messages by political actors. Political actors use these posts and tweets to show 
their fans and followers that they are “like you and me.” And if their message also contains a 
personal action frame (e.g., “We are the 99%”) that users can identify with, users may be more 
willing to become politically active. They can modify the political actors’ message to their own 
situation (e.g., by establishing a hashtag on Twitter) and share it in their network (Bennett, 
2012), which will facilitate the spread of their general political message. Thus, scholars need to 
dig deeper into communication processes involving posts that individualize political actors.  
The mobilizing style ranks third and occurs in 40% of the most successful posts. Calls 
for (non-)digital action and mentions of a national referendum or election activate fans and 
followers. During an election campaign, political actors need to mobilize their (online and 
offline) social networks. If their fans and followers share their call for action, the post or tweet 
may spread virally. Mobilization works on both platforms studied, but in combination with the 
emotional style, it works on Twitter only. Citizens thus respond to mobilization messages by 
playing their part on social media platforms. This is crucial for the success of political actions 
and makes these platforms an important tool to reach and mobilize their followership. 
Mobilizing posts on social media platforms might be able to compensate somewhat for the 
general decline in party membership by allowing political actors to mobilize people quickly 
outside traditional party channels.  
The emotional style is used in only 25% of all posts and tweets in the sample, which 
might reflect how carefully Swiss political actors formulate their public messages. Fear of 
creating a scandal might prevent politicians from sending an emotional post or tweet. In some 
cases, emotional posts, even exaggerated or uncivil posts, can be a crucial part of one’s political 
communication style. Although populist actors very successfully use emotional rhetoric (Wirth 
et al., 2016), in social media and beyond, this type of communication style is not the norm for 
Swiss political actors on social media platforms. 
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When the broader picture is analyzed, although only a marginal number of posts and 
tweets include emotional elements, they are a strong predictor of reactions on Facebook and 
Twitter, thus supporting the notion that emotions help a message go viral (Dobele et al., 2007). 
Thus, although the emotional style is used the least often of the four styles, it is the only one 
that consistently produced more digital reactions on both platforms.  
Although we investigated only one country (cf. Methods), these results may be 
generalized beyond the Swiss case in a number of ways. In countries with a similar platform 
user structure, we expect to find similar differences in the prevalence of the communication 
styles between the two social media platforms (e.g., Austria and Sweden, see Ausserhofer & 
Maireder, 2013; Larsson & Moe, 2011). By contrast, in countries where Twitter is used by 
elites, as well as the broader population, the use of entertaining and emotional messages should 
be more similar on both platforms (e.g., Netherlands, the US, and the UK, see Graham et al., 
2014; Tromble, 2016). Regarding the success of different communication styles, our results are 
more likely to be universal. In particular, the platform-independent success of emotional 
messages is probably due to general psychological mechanisms. However, to confirm this, we 
would need both comparative studies of the success of political communication styles, as well 
as more psychological studies assessing the underlying mechanisms that lead to reactions on 
social media platforms.  
Future research should also explore how politically disinterested citizens perceive 
entertaining political messages. They might serve as a bridge to reach more than just the 
politically interested citizens who already follow politicians on social network platforms. This 
issue calls into question whether mobilizing messages have the same impact on politically 
disinterested readers who receive such messages only via their personal network as they do on 
people who are already following a political actor. We must also critically investigate the degree 
to which bots and other fake digital reactions might drive or prevent the true spreading of posts 
and tweets. As Twitter introduced the reply count at the end of 2016, this measure should be 
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included in future research. Additionally, our models only included those three control variables 
that were considered the most important in recent research; other personal or structural 
characteristics of politicians might also play a role and thus should be considered in the future. 
Finally, we encourage scholars to analyze why messages on these platforms sometimes receive 
no reactions.  
All four successful communication styles adapted from established political 
communication in traditional media channels to network media logic enable digital readers to 
easily react to a post or tweet, which significantly changes what kinds of political messages 
social media users are exposed to, as well as how they perceive (and participate in) politics.  
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Supplemental materials 
Appendix A. Description of the variables coded by the student coders (Codebook) 
This is a greatly reduced and translated version of the original codebook. The full codebook 
is available upon request. 
Text: This was coded if the Facebook post or tweet contained text.  
Picture: This was coded if the Facebook post or tweet contained a picture. 
Video: This was coded if the Facebook post or tweet contained a video. 
Hashtag: This was coded if the Facebook post or tweet contained a hashtag, but not if the 
#-symbol was used for something else (e.g., to curse or referring to a number).  
Link: This was coded if the Facebook post or tweet contained a link to another website or 
social media platform. 
Addressing political actors: This was coded if a political actor (politician or a party) was 
mentioned in the post or tweet, appeared in a picture, or is mentioned in the picture.  
Addressing journalistic actors: This was coded if a journalistic actor (journalist, media 
organization etc.) is mentioned in the post or tweet, appeared in a picture, or is mentioned in 
the picture.  
Addressing citizens: This was coded if citizens (citizen, you, the people etc.) are mentioned 
in the post or tweet, appeared on a picture, or mentioned in the picture.  
Call for digital action:  This was coded if the post, tweet or contained picture was a 
sentence/call to like the post, comment the message, or retweet this tweet. 
Call for action: This was coded if the post, tweet or contained picture was a sentence/call 
such as “go to the ballot box and vote” or “come and join our demonstration on Sunday”.  
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Election: This was coded if the post mentioned the national elections of the Swiss 
parliament 2015 in the post, tweet or picture.  
National Referendum: This was coded if the post mentioned the national referendum in the 
post, tweet or picture. 
Emotionalization: This was coded if, the focus in the post, tweet or picture was on emotions 
instead of an issue (e.g., pictures with cute animals, babies etc. or emotional outburst such as 
“I’m so grateful! Thank you so much!”) 
Emoticons: This was coded if an emoticon or emoji was used in the status or picture. For 
example, :-), ;-), :-P, ^^ etc. 
Incivility: This was coded if a post contained swearing, multiple exclamation marks, or 
capitalization of specific words.  
Exaggerations: This was coded if a post contained exaggerations to emphasize an issue 
(e.g., used superlatives or extremes).  
Individualization: Individualization was coded if the political actor focused on his personal 
experience, spoke from his/her point-of-view, self-represented himself/herself on a picture.  
Privatization: Privatization was coded if the political actor referred to his/her private life 
(e.g, hobbies, pets, family).  
Humor: This was coded if a post contained humor in the message or the picture. Humor 
could occur in silliness, laughing at other people, or in resolving incongruity. The intention of 
the speaker was decisive, not if the joke/humor was actually funny.   
Non-political topic: Each post was categorized into either focusing on a political topic or a 
non-political topic. Non-political topics were sports, culture, lifestyle, topics simply focusing 
on fear (crime) or fun (animals), landscapes, religion and others such as profile pictures.   
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An example for each communication style 
Pseudo-discursive communication style 
 
Translation: A question @SchaerWords: Why criticize the career of Regine Sauter and 
not of Hans-Ulrich Bigler? 
 
Mobilizing communication style 
 
Translation:  
Picture: FOUR STRONG VOICES. Matthias Aebischer, Nadine Masshardt, Alexander 
Tschäppät, Flavia Wasserfallen. FOR A JUST SWITZERLAND.  
Post: FOR A JUST SWITZERLAND. Ad campaign of SP Altstadt/Kirchenfeld. 
Already displayed on the Marzilibähnli. Next week everywhere. 18 October 2015 VOTE SP.  
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Entertaining communication style 
 
Translation: It was beautiful!!! 
   
  Emotional communication style 
   
   
Translation: Thank you so much for the 62.678 votes! I am very happy for the great 
confidence and it is pure energy for the new legislature!  
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Appendix B. Coding instructions 
The three student coders received their sample in an Excel spreadsheet which contained 
the original Facebook post and/or the tweets including the URL to look at the message on 
Facebook/Twitter in its original environment. They were instructed to base the coding decision 
only on the content of the Facebook post and the tweet respectively.  
 
Appendix C. Reliability measures (Krippendorff’s alpha) 
Table A. Reliability measures showing Krippendorff’s alpha for each variable. 
 
Variables 
Krippendorff’s Alpha 
 
Text 1 
Picture  1 
Video 1 
Hashtag .97 
Link .93 
Addressing political actors 0.7 
Addressing journalistic actors 0.78 
Addressing citizens 0.65 
Call for digital action 1 
Call for action 0.84 
Election 1 
National referendum 0.74 
Emotionalization 0.77 
Emoticons 1 
Incivility 0.47 
Exaggeration 0.54 
Individualization 0.8 
Privatization 0.9 
Humor 0.65 
Non-political topics 0.77 
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Appendix D. Regression models for each digital reaction indicator  
As a robustness check negative binomial regression models were also calculated for 
likes, comments, and shares on Facebook (see Table B for the models excluding interaction 
terms and Table C for the models with interaction terms) and likes and retweets on Twitter 
separately (see Table D without the interaction terms and Table E including them).  
For Facebook, the results remain largely the same when looking at individual indicators 
instead of the composite “reactions” (see Table 3 and Table B and C). Noteworthy exceptions 
are, first, the shares differ from the other forms of reactions in two ways: the pseudo-discursive 
and entertaining styles now have a significant (negative) impact, decreasing the likelihood of 
shares. This finding holds true even when their combination is included in the model. Compared 
to liking and commenting, sharing is the most expressive form of engagement with the post of 
a political actors (from the perspective of users, likes and comments are mostly aimed at the 
author of the posts, though they are also visible in one’s personal network, whereas sharing is 
explicitly aimed at one’s personal network and is the most visible). Apparently, users reserve 
this form of engagement to mobilizing messages (thus responding to the appeals contained in 
the messages). Second, comments are less likely for posts containing pictures (probably because 
photos simply do not need further commenting) and somewhat more likely for posts by wing-
party (members) (an increase by 3 percent). We assume that posts of wing-party (members) 
contain more politically controversial content thus stimulating more comments. When 
additionally controlled for the combination of communication styles, users are less likely to 
comment on the pseudo-discursive communication style, probably because they are not the one 
being addressed in most cases (only in 633 out of 2,170 posts, whereas political actors are being 
addressed 1,145 times). The likelihood of commenting on a pseudo-discursive message 
increases, though, if it also contains entertaining elements, which possibly invite users to 
comment at least on the entertaining parts of the message. 
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Table B. Estimating the impact of different communication styles of Swiss political actors on 
the amount of social media reactions on Facebook during the 2015 national election 
 Facebook: 
Likes 
Exp(B) (SE) 
Facebook: 
Comments 
Exp(B) (SE) 
Facebook: 
Shares 
Exp(B) (SE) 
Fans  1.000*** (.000) 1.000*** (.000) 1.000*** (.000) 
Picture 1.070 (.047) .73*** (.075) .942 (.085) 
Wing party 1.076 (.046) 1.03*** (.075) .925 (.085) 
Pseudo-discursive .940 (.053) .957 (.087) .756** (.096) 
Entertaining 1.189* (.053) 1.128** (.085) .767** (.092) 
Mobilizing 1.298*** (.047) 1.305*** (.075) 1.595*** (.088) 
Emotional 1.368***(.049) 1.858*** (.082) 1.07 (.090) 
Intercept 23.14*** (.057) 2.05*** (.092) 5.76*** (.102) 
Goodness of fit  
(Chi-Square) 
2.061 4.863 2.610 
Omnibus test  
(Chi-Square) 
1541*** 727*** 838*** 
95% Wald CI .753 and .853 2.402 and 2.768 1.831 and 2.139 
N 1,748 1,748 1,748 
Notes. ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 (negative binomial regression). Dependent variables: likes, 
comments and shares. Odds ratios and standard errors are displayed. 
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Table C. Estimating the impact of different communication styles of Swiss political actors on 
the amount of social media reactions on Facebook during the 2015 national election 
 Facebook: 
Likes 
Exp(B) (SE) 
Facebook: 
Comments 
Exp(B) (SE) 
Facebook: 
Shares 
Exp(B) (SE) 
Fans  1.000*** (.000) 1.000*** (.000) 1.000*** (.000) 
Picture 1.077 (.048) .751*** (.075) .899 (.087) 
Wing party 1.077 (.046) 1.286*** (.075) .927 (.085) 
Pseudo-discursive 0.883 (.086) .738* (.139) 1.071 (.156) 
Entertaining 1.121 (.085) .997 (.135) 1.067 (.152) 
Mobilizing 1.325*** (.057) 1.286** (.090) 1.738*** (.105) 
Emotional 1.414*** (.073) 1.822*** (.118) 1.238 (.137) 
Pseudo-discursive* 
entertaining 
1.098 (.103) 1.495* (.168) .606** (.186) 
Mobilizing*emotional 0.942 (.098) 1.040 (.156) .750 (.181) 
Intercept 23.66*** (.066) 2.330*** (.109) 4.660*** (.114) 
Goodness of fit  
(Chi-Square) 
2.040 2.389 4.564 
Omnibus test  
(Chi-Square) 
1542*** 843*** 739*** 
95% Wald CI .752 and .852 1.823 and 2.131 2.383 and 2.746 
N 1,748 1,748 1,748 
Notes. ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 (negative binomial regression). Dependent variables: likes, 
comments and shares. Odds ratios and standard errors are displayed. 
 
For Twitter, the separate models again mostly confirm the results of the main model 
(see Table 4 and Table C and D). The one exception between the summarized “reactions” and 
the single indicator models regards the “retweets”, which are not stimulated by the emotional 
style. This finding persists when controlling for the combination of the mobilizing and 
emotional style: Neither the combination with the mobilizing style nor the emotional style alone 
has a significant impact on retweets. Similarly as on Facebook, we assume that emotional 
elements on Twitter might be more often “appreciated” by liking it than stimulating a retweet 
or share to one’s own network. That is, Twitter users appear to “like” that someone speaks out 
(what they might think themselves), but they do not want to spread the tweet as if they had said 
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it. In other words, they appreciate others being emotional, but do not want to appear emotional 
themselves. 
Table D. Estimating the impact of different communication styles of Swiss political actors on 
the amount of social media reactions on Twitter during the 2015 national election 
 Twitter: 
Likes 
Exp(B) (SE) 
Twitter: 
Retweets 
Exp(B) (SE) 
Follower  1.000*** (.000) 1.000*** (.000) 
Picture 1.327*** (.048) 1.478*** (.048) 
Wing party .965 (.043) 1.054 (.043) 
Pseudo-discursive .990 (.051) 1.074 (.051) 
Entertaining .863** (.045) .612** (.052) 
Mobilizing .924+ (.045) .862*** (.053) 
Emotional 1.358*** (.053) .944 (.063) 
Intercept 4.292*** (.059) 3.304*** (.069) 
Goodness of fit (Chi-Square) 1.712 1.433 
Omnibus test (Chi-Square) 633*** 522*** 
95% Wald CI .710 and .818 .961 and 1.121 
N 2,170 2,170 
Notes. ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 +p<.1 (negative binomial regression). Dependent variables: 
likes and retweets. Odds ratios and standard errors are displayed. 
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Table E. Estimating the impact of different communication styles of Swiss political actors on 
the amount of social media reactions on Twitter during the 2015 national election 
 Twitter: 
Likes 
Exp(B) (SE) 
Twitter: 
Retweets 
Exp(B) (SE) 
Follower  1.000*** (.000) 1.000*** (.000) 
Picture 1.343*** (.048) 1.476*** (.057) 
Wing party .970 (.043) 1.053 (.050) 
Pseudo-discursive .990 (.051) 1.074 (.060) 
Entertaining .849*** (.045) .613*** (.053) 
Mobilizing .845*** (.051) .877* (.060) 
Emotional 1.160* (.067) .973 (.080)  
Mobilizing*Emotional 1.471*** (.101) .924 (.128)  
Intercept 4.429*** (.060) 3.284*** (.070) 
Goodness of fit (Chi-Square) 1.715 1.431 
Omnibus test (Chi-Square) 646*** 521*** 
95% Wald CI .704 and .812 .961 and 1.120 
N 2,170 2,170 
Notes. ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 (negative binomial regression). Dependent variables: likes 
and retweets. Odds ratios and standard errors are displayed. 
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Abstract 
Politicians have been criticized for not exploiting the deliberative potential of social media 
platforms. We complement previous definitions of politicians’ success on social media through 
the lens of network media logic: Despite the lack of deliberation, some succeed in building 
large digital followerships, which spread their messages via reactions through the network. 
Analyzing a data set of personal, structural, and social media characteristics of Swiss 
politicians, we used path analysis to determine which predict their success on Facebook (n = 63) 
and Twitter (n = 108). Politicians, who are active in parliament, represent urban regions and 
receive substantial amounts of traditional media coverage also have larger digital followerships 
on both platforms. Digital followership in turn influences the average number of digital 
reactions on Facebook, but not on Twitter. Thus, politicians’ success on social media depends 
on their personal background, political activity, and media coverage, and also their followership 
and the platform. 
 
KEYWORDS: Facebook, Twitter, success on social media, political communication, 
Switzerland 
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The social media performance of most political actors on social media platforms cannot 
be called a success story. In interviews, they glorify the interactive potential of these platforms 
and promise to exploit it intensively in the near future (Brändli & Wassmer, 2014; Enli & 
Skogerbø, 2013), yet that is mostly what can be called cyber-rhetoric (Jungherr, 2016; Kreiss, 
2011; Stromer-Galley, 2014). Instead, political actors use these Web 2.0 platforms to 
disseminate information in a Web 1.0 style, in what has been labeled a “Web 1.5” way of using 
these platforms (Lilleker et al., 2011). 
However, this definition of “exploiting the potential of social media” may be too narrow. 
Previous empirical studies have shown that political actors may benefit from social media 
communication in other ways. Their posts might set the agenda of traditional media and thus 
improve visibility (Parmelee, 2014); their performance can attract new party members, 
substituting for the general decline in party membership (Gibson, Greffet, & Cantijoch, 2016); 
and the lowered transaction costs on these platforms might facilitate micro-donations through 
which political actors can raise millions (Margetts, John, Hale, & Yasseri, 2016). Through the 
lens of network media logic (Klinger & Svensson, 2015), we argue that the premise for all these 
beneficial outcomes is a large digital followership (e.g., fans or followers) that actively reacts 
to politicians’ public messages (e.g., likes or retweets) and thus enables messages to spread 
through the network. Hence, the success of political actors’ communication on social media 
should be defined as their ability to build a large digital followership and trigger as many 
reactions from their followers as possible.  
But political actors do not enter digital ground on equal footing. Drawing on previous 
research, we assume that their social media success can be predicted by a set of personal (age, 
gender, education, party affiliation, ideology, parliamentary activity, urbanization of his/her 
constituency), structural (incumbency, key position, vote percentage, media coverage and 
financial resources), and social media (adoption date and activity) characteristics. Our main 
research question analyzes which characteristics of Swiss parliamentarians lead to success on 
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Facebook and Twitter in terms of followership and reactions. We use path analysis to examine 
a unique dataset of the social media communication of Swiss parliamentarians between 5 
December 2011 and 15 March 2015 and their personal, structural and social media 
characteristics.  
We start our paper with discussing what political actors’ success on social media means 
from the perspective of network media logic (Klinger & Svensson, 2015) and why political 
actors benefit from a larger digital followership which actively reacts to their social media 
contributions. After identifying possible impediments to their success on these platforms, we 
describe the special case of Switzerland, our dataset and the methods. Then we present our 
results for the two platforms Facebook and Twitter. Finally, we put our findings in a broader 
context and discuss implications for future studies focusing on politicians’ success on social 
media. 
 
Political Actors’ Success on Social Media 
In research on politicians’ performance on social media, scholars have focused on the 
discursive potential of social networks, i.e., the hope that political actors use social media to 
debate with citizens (Coleman & Blumler, 2009). Yet, political actors mostly use social media 
platforms like they use traditional media: they disseminate their information in a Web 1.0 style 
over these Web 2.0 platforms (known as a “Web 1.5” style of use, see Lilleker et al., 2011). It 
is not that they do not know about the potential for deliberation on these platforms. In 
interviews, they explicitly talk about this potential and their intention to engage in discussions 
with citizens on these platforms (Brändli & Wassmer, 2014; Enli & Skogerbø, 2013). They 
integrate these remarks about the potential of the internet and social media, the so-called cyber 
rhetoric (Jungherr, 2016; Kreiss, 2011; Stromer-Galley, 2014), into their communication. Often 
as not, their usage of these platforms only has a symbolic purpose (Jungherr, 2016): to show 
they are modern and close to the people. Thus, political actors strategically choose to use these 
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platforms in a Web 1.5 manner. Communication on social media platforms is still from political 
actors to citizens, and is less interactive than it could be. 
Whereas according to the mass media logic politicians’ messages must overcome 
gatekeepers to reach an audience, according to the network media logic politicians can directly 
disseminate their information to partisan citizens (Klinger & Svensson, 2015). Yet most 
political actors do not have a large digital followership that they can directly address (Vaccari 
& Nielsen, 2013), and their messages compete with a vast amount of other content on these 
platforms for visibility. To determine which content is visible, the number of reactions to a post 
or tweet indicates their popularity (van Dijck & Poell, 2013). The more reactions a post 
receives, the more popular it is, and the higher are the chances that it reaches more of a 
platform’s users (Karlsen & Enjolras, 2016). That is, a political actor’s post needs reactions 
such as likes, comments or shares on Facebook or replies, likes or retweets on Twitter in order 
to increase its visibility against competing content and to reach more than just their few fans 
and followers. Thus, network media logic asserts that political actors’ social media success 
hinges heavily on users’ reactions.  
Yet scholars have critically debated the impact of “likes”: The mere clicking on social 
media buttons – such as liking a politician on Facebook – has been dismissed in one strand of 
research as “clicktivism” and “slacktivism”. An aimless digital reaction on its own was assumed 
to have almost no impact in the real world and might even prevent subsequent action for the 
cause, thus strongly differing from “real” activism (Skoric, 2012). However, another strand of 
research described it as a “legitimate political act” (Halupka, 2014, p. 130). Receiving a lot of 
“likes” can be part of a wider hybrid campaigning strategy that involves many additional 
communication tools (Karpf, 2010), and the “like” itself is not the end goal: It must be seen as 
part of an ongoing political process (Gerlitz & Helmond, 2013). One “like” often leads to 
another – and in rare cases even to hundreds of thousands – which can have serious political 
consequences (Margetts et al., 2016). Experiments showed that sharing a video increases 
POLITICIANS’ SUCCESS ON SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS 
cxxii 
people’s willingness to engage in offline helping behavior (Lane & Dal Cin, 2017) and that 
value alignment between the supporter and the cause as well as a strong connection to the 
organization combat slacktivism (Kristofferson, White, & Peloza, 2014). 
We argue, furthermore, that such reactions determine whether communication on social 
media platforms is successful in five ways (see Table 1). First, reactions on platforms such as 
Facebook and Twitter are valuable to political actors because each reaction is visible to both 
the followers and their respective networks. Through these broader networks, political actors’ 
messages can reach people who do not follow politics attentively (Vaccari, 2016). A large 
number of reactions might also lead to more media coverage, thus increasing both their online 
and offline visibility (Parmelee, 2014). Second, these reactions inform social media users about 
which of their friends on these platforms share similar political opinions; they might be invited 
to also follow certain political actors. Given the general decline in party memberships (Gibson, 
2015), parties greatly benefit from facilitating a network of possible volunteers. Thus, a large 
and active followership might serve as an alternative to traditional forms of organization 
through party membership. Third, social media platforms lower the transaction costs and thus 
facilitate micro-donations, through which political actors sometimes raise millions; social cues 
– such as the number of people who have already donated – influence whether others also 
donate (Margetts et al., 2016). Fourth, exposure to political messages on social media influences 
voting intention (Kobayashi & Ichifuji, 2015) and political participation (Dimitrova, Shehata, 
Strömbäck, & Nord, 2014). Successful communication on social media (Gibson & McAllister, 
2014) and many reactions on Facebook (Kovic, Rauchfleisch, Metag, Caspar, & Szenogrady, 
2017) can lead to a higher vote share in elections or transform into large-scale participation 
such as in the Arab Spring (Margetts et al., 2016). While very few mobilization attempts 
succeed on such platforms, those that do may lead to unpredictable and extreme outcomes due 
to the dynamics of sharing on such platforms (Margetts et al., 2016). Fifth, the future 
communication of political actors on social media is driven by the amount and quality of 
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feedback they receive (Jungherr, 2016). There are multiple options for users to provide 
feedback: likes, comments, retweets, favorites and so on. By looking at the reactions to their 
messages, political actors are able to evaluate which arguments or pictures communicate their 
position most effectively, at little to no cost.  
Hence, following these observations and according to the network media logic (Klinger 
& Svensson, 2015), the success of political actors’ communication on social media platforms 
should be defined not by digital debates, but by the size of their followership (e.g., fans and 
followers) and the number of reactions their social media actions receive (e.g., likes, retweets).  
 
Table 1. Five desired outcomes of a large and active digital followership on social media 
platforms 
 
Indicator Desired Outcome 
Visibility A large digital followership and many reactions increase 
an actor’s visibility, which in turn can lead to more media 
coverage. 
Organization Due to the general decline in party membership, political 
actors might organize their followership via social media. 
Citizens are more often invited to participate in politics 
on social media platforms: They are being recruited as 
members, or being activated, i.e., to help out at events or 
attend demonstrations. 
Micro-donations Social media platforms lower transaction costs and 
facilitate micro-donations (e.g., money, time or ideas). 
Social cues influence whether someone donates or not.   
Mobilization Mobilizing members at the right moment is crucial for 
political outcomes. Since mobile devices can access 
various social media platforms, people are instantly 
notified and possibly mobilized.  
Feedback Thanks to a large and active digital followership, political 
actors receive feedback on their messages and can thus 
evaluate them. Future communication behavior is driven 
by the amount and quality of feedback. 
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Impediments to Success on Free Social Media Platforms 
Most political actors use free social media platforms due to their low costs, their 
popularity among citizens and the ability to easily integrate features into their own websites 
(Jungherr, 2016). Few are able to build their own social network sites like 
“myBarackObama.com”. Yet political actors face at least three general challenges in using 
these free platforms compared to a building their own proprietary platform.  
First, most users did not initially join the platform in order to follow political actors. In 
contrast to a social network site like “myBarackObama.com”, users of free platforms such as 
Facebook and Twitter might agree with the opinions of certain political actors, but may not 
want the people in their network to know this. Hence, political actors need to transfer their 
members from offline to online, and to attract new people with successful communication on 
these platforms. To find out how successful political actors have been in building a digital 
followership, there is a public indicator on most platforms such as the number of fans on 
Facebook or followers on Twitter, which may motivate additional users to join. 
Second, there is a lack of control of these platforms compared to proprietary platforms. 
Due to their business models, political actors depend on possibly biased information about a 
platform, for example regarding the reach of paid posts. Due to stricter data sharing laws and 
stronger reservations concerning privacy outside the United States, it is almost impossible to 
confirm the success of micro-targeting attempts with data not provided by the platform itself, 
i.e. with independent data on concrete voting behavior. Regarding the reach of unpaid social 
media posts, political actors need to adjust their way of communicating to the platforms’ 
algorithms and selection criteria to make their postings visible to as many as possible (Bene, 
2016). They use messages in a personal tone to adapt to the platforms’ style of communication, 
to show their followership that they are “like you and me” and thereby to increase the number 
of reactions to their posts (McGregor, 2017).  
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Third, although various platforms merge and influence each other, new platforms 
continue to be developed. Political actors cannot realistically engage on every platform; they 
must choose the ones that best fit the goals of their digital communication strategy. The user 
base varies by platform, so the communication strategy must be adapted accordingly. For 
example, about 50% of the population of Switzerland uses Facebook, and about 17% use 
Twitter passively and about 6% actively (Latzer, Büchi, & Just, 2015). Facebook thus 
represents the Swiss population more effectively than Twitter, the members of which mainly 
belong to the political elite or media organizations (Rauchfleisch & Metag, 2016). Politicians 
can most effectively reach other political actors and journalists via Twitter, and better address 
the general public using Facebook.  
 
Normalized use – but also normalized success? 
In addition to these challenges, political actors do not access social media platforms on 
an equal footing. Well-funded political actors and those with a strong presence in traditional 
media dominate digital political communication flows. Therefore, political communication 
continues to be “normalized” (Margolis & Resnick, 2000; Rauchfleisch & Metag, 2016). 
Previous research on the impact of politicians’ personal and structural characteristics on their 
online political communication has focused mostly on the adoption of (and activity on) various 
platforms (e.g., Larsson & Kalsnes, 2014). The results of this focus are mixed, and most of 
them indicate normalization. Some of the discrepancies between results may be due to the use 
of different indicators for personal and structural advantages and different dependent variables 
(Strandberg, 2008, 2013). Therefore, we propose a set of personal and structural characteristics 
to systemize this field of research: Personal characteristics such as age, gender, education, party 
affiliation, and parliamentary activity are important predictors of platform adoption and 
activity, but structural characteristics such as incumbency, key position, vote percentage, media 
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coverage, and financial power are important for interpreting results in terms of normalization 
and equalization (Keller & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2018).  
Since for many political actors being active on social media platforms has become a 
necessary (although not sufficient) condition for political success (van Dijck, 2013), they have 
gained knowledge about how social media platforms work and how to generate digital 
reactions. Some of them have hired (external) community managers to improve their social 
media communication (Gálvez-Rodríguez, Haro-de-Rosario, & Caba-Pérez, 2017) or are early 
adopters and thus have more experience than newcomers in how to build up a followership and 
provoke reactions. Other political actors may be very prolific and post several times a day, 
creating a stronger social media presence. Therefore, it is unclear whether personal or even 
structural characteristics still play such a crucial role in success on these platforms. For our 
analysis, we distinguish between personal, structural, and social media characteristics to find 
out which predict success (i.e., digital followership and reactions) on these platforms. Our 
research question explores: Which characteristics of political actors lead to success on 
Facebook and Twitter? 
Personal characteristics predict the use of social media platforms very well in the Swiss 
population (NET-Metrix, 2014). Younger members of the Swiss Parliament from urban regions 
are more likely to have adopted Twitter early and to actively tweet on the microblogging service 
(Rauchfleisch & Metag, 2016). Because users of these platforms probably feel better 
represented by members of parliament who are of a similar age and engage in similar social 
media behavior, we expect that younger members of parliament from urban regions attract a 
larger followership. Additionally, we assume that politicians who actively submit parliamentary 
proposals win more fans and followers on these platforms since they can report on their 
parliamentary efforts, which might help explain why many users follow politicians on these 
platforms. Therefore, we hypothesize:  
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H1: a) Younger members of parliament who b) actively submit parliamentary proposals 
and c) represent urban regions attract a larger digital followership on Facebook and Twitter.  
 
Although political actors disseminate information in a Web 1.0 style, most have a 
steadily rising number of digital fans (Klinger, 2013). The distribution of followers among 
politicians is usually heavily skewed; for example, while few politicians in the U.S. midterm 
elections had over 100’000 followers, most of them only had a few 1000 (Vaccari & Nielsen, 
2013, p. 209). We assume that political actors with structural advantages such as incumbency, 
vote percentage, key position, media coverage, and financial resources have more fans on social 
media platforms than structurally disadvantaged ones, since these advantages may lead to 
greater popularity, professional support, and to more statements they can recycle on their page. 
We assume that structural characteristics explain in a normalized fashion why some political 
actors have built a larger digital followership than others.  
H2: Structurally advantaged political actors have a larger digital followership on 
Facebook and Twitter than structurally disadvantaged ones.  
 
Building a large followership does not on its own reflect how successfully political 
actors perform on the platform. Politicians depend on reactions such as likes or retweets, which 
enable their public messages and tweets to spread through the network, to compete against the 
vast number of other public messages and extend their visibility beyond their followership. 
While personal and structural characteristics should influence who attracts more fans and 
followers, it seems less likely that they have a strong impact on the success of individual posts 
and tweets. For example, whereas a politician’s age or key position might influence the one-
time decision of a citizen to “like” or “follow” her on the platform, for daily decisions of which 
posts or tweets to like or retweet, social media characteristics such as adoption date and activity 
are more likely to predict the number of reactions politicians receive. These two social media 
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characteristics function as indicators of politicians’ experience on these platforms; we expect 
that the more experience they have gained on these platforms, the more reactions they will 
receive on their Facebook posts and tweets on Twitter. That is, members of parliament who 
joined the platform early and actively post public messages probably know better how to 
provoke reactions. Additionally, those with a larger followership generally reach more people, 
which makes it more likely that they will receive more digital reactions (Casero-Ripollés, 
Feenstra, & Tormey, 2016). Therefore, we hypothesize: 
 
H3: Early adoption and active use lead to more reactions on Facebook and Twitter.  
H4: The larger the digital followership of a political actor, the more digital reactions 
the actor receives, on average, on Facebook and Twitter.  
 
Method 
Our case study focuses on political actors in Switzerland, which serves as an ideal case 
for studying success on social media platforms in a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013) due 
to its media and political plurality (246 members of parliament from eleven parties in 2015, for 
media plurality see Appendix A). The country’s political system further encourages permanent 
campaigning (Norris, 2003) and permanent contact between political actors and the citizenry: 
Swiss citizens are invited to participate in direct democracy at the ballot box multiple times a 
year (e.g., four times in 2016). Furthermore, every four years citizens elect the members of the 
two chambers with a list on which they can add or remove people from their canton; they are 
even allowed to put a name twice on a list. Hence, political actors are in constant competition 
for attention. These instruments of direct democracy make Switzerland a special case 
(Rauchfleisch & Metag, 2016) and might contribute to politicians’ success on social media as 
the latter need to continuously campaign and citizens need to continuously keep informed as 
part of their civic duty. In countries with other political systems – less permanent campaigning 
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and fewer instruments of direct democracy – politicians might have more difficulties in winning 
a large followership which reacts to their social media postings.  
Politicians also differ starkly in their personal and structural characteristics. Since 
Switzerland’s parliamentarians are not full-time professional politicians, permanent 
campaigning needs an easy-to-handle and not resource-intensive solution to connect to the 
public. Therefore, social media platforms are very appealing to them. A survey of Swiss 
political actors showed that Facebook and Twitter are of growing importance (Brändli 
& Wassmer, 2014), for example political actors’ adoption rates of Twitter steadily rose from 
2.5 percent in 2009 to 13.5 percent in 2011 to 34 percent in 2013 (Rauchfleisch & Metag, 2016, 
p. 2422). In our data collection of 2015, 108 (44 percent) of the 246 members of Swiss 
parliament used Twitter and 63 parliamentarians (26 percent) used Facebook pages.  
Data was collected for all members of the Swiss Parliament using R (R Development 
Core Team, 2017) and the packages “Rfacebook” (Barbera, Piccirilli, Geisler, & van Atteveldt, 
2016) and “twitteR” (Gentry, 2015). All pages, posts, and counts of reactions were 
automatically downloaded from the beginning of the 49th legislation period (5 December 2011) 
on 15 March 2015: this included 63 parliamentarians’ Facebook pages with 14,264 posts and 
108 Twitter accounts with 54,385 posts. This timeframe allows us to analyze how political 
actors in Switzerland used social media platforms to build a digital followership that actively 
spreads their messages during a non-election period. Despite the growing importance of 
permanent campaigning (Norris, 2003), these periods between elections have mostly been 
neglected in research (Vaccari, 2016). There are two dependent variables: Digital followership 
is the count of fans on Facebook and followers on Twitter as of 15 March 2015. Digital 
reactions is the average of the sum of likes, comments, and shares on Facebook and of favorites 
and retweets on Twitter for the study period. The replies on a tweet could not be retrieved via 
twitteR.  
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Similar to Larsson and Kalsnes (2014) we differentiate in our study between politicians’ 
personal and structural characteristics, but add also social media characteristics as well as 
important predictors identified in other studies (such as education). The personal characteristics 
age, gender, education, and party affiliation are drawn from the official website of the Swiss 
Parliament (Bundesamt für Statistik, 2015; Parlamentsdienste, 2015). The ideology of political 
actors is ranked on a scale from -10.0 (left) to +10.0 (right) based on Schoenenberger (2014). 
A ranking of parliamentary activity for each political actor was retrieved from 
Parlamentsdienste (2015) and the degree of urbanization of their constituency from BADAC 
(2001).  
The variables for the structural advantages incumbency, key positions, and vote 
percentage were collected via the official website of the Swiss Parliament (Bundesamt für 
Statistik, 2015; Parlamentsdienste, 2015). Media coverage is based on a search for each member 
of parliament in 54 print, 37 online, and 16 television news outlets and three news agencies 
covering all three national languages during the 49th legislation using the online archives of the 
media outlets (see Appendix A). Financial resources corresponds to the number of paid ads in 
65 news outlets adapted from a study by Bühlmann, Gerber, Salathe, and Zumbach (2015). The 
two platform-specific variables are adoption, which represents the number of days since the 
account was created and the first post was published, and activity, which describes the number 
of posts per day during the legislative period.  
We first report descriptive results to allow readers to form an impression of the success 
of Swiss politicians’ social media communication. We then conduct a path analysis based on 
negative binomial and multiple linear regression analysis (see for additional information 
Appendix B) to find out which characteristics lead to a larger digital followership and more 
digital reactions in line with our proposed hypotheses. We also conducted regression analysis 
for each type of reaction (likes, retweets etc.) separately as a robustness check (Appendix C).  
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Results 
In Switzerland, the success of politicians’ performance on social media is mostly an 
outlier phenomenon (see Figures 1 and 2). Almost every party has a few politicians who attract 
many times the number of fans or reactions compared to others.  
The 63 Facebook accounts analyzed have an average digital followership of 2,106 (SD 
= 529, median = 286). Oskar Freysinger of the right-leaning SVP party acquired the most fans 
on Facebook (24,466), followed by his colleague from the same party, Natalie Rickli, who had 
17,596. Lukas Reimann (8,178) and party leader Toni Brunner (6,613), both SVP, also curate 
popular Facebook sites. Among the exceptional performers are not only political actors from 
the largest right-leaning party: Cédric Wermuth of the left-leaning party SP (9,359) and the 
leader of the centrist party CVP Filippo Lombardi (6,700) also reach many citizens.  
Although Twitter is a niche social media platform in Switzerland, the average 
followership of the 108 political actors who use this platform is even higher than on Facebook 
with 2,533 followers (SD = 488, median = 345), which illustrates the importance of Twitter in 
political communication in Switzerland. Whereas right-leaning accounts dominate on 
Facebook, in the Twittersphere political actors from the left have a larger digital followership: 
Cédric Wermuth (SP) had the most with 25,105 followers, followed by SP Party leader 
Christian Levrat (12,650), Balthasar Glättli from the Green Party (10,768), Jacqueline Badran 
(8937, SP), Bastien Girod (8589, Green), and Pascale Bruderer (8581, SP). Of the right-leaning 
parties, Natalie Rickli (13,625, SVP) and Christoph Mörgeli (9270, SVP) have built up large 
followerships on Twitter.  
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Figure 1. The size of followership on Facebook and Twitter of Swiss members of parliament 
 
Note. Every dot represents a member of parliament, grouped by party affiliation. Followership 
indicates the number of fans on Facebook and followers on Twitter.  
 
A Facebook post receives on average 38.2 likes, comments, and shares (SD = 12, median 
= 8.1). Again, Oskar Freysinger (672.7, SVP) leads the chart, followed by Natalie Rickli (328.9, 
SVP) and Lukas Reimann (128.1, SVP). In this SVP-dominated platform, Guillaume Barrazone 
of the centrist party CVP (123.2) is a noteworthy exception.  
Four political actors receive the most reactions per tweet: Daniel Vischer (14.7, Green), 
Kathrin Bertschy (14.5, Green Liberal), Pirmin Bischof (14.4, CVP), and Oskar Freysinger 
(14.3, SVP). Following by quite a distance with around seven reactions per tweet are Christoph 
Mörgeli (7.3, SVP), Alfred Heer, (7.2, SVP) and Pascale Bruderer (7.2, SP). Political actors 
receive on average 2.3 reactions per tweet (SD = 2.8, median = 1.5).  
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Figure 2. Average number of reactions that Swiss members of parliament receive on their 
Facebook posts and tweets on Twitter  
 
Note. Every dot represents a member of parliament, grouped by party affiliation. The number 
of reactions is the average of likes, comments and shares per post on Facebook and favorites 
and retweets per tweet on Twitter. 
 
We conducted path analysis based on negative binomial (for the number of followers) 
and multiple linear regression (for the average number of reactions) analysis to determine which 
personal, structural, and social media characteristics explain the success in terms of digital 
followership and digital reactions. 
Seven characteristics predict the size of the followership on Facebook (see Figure 3): 
Younger politicians did not win more followers on Twitter (Exp(B) = .990, SE = .019, p = .574, 
rejects H1a). Yet supporting H1b and H1c, politicians from more urban regions have 1.3% more 
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fans (Exp(B) = 1.013, SE = .007, p = .074), and each parliamentary submission increases the 
size of the followership by 1.6% (Exp(B) = 1.016, SE = .006, p = .012). Additionally, male 
politicians win more fans (Exp(B) = .444, SE = .326, p = .013).  
Of the structural characteristics, a one-unit increase in vote share raises the number of 
fans by 2.2% (Exp(B) = 1.022, SE = 0.12, p = .073), and each presence in a news article leads 
to an increase of 0.1% (Exp(B) = 1.001, SE = .000, p < .001) (supports H2 on Facebook). Yet, 
an increase in financial resources leads to a decrease in the followership by a factor of 0.98 
(Exp(B) = .977, SE = .011, p = .028, diminishing support for H2 on Facebook). Of the social 
media characteristics, only activity explains the size of the followership: Those who increase 
their posting activity on average by one post per day raise the expected number of fans by an 
extraordinary 306.6% (Exp(B) = 3.066, SE = .506, p = .027, supports H3 on Facebook).  
In turn, digital reactions correlate the strongest with the number of digital fans (b = .984, 
SEM = .001, p = .000; model 2: R2 = .892, adjusted R2 = .858; support for H4 on Facebook). 
Whereas a strong media presence leads to more fans, it hinders the average number of digital 
reactions (b = -.135, SEM = .13, p = .072). Other structural characteristics do not appear to 
influence the number of reactions on Facebook. Of the personal characteristics, higher 
education leads to more digital reactions, on average (b = .11, SEM = 11.16, p = .067). In 
contrast to our expectations, none of the social media activity characteristics affects the number 
of reactions on Facebook (rejects H3 for Facebook). The reduced model (only significant 
variables included in the path model) does not change R2 significantly (change in R2 =.020, p 
= .718).  
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Figure 3. Path analysis of Swiss politicians’ characteristics predicting success on Facebook 
 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .1, N = 63. Negative binomial regression for DV 
Followership: Only significant odds ratios are displayed. Linear regression analyses for DV 
Reactions (adjusted R2 = .858): Only significant standardized beta coefficients are displayed. 
 
On Twitter, six characteristics predict the number of followers (see Figure 4): Younger 
politicians (Exp(B) = .962, SE = .010, p < .001), left-leaning politicians (Exp(B) = .953, SE = 
.016, p = .003), those who actively submit parliamentary proposals (Exp(B) = 1.007, SE = .004, 
p = .053) and those representing an urban region (Exp(B) = 1.011, SE = .004, p = .007) won 
more followers (supports H1a, H1b, H1c). Additionally, each mention in a news article 
increases the number of followers by 0.1% (Exp(B) = 1.001, SE = .000, p < .001, support for 
H2 on Twitter). Finally, for each day earlier that a politician adopted Twitter, there is a 0.1% 
increase in the his or her followership (Exp(B) = 1.001, SE = .000, p < .001).   
Personal, structural, and social media experience variables have little impact on the 
average number of digital reactions (model 4: R2 = .269, adjusted R2 = .150). Users are more 
likely to react to politicians who are structurally disadvantaged in terms of key positions (b = -
.209, SEM = .237, p = .043) and a low vote share (b = -.202, SEM = .018, p = .062), but who 
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receive a lot of media coverage (b = .470, SEM = .001, p = .001). Contrary to expectations, late 
adopters are favored with more reactions (b = -.278, SEM = .001, p = .011, rejects H3 on 
Twitter). More followers also do not lead to more digital reactions on Twitter (rejects H4 on 
Twitter). As for the reduced Twitter model, R2 does not change significantly when only the 
significant variables were included (change in R2 = .057, p = .501).  
 
Figure 4. Path analysis of Swiss politicians’ characteristics predicting success on Twitter 
 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .1, N = 108. Negative binomial regression for 
DV Followership: Only significant odds ratios are displayed. Linear regression analyses for DV 
Reactions (adjusted R2 = .150): Only significant standardized beta coefficients are displayed.  
 
Discussion 
This study contributed with a unique dataset of personal, structural, and social media 
characteristics of the members of the Swiss Parliament to enhance understanding of politicians’ 
varying degrees of success on social media platforms. We argue that political actors’ social 
media success should be evaluated not (only) based on their interactions and political debates 
with citizens, but on the size and activity of their digital followership – which potentially lead 
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to greater visibility, low-effort organization and low-threshold recruitment, more micro-
donations, better-timed mobilization and illuminating feedback for future communication 
strategies, and to potentially large-scale social movements.  
Three personal characteristics increased politicians’ chances of attracting a larger digital 
followership. Confirming our first hypothesis, younger politicians who actively submit 
parliamentary proposals are more popular on social media platforms, presumably because users 
expect politicians to be engaged, and active politicians are more interesting to follow. 
Furthermore, those who represent citizens from an urban region also become popular on these 
platforms. We assume that this is due to the sociodemographic characteristics of the user base 
of these platforms: Members of parliament who resemble the users of a platform (younger, 
urban) might find it easier to enlarge their network. Future studies should investigate the fit 
between the sociodemographics of a platform’s users and the politicians seeking to attract them, 
how the content of more and less active politicians differs, and the expectations of citizens who 
follow politicians on social media.  
On both platforms under investigation, Facebook and Twitter, the structural advantage 
of high levels of media coverage best predicts social media success (H2 confirmed). First, 
citizens “like” and “follow” political actors who are often covered by traditional media. Second, 
media coverage is key for digital reactions on both platforms – but in different ways. Media 
coverage directly leads to more digital reactions on Twitter. On Facebook, the impact of media 
coverage is less clear-cut: Though it appears to indirectly increase reactions via the digital 
followership, its direct impact is negative, leading to fewer reactions. We assume that people 
“like” political actors who are often covered by traditional media, but react less frequently when 
they are often visible in traditional media, maybe because the social media message only repeats 
the message already heard via traditional media, or because people think the respective 
politician does not need help spreading his or her messages on social media. By contrast, 
political actors on Twitter receive a lot of digital reactions when they dominate traditional media 
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coverage. Again, this can be explained by the news-like character and the motivation of users 
to receive news and live events (Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2012).  
In addition to media coverage, one other structural advantage indicates a normalization 
on Facebook: Politicians with a larger vote share attract more fans on Facebook. They do well 
to build a large digital followership that actively reacts to their posts and can be mobilized 
during the next election or vote.   
Yet, contradicting our second hypothesis, we also found indications of equalization on 
both platforms: Politicians who spend less money on ads in traditional media have larger digital 
followerships on Facebook. We assume that they do not need to pay for as many ads in print 
media as those with fewer digital fans because they have already built large followerships. That 
is, they manage to reach thousands of people without paying for traditional ads. Hence, future 
studies should dig deeper and analyze whether these politicians use Facebook ads to raise their 
visibility: They may simply have shifted from paying for traditional to digital ads.  
Although we did not find any direct effects of social media characteristics on reactions 
(H3 rejected), on both platforms neither early adaption nor intensive activity led to more 
reactions. However, there is an indirect effect (H4 confirmed). On Twitter, it is not the greater 
social media experience and savviness of early adaptors that assures more reactions, but the 
greater professional follower networks they were able to build in the early years of Twitter 
(whereas late comers have more problems to get noticed) which then leads to more reactions 
per tweet. By contrast, on Facebook activity leads to more fans and thus to more reactions. At 
this point it becomes clear that the different technical affordances of both platforms (Bucher & 
Helmond, 2017) may have had an impact on our results. As the two platforms differ strongly 
in their algorithms. It may that continuous activity is rewarded by the Facebook algorithm, 
assuring the visibility of posts and thus making reactions more likely. Thus, although an active 
digital followership can spread a message to raise visibility, the effective reach of a message is 
still moderated by the algorithm. In particular, how far each message spreads in the networks 
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of their friends and followers depends on the algorithm (or on the money politicians spend on 
“sponsored posts”). Thus, platforms with a strong algorithmic influence – such as Facebook – 
are powerful actors.  
The results of the Swiss political actors’ behavior on these platforms illustrate how the 
platform moderates their success: The gap between politicians receiving the most and the least 
reactions, on average, by their followership is much larger on Facebook (Oskar Freysinger with 
672 and Peter Keller with .41) than on Twitter (Daniel Vischer with 14.67 and Heinz Brand 
with < .01). Since there are more Swiss Facebook than Twitter users, not only do the “rich get 
richer” in terms of “likes” on Facebook, they reach an even larger secondary audience on 
Facebook through “likes” than they probably would have on Twitter. Therefore, investigating 
success on social media needs not only to focus further on the active digital followership, but 
also on the moderating role of platforms’ algorithms.  
This study faces several limitations. The proposed model suggests that offline measures 
(e.g., vote shares) predict success online (e.g., followership) by measuring correlations. That 
leaves the question of causality unanswered. Future studies should address the interplay 
between offline and online success: Does social media communication lead to success offline, 
which in turn leads to success online again? Though the investigation was a single country study 
on Switzerland, our results are supported by findings from other countries: For example, van 
Aelst, van Erkel, D’heer and Harder (2016) found for politicians in Belgium a similar 
relationship between the size of the Twitter and the media coverage they receive. Contrary to 
our results, however, the amount of followers also explains the digital reactions, probably due 
to their focus on the election phase. In Norway, the leaders of the three largest parties received 
by far the most reactions on Facebook (Larsson, 2016), indicating a normalization tendency 
that we also found for Facebook in Switzerland. Yet, Samuel-Azran, Yarchi and Wolfsfeld 
(2015) who compared challengers with incumbent political leaders from Israel found equally 
large followerships on Facebook indicating equalization opportunities. In sum, the country-
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specific aspects of the political system and the adoption and use of social media must be a 
central element of comparing political actors’ social media success in different countries: While 
the possible beneficial outcomes of social media might be similar, the platforms’ roles in a 
country might not be.  
Furthermore, we argued that the power to determine success on social media has shifted 
towards citizens. Political actors’ impact on social media depends heavily on their followership, 
which reacts to (and spreads) their messages. However, the feedback might not always be 
favorable: Digital citizens – and especially media actors – watch with Argus eyes what political 
actors post, which could spark a firestorm. That is one reason why political actors cautiously 
post messages and very seldom deliberate publicly online (Kalsnes, 2016; Stromer-Galley, 
2000). Although Swiss political actors are usually very careful online, and none of the most 
successful politicians in this study was involved in a firestorm that could have biased these 
results, we did not distinguish between positive and negative digital reactions.  
Finally, “likes” might be manipulated by users or bots. Since “manipulations” are an 
established part of offline political communication (e.g., orchestrated audiences or lobbyists), 
it is not surprising that they happen online as well. However, they need to be kept in mind and 
should be further investigated (Kovic, Rauchfleisch, & Sele, 2016). Additionally, political 
actors might outsource their followership management and may not (regularly) monitor their 
online presence themselves. Yet it is ultimately the politicians’ characteristics that attract a large 
digital followership and reactions. 
We argued that building an active digital followership might become a crucial part of a 
successful political career. In Switzerland, almost half of the successful outlier cases are 
younger political actors from both sides of the political spectrum and larger as well as smaller 
parties. How large and active their digital followership becomes might serve as a predictor of 
their future political success.   
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Supplementary materials 
Appendix A. Swiss media outlets for media coverage 
We conducted a search for each political actor (first name and surname) and his/her position 
(e.g., member of parliament; translated in the three national languages of Switzerland (German, 
French and Italian) in the following media outlets.  
 
Table A. The 118 media outlets of Switzerland representing the diverse Swiss media landscape 
including print, online, television and radio outlets as well as national news agencies. 
 
Media Print Online TV Radio News Agency 
10 vor 10 (SRF)   X   
20 minuten X     
20 minutes X     
20 minuti X     
20minuten.ch  X    
20minutes.ch  X    
24-Heures X     
24heures.ch  X    
Aargauer Zeitung X     
AargauerZeitung.ch  X    
Agence Télégraphique Suisse      X 
arcinfo.ch / L`Impartial Online   X    
Arena (SRF)   X   
Basellandschaftliche Zeitung X     
Basler Zeitung X     
Basler Zeitung Sonntag X     
baslerzeitung.ch  X    
Beobachter X     
Berner Zeitung X     
bernerzeitung.ch  X    
Bieler Tagblatt X     
Blick X     
Blick am Abend X     
Blick.ch  X    
BlickamAbend.ch  X    
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bluewin.ch (deutsch)  X    
bluewin.ch (französisch)  X    
bluewin.ch (italienisch)  X    
Bote der Urschweiz X     
Bote vom Untersee und Rhein X     
Bündner Tagblatt X     
Corriere del Ticino X     
Corriere del Ticino - cdt.ch  X    
Der Bund X     
Der Landbote X     
Die Südostschweiz X     
Die Südostschweiz am Sonntag X     
Echo der Zeit (SRF)   X   
gmx.ch  X    
HandelsZeitung X     
handelszeitung.ch  X    
(il) caffe.ch (Ringier)  X    
infosperber.ch  X    
landbote.ch  X    
Le 12h30 (RTS)   X   
Le Journal (RTS)   X   
Le Matin (print) X     
Le Matin Dimanche X     
Le Matin.ch  X    
Le Nouvelliste X     
Le Temps X     
LeNouvelliste.ch  X    
LeTemps.ch  X    
L'Express - Feuille davis de Neuchatel X     
L'Hebdo X     
luzernerzeitung.ch / Neue Luzerner 
Zeitung Online  X    
Migros-Magazin X     
msn.ch (German)  X    
msn.ch (French)  X    
Neue Fricktaler Zeitung X     
Neue Luzerner Zeitung X     
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Neue Zürcher Zeitung X     
NZZ am Sonntag X     
NZZ Online  X    
Ostschweiz am Sonntag X     
Radio 24 - News    X  
Radio Argovia - Nachrichten    X  
Radio Central - Nachrichten    X  
Radio Energy - News    X  
Radio Lausanne FM - Journal    X  
Radio Zürisee - News    X  
Radiogiornale 12.30 (RSI)    X  
Rendez-Vous (SRF)    X  
Reuters German News Service     X 
Rheintalische Volkszeitung X     
RSI (uno / due / tre)   X   
rsi.ch  X    
rts.ch  X    
Rundschau (SRF)   X   
Sarganserländer X     
Schweiz am Sonntag X     
Schweizerische Depeschenagentur     X 
Solothurner Zeitung / NMZ X     
Schweiz am Sonntag (AZ) X     
SonntagsBlick X     
SonntagsZeitung X     
sonntagszeitung.ch  X    
srf.ch  X    
St. Galler Tagblatt X     
St. Galler Tagblatt Online  X    
Surseer Woche X     
Tages Woche X     
Tages-Anzeiger X     
TagesAnzeiger.ch  X    
Tagesschau (SRF)   X   
tageswoche.ch   X    
Tele 1 - Nachrichten   X   
Tele Bärn - News   X   
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Tele Basel - 7vor7   X   
Tele M1 - Aktuell   X   
Tele Ostschweiz   X   
Tele Top   X   
Tele Züri - Züri News    X   
Telegiornale Sera (RSI)   X   
Thurgauer Nachrichten  X    
Thurgauer Zeitung X     
ticinonews.ch  X    
tio.ch  X    
Tribune de Genève X     
Tribune de Geneve - tdg.ch  X    
Walliser Bote X     
Watson.ch  X    
Weltwoche X     
WochenZeitung X     
Zentralschweiz am Sonntag X     
Zürcher Oberländer X     
Zürcher Unterländer X     
Zürichsee Zeitung X     
Total 54 37 16 8 3 
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Appendix B. Personal, structural and social media characteristics predicting the amount 
of reactions on Facebook and Twitter.  
 
We conducted negative binomial regressions for the amount of digital followership and multiple 
linear regressions for the average amount of reactions separately for Facebook (see Table B) 
and Twitter (see Table C). The path models (Figure 3 and 4 in the paper) are based on these 
calculations.  
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Table B. The impact of personal, structural, and social media characteristics of Swiss political 
actors on the amount of fans and reactions on Facebook during the non-election phase of the 
49th legislation  
 
 Model 1: Facebook 
Digital followership 
Exp(B) (SE) 
Model 2: Facebook 
Digital reactions 
Beta (SEM) 
Age  .990 (.019) .060 (.614) 
Gender .444* (.326) .042 (12.2) 
Education .831 (.318) .110+ (11.16) 
Ideology 1.005 (.024) .096 (.894) 
Parliamentary activity 1.016* (.006) .017 (.237) 
Urbanization  1.013+ (.007) -.040 (.234) 
Wing party 1.287 (.382)) .007 (14.38) 
Incumbency 1.007 (.030) -.034 (1.02) 
Vote percentage 1.022+ (.012) .017 (.494) 
Key position 1.278 (.155) -.001 (5.07) 
Media coverage 1.001*** (.000) -.135+ (.013) 
Financial resources 0.977* (.011) -.048 (.358) 
Adoption 1.000 (.000) -.039 (.009) 
Activity 3.066* (.506) -.078 (16.45) 
Digital Followership - .984*** (.001) 
Adjusted R2 - .858 
Interception 62.667* (.506) - 
Goodness of fit (Chi-Square) 1.234 - 
Omnibus test (Chi-Square) 74.98*** - 
95% Wald CI .683 and 1.271 - 
N 63 63 
Note. *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.1 Negative binomial regression for DV Followership: 
Odds ratios (Exp(B)) and standard error (SE) are displayed. Linear regression analyses for DV 
Reactions (adjusted R2 = .858): Standardized beta coefficients and standard errors of 
measurement (SEM) are displayed.  
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Table C. The impact of personal, structural, and social media characteristics of Swiss political 
actors on the amount of followers and reactions on Twitter during the non-election phase of the 
49th legislation 
  
 Model 3: Twitter 
Digital followership 
Exp(B) (SE) 
Model 4: Twitter 
Digital reactions 
Beta (SEM) 
Age  .962***(.010) -.064 (.033) 
Gender .852 (.167) .012 (.563) 
Education .989 (.212) .064 (.611) 
Ideology .953**(.016) .051 (.001) 
Parliamentary activity 1.007+(.004) .026 (.11) 
Urbanization  1.011**(.004) -.084 (.013) 
Wing party .756 (.209) -.032 (.668) 
Incumbency 1.004 (.019) .169 (.062) 
Vote percentage 1.006 (.006) -.202+ (.018) 
Key position 1.008 (.077) -.209* (.237) 
Media coverage 1.001***(.000) .470** (.001) 
Financial resources 1.001 (.007) -.021 (.19) 
Adoption 1.001***(.000)  -.278* (.001) 
Activity 1.151 (.155) -.101 (.526) 
Digital Followership - -.087 (.000) 
Adjusted R2 - .150 
Interception 464.75*** (.65) - 
Goodness of fit (Chi-Square) 1.180 - 
Omnibus test (Chi-Square) 114.08*** - 
95% Wald CI .526 and .864 - 
N 108 108 
Note. *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.1 Negative binomial regression for DV Followership: 
Odds ratios (Exp(B)) and standard error (SE) are displayed. Linear regression analyses for DV 
Reactions (adjusted R2 = .858): Standardized beta coefficients and standard errors of 
measurement (SEM) are displayed. 
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Appendix C. Personal, structural and social media characteristics predicting the amount 
of likes, comments and shares on Facebook and the amount of favorites and retweets on 
Twitter 
Since our aggregated variable reactions included likes, comments and shares on Facebook and 
favorites and retweets on Twitter, we calculated the same models for each indicator to check 
whether there are were any differences between them. Yet, there were almost none. 
Citizens on Facebook like public messages of higher educated politicians, but do not 
comment or share them (see Table D compared to Table B). Furthermore, the aggregate 
reactions did not reveal that Facebook users like public posts of politicians who are more 
ideologically right-leaning (b = .097, SE = .688, p = .061). Additionally, whereas the aggregate 
reactions already showed that media coverage leads to fewer reactions, the reactions split up 
uncover that this is true for likes and comments but not for shares (b = -.087, SE = .002, p = 
.403). Finally, there is a negative correlation between comments and activity (b = -.115, SE = 
1.97, p = .089). Users comment more if a politician posts more rarely, which is probably due to 
the resources of users.  
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Table D. The impact of personal, structural, and social media characteristics of Swiss political 
actors on the amount of the digital reactions likes, comments and shares on Facebook during 
the non-election phase of the 49th legislation  
 
 Facebook: 
“Likes” 
Beta (SEM) 
Facebook: 
“Comments” 
Beta (SEM) 
Facebook: 
“Shares” 
Beta (SEM) 
Age  .054 (.473) .043 (.074) .119 (.088) 
Gender .050 (9.39) .040 (1.47) -.022 (1.74) 
Education .110+ (8.59) .096 (1.34) .120 (1.60) 
Ideology .097+ (.688) .096 (.107) .083 (.128) 
Parl. activity .004 (.182) .016 (.028) .120 (.034) 
Urbanization  -.035 (.181) -.021 (.028) -.106 (.034) 
Wing party .005 (11.07) .072 (1.73) -.054 (2.06) 
Incumbency -.032 (.781) -.032 (.122) -.046 (.154) 
Vote percentage .032 (.381) -.068 (.059) -.008 (.071) 
Key position .012 (3.90) -.010 (.608) -.094 (.724) 
Media coverage -.140+ (.010) -.129+ (.002) -.087 (.002) 
Financial resources -.048 (.276) -.026 (.043) -.067 (.051) 
Adoption -.054 (.007) .011 (.001) .020 (.001) 
Activity -.061 (12.66) -.115+ (1.97) -.155 (2.35) 
Followership .987*** (.001) .986*** (.000) .894*** (.000) 
Adjusted R2 .864 .856 .716 
N 63 63 63 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .1, N = 108. Linear regression analyses. 
Standardized beta coefficients and standard errors of measurement (SEM) are displayed. 
 
The aggregated results of reactions are the same for favorites and retweets separately with one 
exception (compare Table E with Table C): Whereas tweets are more often retweeted if the 
politician is member of a party with low vote percentage, they do not “favorite” their tweets 
more often (b = -.125 , SE = .010, p = .248). Twitter users thus help spread their tweets rather 
with retweets than favorites to make them more visible.   
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Table E. The impact of personal, structural, and social media characteristics of Swiss political 
actors on the amount of the digital reactions favorites and retweets on Twitter during the non-
election phase of the 49th legislation  
 Twitter: 
“Favorites” 
Beta (SEM) 
Twitter: 
“Retweets” 
Beta (SEM) 
Age  -.105 (.018) -.011 (.018) 
Gender .082 (.312) -.062 (.302) 
Education .017 (.338) .105 (.327) 
Ideology .042 (.028) -.042 (.027) 
Parliamentary activity -.006 (.006) .056 (.006) 
Urbanization  -.041 (.007) -.116 (.007) 
Wing party -.119 (.370) .065 (.358) 
Incumbency .138 (.034) .177 (.033) 
Vote percentage -.125 (.010) -.252*(.010) 
Key position -.208*(.131) -.179+ (.127) 
Media coverage .478***(.000) .392**(.000) 
Financial resources .017 (.011) -.058 (.010) 
Adoption -.291** (.000) -.222* (.000) 
Activity -.083 (.291) -.106 (.282) 
Followership -.090 (.000) -.071 (.000) 
Adjusted R2 .141 .125 
N 108 108 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .1, N = 108. Linear regression analyses. 
Standardized beta coefficients and standard errors of measurement (SEM) are displayed. 
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Appendix D. Personal and structural characteristics predicting the amount of reactions 
media coverage. 
 
We conducted negative binomial regression analysis to find out which personal and structural 
characteristics explain the amount of media coverage of the members of Swiss parliament 
during the non-election phase of the 49th legislation. We found that younger (Exp(B) = .978, 
SE = .342, p < .001), female (Exp(B) = .769, SE = .005, p < 0.01) and long-term incumbents 
(Exp(B) = 1.072, SE = .001, p < .001) in key positions (Exp(B) = 1.179, SE = .039, p < .001) 
and with many financial resources (Exp(B) = 1.010, SE = .003, p < .001) have higher odds to 
receive media coverage about themselves (see Table F).  
  
Table F. The impact of personal and structural characteristics of Swiss political actors on the 
amount of media coverage during the non-election phase of the 49th legislation 
  
 Media coverage 
Exp(B) (SE) 
Age  0.978*** (.342) 
Gender 0.769* (.005) 
Education 1.137 (.091) 
Ideology 0.999 (.008) 
Parliamentary activity 1.003 (.002) 
Urbanization  1.003 (.002) 
Wing party 1.044 (.112) 
Incumbency 1.072*** (.001) 
Vote percentage 0.996 (.003) 
Key position 1.179*** (.039) 
Financial resources 1.010** (.003) 
Interception 6.494*** (.34) 
Goodness of fit (Chi-Square) 0.986 
Omnibus test (Chi-Square) 100.21*** 
95% Wald CI .362 and .506 
N 245 
Note. *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, Negative binomial regression for DV Media coverage: 
Odds ratios (Exp(B)) and standard error (SE) are displayed.  
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Abstract 
Social bots mimic and potentially manipulate humans and their behaviours in social networks. 
The public sphere might be especially vulnerable to their impacts, which is why we first discuss 
their potential influence on the public sphere from a theoretical perspective. From an empirical 
perspective, we analysed Twitter followers of seven German parties before (N = 638,674) and 
during the 2017 electoral campaigns (N = 838,026) regarding bot prevalence and activities. The 
results revealed that the share of social bots increased from 7.1% before to 9.9% during the 
election campaigns. The percentage of active social bots remained roughly the same. An 
analysis of the content distributed by both the most popular and the most active bots showed 
that they disseminate few political hashtags, and that almost none referred to German politics. 
We discuss the results against the background of normative traditions of public sphere theories 
and address the methodological challenges bots pose in political communication. 
 
KEYWORDS: social bots, elections, Twitter, public sphere, Germany 
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1. Introduction 
Social bots are computer programs that mimic and potentially manipulate humans and 
their behaviours in social networks (Ferrara, Varol, Davis, Menczer, & Flammini, 2016; 
Wagner, Mitter, Körner, & Strohmaier, 2012). Bots post in online forums and dating platforms, 
and ‘like’, comment, and share social media contributions. They are cheap tools to make 
content, topics, or actors appear more popular than they really are. They start and catalyse online 
phenomena to stir outrage and artificial hypes, while neither people nor trending algorithms can 
discern them with full accuracy as non-human agents. Social bots differ from more general bot 
software that deliver simple services around information retrieval, selection or the creation of 
personalised preferences without directly interacting with Internet users (Woolley, 2016).  
Social bots are no longer a marginal phenomenon on social media platforms. On Twitter, 
9% to 15% of users are estimated to be bots (Varol, Ferrara, Davis, Menczer, & Flammini, 
2017). There has been an exponential growth in the number of Twitter bots on the largest open-
source online code repository, GitHub – which enables people with few programming skills to 
deploy social bots for their (political) purposes (Kollanyi, 2016). Their everyday occurrence 
makes analysis and reflection imperative from a social science perspective, and calls for a 
convergence of social and computational science approaches. How do social bots influence and 
change social and political discourses that are invisible and indiscernible to Internet users? Do 
social bots endanger and challenge the interactive and participatory potential of digital 
communication in mass democracies? How should studies assess empirical evidence of social 
bots’ prevalence, activities and impacts, and what does this mean for studies on political 
communication in social media generally?  
From the perspective of political communication, we address social bots from three 
angles: theoretical, empirical and methodological. We begin with a review of the theory and 
current literature regarding social bots, to discuss how they work and why they may create 
problems for democratic processes and public communication, drawing on public sphere 
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theories. We then present an empirical study of social bots among Twitter followers of 
Germany’s political parties before and during the country’s 2017 national election campaigns. 
From a methodological perspective, our paper raises the question how political communication 
scholars who work with social media data should deal with social bots.  
 
2. Theory: Social bots, agency and normative models of the public sphere 
From a theoretical perspective, social bots challenge many concepts that social scientists 
take for granted, for instance, the question what constitutes an actor. While some authors 
understand bots as “automated social actors” (Abokhodair, Yoo & McDonald, 2015, p. 2), the 
question of technology and non-human agency is theoretically more complex. Technologies 
designed and programmed by humans embody social values and business models; they are 
encoded with human intentions and have limited agency of their own (Klinger & Svensson, 
2018). Their behaviour is human-like and human-guided, which makes them human-dependent 
rather than autonomous actors. For instance, people overcome their physical limitations by 
using bots to retweet messages under multiple personas. Social bots impact communal 
relationship types (Vergemeinschaftung), i.e. social relationships based on a sense of belonging 
together, as well as associative relationships (Vergesellschaftung), i.e. social relationships 
based on rational agreements (Weber, 1922, §9). How do we account for social structures and 
relations that include social machines? And, since we know that social bots generate a large 
percentage of Internet traffic (Zeifman, 2015) and interact with human users, what does this 
mean for the formation of social relations and society, especially the public sphere? 
On the one hand, there are many useful tasks for social bots in political communication. 
Similar to bots helping people to choose new outfits, bots could help citizens identify their 
political preferences and match them with parties and candidates (e.g. in voting advice 
applications, such as Wahl-O-mat in Germany or Smartvote in Switzerland). On the other hand, 
problems start when bots operate in disguise, interacting with citizens, voters, and stakeholders 
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without people knowing. Social bots can orchestrate campaigns to hype organisations, alter 
perceptions of political reality by spreading propaganda (Abokhodair et al., 2015; Boshmaf, 
Muslukhov, Beznosov & Ripeanu, 2011), disrupt government and organisational 
communication (Woolley & Howard, 2016), feign grassroots movements (Rathnayake 
& Buente, 2017), spread misinformation (Shao, Ciampaglia, Varol, Yang, Flammini, & 
Menczer, 2018), and alter public opinion by simulating the popularity of or protest against 
topics or actors (Ferrara et al., 2016). This implies that an increasing amount of online 
communication is non-authentic, but at the same time intended to yield real consequences.  
Social bots can have different functions based on the behaviours they are programmed 
for. They can be merely passive, connecting with a number of accounts in order to boost the 
number of followers and their interconnectedness without contributing content. In this way, 
they make actors appear more popular and socially acceptable than they really are, encouraging 
others to follow or ‘like’ them (the so-called bandwagon effect, Sundar, Oeldorf-Hirsch, & Xu, 
2008). Alternatively, they could be active, liking, sharing, retweeting, commenting and 
broadcasting information, interacting in debates and fuelling discussions.  
Online public spheres, such as social media platforms and online forums, have become 
commonplace for deliberation, political talk, discourse, and the articulation and aggregation of 
political interests. Whether or not participants realise it, their interactions are likely to be 
infiltrated by social bots and their agendas; as Mitter, Wagner, & Strohmaier (2013, p. 1) put 
it: “Without a deep understanding of the impact of such attacks, the potential of online social 
networks as an instrument for facilitating discourse or democratic processes is in jeopardy.” 
However, whether social bots pose a threat to the public sphere or democracy largely depends 
on the normative perspective. Table 1 describes Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht’s (2002) 
four models of the public sphere in modern democracies: representative-liberal, participatory-
liberal, discursive and constructionist. 
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Table 1: Normative traditions of public spheres 
 
 
Inclusion 
 
Processes 
 
Key bot problems 
 
Representative-
liberal 
Elites, 
Experts 
Recurring exchange of 
political elites in elections 
Quantitative misrepresentation 
of popularity 
Participatory-
liberal 
Popular 
inclusion 
Plural decision-making 
Diffusion of fake political 
interests (astroturfing) 
Discursive 
Popular 
inclusion 
Deliberation 
Non-authentic, manufactured 
participants; Lack of mutual 
respect and rationality 
Constructionist 
Popular 
inclusion 
Empowerment of 
marginalized actors, 
Expansion of political 
community 
Non-authentic, manufactured 
participants 
 
Note. Overview of the models of public sphere is based on Ferree et al. (2002, p. 316). 
 
 
In a representative-liberal tradition, the public sphere is an elite-dominated, free and 
transparent forum that enables citizens to repeatedly choose (and replace) their representatives. 
In this instance, bots potentially disturb the key principles of proportionality and transparency. 
By discreetly making some ideas and actors appear more popular than they really are, coverage 
of political actors becomes disproportional to their de facto citizen following. Although citizens 
may be unaware of the situation, it becomes impossible for them to take popularity cues (Keller 
& Kleinen-von Königslöw, in press; Porten-Cheé, Haßler, Jost, Eilders & Maurer, 2017) from 
political actors in social networks as a proxy of public opinion and their popularity among 
fellow citizens, and there may even be a conflict of popularity cues online (likes, retweets) and 
offline (polls, media coverage). Thus, in a representative-liberal perspective, bots are a problem 
when they distort political competition, intervene in campaigns, and influence elections’ 
outcomes. If bots boost political parties or candidates’ number of Twitter followers, Facebook 
friends or group members, they threaten the functioning of key democratic processes. 
In a participatory-liberal tradition, the public sphere is a space for public discourse that 
seeks to achieve maximum popular inclusion – not only during election campaigns, but all the 
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time. Voices should not be linked to proportionality, but to plurality: all interests and actors in 
a community should be included and heard. However, with increasing bot presence, the desired 
inclusion of grassroots movements may turn more to astroturfing,  “grassroots support that is 
artificial because it is manufactured and does not arise spontaneously” (Klotz, 2007, p. 5). The 
principle of plurality is based on the premise of authentic interests and stakes in a society. Bots 
may insert non-authentic interests (interests no human or group in a society have ever voiced) 
and manipulated interests (fake interests that are manufactured to distort plurality). It becomes 
impossible for a society to monitor itself when machines disguised as societal members enter 
and manipulate the marketplace of ideas (Alexander, 2015). This means that bots are not only 
a problem because they lead to quantitative misrepresentations and make parties or candidates 
seem more popular than they are, but because they could potentially give voice to non-existent 
ideas. In the functioning of public spheres, this is particularly relevant when bots send and 
multiply (retweet) political messages. 
This aspect becomes even more toxic in the discursive tradition: “But when important 
normative questions are at stake, it is crucial that the discussion not be limited to actors at the 
centre of the political system. On such issues, a well-functioning public sphere should 
simultaneously include actors from the periphery as well [...]” (Ferree et al., 2002, p. 300). 
Habermas’s distinction between autonomous (autochtone) and power-regulated (vermachtete) 
actors from the periphery becomes obsolete when automated, manipulative and interest-driven 
bots enter a discourse. Bots have no intention to understand or consider others’ opinions, and 
their participation in political discourse only emphasises their creators’ lack of respect for 
deliberative processes. The idea that decisions are made collectively, and conflicts are resolved 
based on an argument’s quality rather than on the number of supporters for an argument, is 
irreconcilable with social bots. With bots, discourse becomes impossible; debate turns into a 
travesty. 
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Finally, a constructionist perspective on public spheres focuses not only on plurality and 
inclusion, but on difference and mutual recognition: “Recognition politics, sometimes called 
identity politics, creates a good public sphere by decentring dominant speakers and their 
assumptions of what is ‘natural’” (Ferree et al., 2002, p. 308). In this tradition, everything is 
political, whether it takes place in private or in public, wherever power structures appear. The 
normative objective is to give voice to the marginalised, contesting and breaking “the 
boundaries between the public and private” (p. 311). This notion of public conversation and 
democratic processes is seen as particularly vulnerable to the participation of bots, because it 
seeks to empower previously silent voices and to include fringe groups and their political 
claims, and prefers narrative styles over rational, unemotional debate. Bots can boost popularity 
cues and take on the identity of an assumed marginalised group (Howard, Wooley & Calo 
2018). Constructionist visions of public discourse depend on authentic individuals contributing 
genuine perspectives from their life-worlds (Lebenswelt), which are easily infiltrated and 
undermined by bots. 
Bots are not inherently evil forces, and they are not all problematic for the same reasons. 
Any assessment of their impacts must acknowledge their empirical behaviour patterns and a 
theoretical reflection on normative assumptions about political communication and the public 
sphere. 
 
3. Literature review: What we know about social bots in political communication 
While these questions are being discussed in blogs and newspapers, communication 
research is only starting to focus on social bots. Initial social science research projects have 
made it clear that social bots are by no means a merely technical phenomenon, but change how 
Internet users interact and form social relations among each other, and with institutions, 
organisations and society. Social scientists have only recently begun to address their potential 
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to intervene in election campaigns and to distort public communication and deliberation 
(Hegelich & Janetzko, 2016; Woolley, 2016). 
Social bots exist to participate in human interaction and discourse, and are finding a 
fertile habitat in social media networks. Approximately one-quarter of Donald Trump’s Twitter 
followers during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign were bots (Woolley & Howard, 2016b). 
By focusing on hashtags, Kollanyi, Howard and Woolley (2016) found that bots made up a 
large part of Twitter traffic during the campaign and privileged Trump messages over Clinton 
ones. Bessi and Ferrara (2016) found that social bots were present and did influence the U.S. 
presidential campaign, with about 20% bots involved, generating about 20% of the political 
debate on Twitter. They also showed how easy it is to employ bots, even for inexperienced and 
non-tech-savvy users, since they are offered by diverse companies, sometimes even on a 
monthly subscription basis (p. 2). Bots intervened in the Brexit debate (Howard & Kollanyi, 
2016), and the online petition for a second referendum on Brexit in June 2016 was “signed” by 
77,000 bots (BBC, 2016). Bastos and Mercea (2017) discovered a network of 13,493 
Twitterbots supporting the Leave EU campaign. Social bots drove the #MacronLeaks 
disinformation campaign: “the users who engaged with MacronLeaks are mostly foreigners 
with a pre-existing interest in alt-right topics and alternative news media, rather than French 
users with diverse political views. Concluding, anomalous account usage patterns suggest the 
possible existence of a black-market for reusable political disinformation bots” (Ferrara, 2017, 
p. 1). A study of Germany’s 2017 election campaigns at the Oxford Internet Institute found that 
“highly automated” tweeting increased from 5.7% to 7.4% between February and September 
2017. It also compared data from other projects but with the same research design, finding 
between 5.2% and 16.5% automated tweeting in various campaigns (Neudert, Kollanyi & 
Howard, 2017). Previous studies outside the U.S. and European contexts found that right-wing 
parties and radical opposition parties used social bots more often than other parties (Schäfer et 
al., 2017). Hegelich and Janetzko (2016) identified and analysed a botnet connected to the 
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Ukraine conflict and showed that social bots have political agendas and act relatively 
autonomously on the basis of complex algorithms.  
This is all the more relevant because experimental studies show that users perceive 
social bots as equally credible, competent, attractive and interactive as human agents (Edwards, 
Edwards, Spence & Shelton, 2014; Everett, Nurse & Erola, 2016). In this perspective, social 
bots can be understood as new actors in digital political communication and a key element of 
what has been termed computational propaganda: “We define computational propaganda as 
the assemblage of social media platforms, autonomous agents, and big data tasked with the 
manipulation of public opinion” (Woolley & Howard, 2016a). 
From previous empirical studies on social bots, we can conclude that bots are 
omnipresent on platforms, particularly on Twitter, and that they are being used to influence 
political and other debates. This case study of how social bots interfere with the digital public 
sphere focuses on Germany’s 2017 national elections seeks to answer five research questions 
detailed below.  
Previous studies found that between 5% and 25% of Twitter accounts are bots (Bessi 
& Ferrara, 2016; Neudert et al., 2017; Varol et al., 2017) and that the number of bots is higher 
during a campaign phase than in a non-electoral period, especially since bots are sometimes 
removed from a platform after a campaign (Bastos & Mercea, 2017). Based on this, we ask: 
RQ1: How many social bots follow Twitter accounts of German parties? 
RQ2: Are there more social bots during the election campaign than in the non-electoral 
period? 
 
While passive social bots among a party’s followers may increase their popularity, 
active bots’ functionalities are more sophisticated. They are able to ‘like’ or retweet parties’ 
messages, making them appear more popular and spreading them through the network. During 
election campaigns, the incentives to use bots to increase a party’s visibility and to impact on 
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political debate are higher, both for a party’s supporters or other actors with an interest in 
influencing an election (Ferrara, 2017). 
RQ3: Are there more active social bots during the election campaign than in the non-
electoral period? 
 
All but one political party in Germany have pledged to not strategically use social bots 
during their campaigns, after social bots became a topic of public debate. One party, the right-
wing populist AfD (Alternative for Germany) declared in October 2016 that “of course” they 
would implement social bots in the election campaign – “after all, for young parties such as 
ours social media tools are important instruments to proliferate our positions among voters”15 
(Stürzenhofecker, 2016, p. 1). A few days later, the party retracted this statement with a 
declaration not to use bots in the campaign. However, since similar right-wing populist parties 
in Japan and France used bots (Ferrara, 2017; Schäfer et al., 2017), and Neudert et al. (2017) 
found that most bots were supporting AfD, we ask: 
RQ4: Does the right-wing populist party AfD have the largest share of social bots 
among its followers? 
 
Most studies measuring bots during election campaigns have remained silent on the 
content disseminated by bots (Zhang & Lu, 2016). Bots’ presence alone is regarded as 
problematic. Nonetheless, it is possible that the same bots that boost parties and candidates’ 
popularity levels spread no political messages, only commercial advertisements (Maireder, 
Weeks, Gil de Zúñiga, & Schlögl, 2016) or even nonsensical content (Bucher, 2017). We 
                                                 
15 Original quote: “Gerade für junge Parteien wie unsere sind Social-Media-Tools wichtige Instrumente, um 
unsere Positionen unter den Wählern zu verbreiten.”  
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investigate whether bots post political content, and if they do it more often during an election 
period than in a non-electoral period. 
RQ5: Do social bots disseminate political content, and if so, more during the election 
campaign than in the non-electoral period? 
 
A final aspect in this literature review addresses the methodological approaches of bot-
detection in studies. Bots avoid detection, and their creators invest effort into their resembling 
human users. Thus, it is not easy to identify bots and to distinguish these Twitter accounts from 
human accounts. Zhang and Lu’s (2016) computational approach used a user’s network 
information to determine whether an account is a bot or a human on Weibo. Thus, they 
identified “millions of spammers” (Zhang & Lu, 2016, p. 14). The downside of their strategy 
is that they can only identify spambots depending on someone’s network. Another approach, 
that of Hegelich and Janetzko (2016), is based on the URL that a tweet was sent from, which 
can be retrieved as part of a tweet’s metadata. By manually identifying tweets sent from obvious 
bot creators, such as Twifarm, they searched for accounts that followed these bots in order to 
unveil bot-networks. This approach is only possible if one starts with hashtags and tweets, not 
with Twitter accounts, because account metadata contains no URL information. The downside 
is that this method only detects a small number of active bots. For instance, in Hegelich and 
Janetzko’s case study, only 1,740 bots followed one another. Another approach is to identify 
and single out behavioural aspects that differ from human users, such as a high frequency of 
messages sent. Various studies on campaigns (Howard & Kollanyi, 2016; Neudert et al., 2017) 
came from a group of scholars who count any account that sends out more than 50 tweets per 
day as bot, assuming “high automation”. Needless to say, it is possible for a person to send 50 
tweets per day (Musgrave, 2017). Also, not all bot accounts are this active, since passive bots 
exist only to boost certain accounts’ follower numbers. Thus, this approach can only capture a 
specific bot type that broadcasts very actively. There is also the strategy of detecting social bots 
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via near-duplicate tweets (copies or very similar versions of the same tweet sent by multiple 
bots), which bots use to inflate certain topics’ frequency and importance (Schäfer, Evert & 
Heinrich, 2017). While this detection method is very useful, it remains unclear whether humans 
copied and pasted a tweet’s content (Musgrave, 2017). Even if these copy-and-paste users were 
bots, they discover only one type of active copy-bots. Another share of studies uses multiple 
indicators to detect social bots: More elaborate ones use indicators such as “tweets to user”, 
“mean tweet to retweet”, “common words in the username” or “ratio of outbound to inbound 
@-mentions” (Bastos & Mercea, 2017, p. 6) to capture more than simple automated accounts. 
A similar approach, by Guo and Chen (2014), with a focus on geotagged tweets, proposes four 
steps to identify spambots, including machine learning techniques. A drawback is the focus on 
geotagged tweets, because many Twitter users opt out of this option. Although very elaborate, 
these techniques are hardly reproducible, since they require programming skills, which many 
social scientists (like us) lack.  
With any bot-detection method, scholars face two key problems: 1) the cat-and-mouse 
game between bot creators and bot-detection developers and 2) the limited availability of data 
from commercial platforms. With complete datasets, it should be easy for platform owners to 
detect bots, but the incentive to do this and to delete these accounts is perhaps not worth 
pursuing: bot accounts do not buy anything and have no value for advertisers, but they keep the 
user numbers high. A sudden drop in platform users may unsettle shareholders. Thus, scholars 
must make the best of a tough situation. Here, we use the bot-detection tool Botometer, which 
was developed and maintained by computer scientists; it checks more than 1,000 variables of 
an account for features that are typical for bots (Davis, Varol, Ferrara, Flammini, & Menczer, 
2016). This tool has been used in previous studies and is currently the most sophisticated, 
reliable and available instrument for bot-detection (see the next section on methods). Botometer 
is open for other scholars to detect social bots on Twitter so as to replicate our analysis. 
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4. Data and methods  
We collected data on all Twitter accounts that followed the five German parties 
represented in parliament: conservative CDU and CSU, social-democrat SPD, socialist Die 
Linke, and environmentalist Die Gruenen. We also studied the liberal FDP, and right-wing 
populist AfD, which were considered likely to successfully (re-)enter Germany’s Parliament in 
2017 (and did). There were two data collection waves: the first, before campaigns started in 
January and February 2017, and the second during the week before Election Day on 24 
September 2017. 
For both waves, we first downloaded the Twitter account data of all followers of the 
seven German parties, including metadata such as their Twitter ID, screen name and numbers 
of followers, following and tweets (via BirdSong Analytics). Metadata also included 
information on account activity, i.e. whether or not a follower had been active in the past three 
months – that is, whether he or she tweeted, retweeted, liked or replied to a tweet. Downloading 
took place between 1 January and 13 February 2017 for the non-election period (1.180.362 
accounts), and from 12 to 14 September 2017 for the campaign period (1.588.213 accounts).  
In the second step, we used Botometer to identify bots and distinguish them from 
humans in an automated analysis via Botometer’s API (Python 3.5). Since social bots constantly 
change their appearance, they are complicated to detect (Thieltges, Schmidt, & Hegelich, 2016). 
Botometer is a publicly available bot-detection instrument created and maintained by computer 
scientists at the University of Indiana. At the time of our study, it was the most sophisticated 
available instrument and has been used in several academic research projects, both by the 
creators and other scholars (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016; Ferrara, 2017). To ensure quality and 
comparability between the two waves, we kept in close contact with the computer scientists 
who maintain Botometer (and are greatly indebted to them for their kind support). However, 
we need to stress that bot detection is not an exact science, and Botometer also comes with 
serious limitations that we detail below. 
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Botometer “generates more than 1,000 features using available metadata and 
information extracted from interaction patterns and content” (Davis et al., 2016, p. 2). These 
are grouped into six main classes, (Varol et al., 2017): user features include the number of 
followers and tweets produced by users; friends encompasses follower-friend relations such as 
retweeting and mentioning behaviours between one another; network characteristics include in-
strength and out-strength (weighted degree) distributions, density and clustering; content and 
language features include statistics about length and entropy of tweets and part-of-speech 
tagging; sentiment features encompass arousal, valence and dominance, happiness, polarisation, 
strength and emoticon scores (see Varol et al., 2017). From these, Botometer calculates a 
probability score between 0 (human) and 1 (bot) for each Twitter account. Overall, the tool has 
an accuracy of 0.86 and suggests that 9% to 15% of all Twitter users are bots (Varol et al., 
2017). Because the tool is better equipped to identify humans than bots, our threshold for bots 
should be fairly high – not all accounts with a probability score over 0.5 should be counted as 
bots.  
We conducted step three, data manipulation and cleansing, in R (R Core Team, 2017). 
Botometer could only evaluate about half of the Twitter accounts: 54% of followers in the non-
electoral period (N = 638,674) and 53% of followers in the campaign period (N = 838,026), 
which constituted our sample (see Tables 2 and 3). Three errors prevented Botometer from 
calculating a final score for the remaining 541,688 follower accounts in the non-electoral and 
750,187 accounts in the campaign phase: (1) an empty timeline (478,954 / 667,477 accounts), 
(2) the deletion of a Twitter account in the days between data collection and data analysis (1,269 
/ 2,135), and (3) privacy settings not authorising access to run an analysis (61,465 / 80,575). 
This points to a serious limitation of Botometer. While social media platforms monitor their 
users’ behavior and remove suspicious accounts such as social bots (Lorenz 2018), external bot 
detection tools struggle with the platform’s API access and its corresponding restrictions. 
Botometer cannot include a user’s past activity in its analysis (when a user deletes all previous 
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activity, Botometer cannot calculate a score). Additionally, Botometer’s access is limited by 
the user’s privacy settings (bots may hide behind the veil of strict privacy settings). This leaves 
us with a specific kind of accounts: Twitter accounts with weak privacy settings, which were 
not deleted between data retrieval and the completion of analysis, with at least one tweet, 
retweet or like. However, it should be underlined that all current bot detection tools and methods 
are imperfect. Despite these limitations, Botometer is a not-for-profit, academic project that has 
been and is widely used (e.g. by the PEW Institute), publishes about how it works and is based 
on a multitude of possible indicators – which makes it a viable tool for the purpose of this study. 
 
Table 2: Data of the non-electoral period (January to February 2017) 
 Number 
of 
Followers 
(total) 
Final data  Error 
(Sum) 
Error: 
No 
Timeline 
Error: 
Page 
does not 
exist 
anymore 
Error: 
Not 
authorized 
AfD 47.534 31.885 15.649 11.946 12 3.691 
CDU 161.025 88.207 72.818 61.766 796 10.256 
CSU 123.324 60.795 62.529 56.607 36 5.886 
FDP 148.311 75.470 72.841 66.119 33 6.689 
GRUENE 290.679 160.152 130.527 115.769 144 14.614 
LINKE 155.599 86.447 69.152 61.324 57 7.771 
SPD 253.890 135.718 118.172 105.423 191 12.558 
Sum 1.180.362 638.674 541.688 478.954 1.269 61.465 
 
 
Table 3: Data of the campaign period (September 2017) 
 Number 
of 
Followers 
(total) 
Final data  Error 
(Sum) 
Error: 
No 
Timeline 
Error: 
Page 
does not 
exist 
anymore 
Error: 
Not 
authorized 
AfD 74.923 44.912 30.011 24.541 228 5.242 
CDU 221.114 118.446 102.668 89.469 306 12.893 
CSU 166.631 81.389 85.242 76.875 221 8.146 
FDP 244.624 119.124 125.500 114.340 337 10.823 
GRUENE 356.481 192.472 164.009 146.104 358 17.547 
LINKE 200.089 110.578 89.511 78.956 332 10.223 
SPD 324.351 171.105 153.246 137.192 353 15.701 
Sum 1.588.213 838.026 750.187 667.477 2135 80.575 
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To allow direct comparability between the different number of party followers and the 
metric scale scores, we calculated probability density functions (PDF), which we present as 
density plots. To answer RQ1 to RQ5, we set the threshold for detecting bots depending on the 
density plots and accuracy of Botometer.  
For a content analysis of messages that bots disseminated (RQ5), we selected the 100 
most active bots (number of tweets sent) and the 100 most popular bots (number of followers). 
Both vary significantly from the general bot population and represent the peak of the long-tail 
distribution of bots’ activity and popularity: While the 100 most active bots sent on average 
94,920/113,200 tweets (non-electoral/election period), the average of all bots was 171/120 
tweets. The 100 most popular bots had an average of 45,950/81,520 followers, whereas the 
average of all bots was 106/90 followers. With this focus we investigate two very specific types 
of bots: the most popular bots, which could potentially function as opinion leaders reaching a 
large number of Twitter users and the most active, which could potentially flood the 
twittersphere with political content. After having downloaded their tweets for the extended non-
electoral period between 2 January and 2 April 2017 (N(active) = 60,262, N(popular) = 42,425), and 
the extended campaign period between 24 June and 24 September 2017 (N(active) = 36,804, 
N(popular) = 14,130), we extracted all hashtags used in these posts to assess the overall topics of 
these tweets (Bruns & Burgess, 2015; Small, 2011). The 100 most used hashtags for both the 
most active and most popular bots in both periods were manually coded by the authors. We 
analysed 400 hashtags to assess whether they were political (e.g. #Brexit), and checked the 
tweets containing the hashtag for verification. The pre-test of 50 hashtags showed good 
reliability of the coders with a Krippendorff’s alpha of 0.87. 
 
5. Results  
We compared the distribution of scores between 0 (human) and 1 (bot) across the seven 
German parties’ followers. We found three different patterns in the non-electoral period; while 
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in the campaign period, all parties except the right-wing populist AfD show a similar pattern 
(see Figure 1 and Figure 2).  
During the non-electoral period, CDU, CSU and FDP had a similar score distribution, 
as did SPD, Linke and Gruene; AfD showed a unique pattern. In the election phase, the general 
score distribution moved to the right, indicating a tendency of more bots among party followers. 
This is also true for AfD, whose follower distribution changed only marginally between the 
non-electoral and the campaign periods, although they gained more followers in the time 
between the two waves (+27,389 followers, +57%).  
The strongest differences could be found regarding accounts that are most likely bots,  
followers with scores above 0.75. In the non-electoral period, SPD, Linke and Gruene showed 
a peak around 0.75, all other parties expressed a smaller peak between 0.85 and 1. During the 
campaign period, this peak between 0.85 and 1 was more pronounced for all parties. Notably, 
the probability density function pattern during the campaign period was very similar for all 
parties, except AfD. One reason for this, we discovered, is that most parties share followers. 
While AfD had about 45% single-party followers (followers that only follow AfD but no other 
party), the average share of single-party followers among all other parties was 17%. This means 
that approximately 83% of Twitter users in our data (whether human or bot) followed multiple 
parties. The share of single-party followers decreased slightly from February to September (-
2%), so during the campaigns, more followers chose to also follow other parties. This also 
indicates that a surplus of followers does not necessarily mean that more people follow parties 
on Twitter, but that people who already follow a party also follow other parties. Among the 
407,851 new followers the parties acquired between February and September, only 79,272 
(19%) were single-party followers. 
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Figure 1: All followers’ probability of being a bot in the non-election phase in a density plot 
(January and February 2017) 
 
 
Note. Density plot of all seven German parties’ followers and their Botometer scores in the non-
election phase. N = 638.674, bandwidth = ndr0 (see Silverman, 1986). The area between two 
scores and the function = the probability of a follower receiving such a score. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: All followers’ probability of being a bot in the campaign period in a density plot 
(September 2017) 
 
 
Note. Probability density function (PDF) of all seven parties’ followers and their Botometer 
scores in the election phase. N = 838.026, bandwidth = ndr0 (see Silverman, 1986). The area 
between two scores and the function = the probability of a follower receiving such a score. 
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Considering Botometer’s accuracy, the hard task to distinguish between humans and 
bots in general, and the distribution of the scores in our two waves, we set the threshold for bots 
at a score of 0.76. We found that the share of social bots fall mostly in the expected range of 
5% to 25% (RQ1) (see Table 4).  
Comparing the two waves, almost all parties had more followers, and most parties had 
more social bots among their followers in the campaign period than in the non-electoral period: 
AfD gained 0.4% more bots, Gruene 4.2%, Die Linke 8.3% and SPD 8.2%. Some parties had 
fewer bots during the campaign period: CDU -0.3% bots, CSU -0.8% and FDP -0.2%. Overall, 
the mean share of social bots among the seven German parties’ followers rose from 7.1% to 
9.9% (11,105 to 23,373 social bots), but not for all parties (RQ2). 
Of these social bots, 212 (2%) on average per party were active during the non-electoral 
period and 314 (1.4%) during the campaign period. The numbers for each party are reported in 
Table 4. Social bots were not more active during the campaign period (RQ3). 
Regarding RQ4, whether the populist party AfD had the highest number of social bots 
among its followers, our analysis revealed that during the campaign, AfD actually had the 
smallest share of bots among its followers (7.1%, 5,325 social bots). In the non-electoral period, 
AfD had a below-average share of social bots (6.7%, 3,181). However, AfD bots were 
particularly active: AfD had the second highest share of active social bots, with 2.8% during 
the non-electoral period and 1.7% during the campaign period. The data suggests that AfD had 
a larger share of human scores than all the other parties (scores lower than 0.4), a much higher 
share of active followers (33%/26% compared to an average of 15%/14.5% for the other 
parties), and the highest share of active humans. 
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Table 4. Bot presence and activity on Twitter in the non-electoral and campaign periods of 
Germany’s 2017 national election 
 
 
 
Non-Electoral Period Campaign period 
 Social bots 
among followers 
(%) 
Active bots 
among  
social bots 
(%) 
Social bots  
among  
followers 
(%) 
Active bots 
among  
social bots 
(%) 
AfD 3.181 (6,7 %) 88 (2,8 %) 5.325 (7,1 %) 90 (1,7 %) 
CDU 16.419 (10,2 %) 399 (2,4 %) 21.981 (9,9 %) 363 (1,7 %) 
CSU 13.759 (11,2 %) 253 (1,8 %) 17.238 (10,4 %) 236 (1,4%) 
FDP 16.180 (10,9 %) 287 (1,8 %) 26.087 (10,7 %) 338 (1,3 %) 
GRU 19.287  (6,6 %) 196 (1,0 %) 38.549 (10,8 %) 485 (1,3 %) 
LIN 1.696 (1,1 %) 9 (0,5 %) 18.734 (9,4 %) 243 (1,3 %) 
SPD 7.212 (2,8 %) 267 (3,7 %) 35.697 (11 %) 445 (1,3 %) 
Mean 11.105 (7,1 %) 212 (2 %) 23.373 (9,9 %) 314 (1,4 %) 
 
 
Finally, we analysed the content of the tweets from social bots in the non-electoral and 
the campaign periods. Of the 100 most frequent hashtags distributed by social bots following a 
German party in the non-electoral period, the popular bots used 13 political hashtags (the 
frequency of a hashtag’s use ranged from 34 to 2,375, median = 71.5) and the most active bots 
30 (the frequency ranged from 30 to 1965, median = 65.5). With one exception, these political 
hashtags did not refer to German politics. They covered issues concerning politics in Austria, 
the EU (without a focus on Germany), France, Great Britain, Nigeria and the U.S. The one 
exception was one very popular bot that distributed the hashtag #AfD to promote its political 
agenda, with a total of 53 tweets. Most non-political hashtags and tweets were advertisments 
(ads for jobs, paintings, financial investments, etc.).  
During the campaign period, the use of political hashtags decreased. Of the 100 hashtags 
analysed for each set, the most popular bots used only seven political hashtags (the frequency 
ranged from 12 to 2,263, median = 23), the most active bots only eight (the frequency ranged 
from 42 to 1,916, median = 73.5). Again, none of the political hashtags referred to German 
politics; most concerned U.S. finance and climate change politics (such as #MisesInstituteUSA, 
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#DavidStockmansContraCorner, #environment, #green, #climatechange). Fewer hashtags 
related to Nigerian politics (#Biafra). Similar to the non-electoral period, most hashtags had a 
promotional purpose (#yoga, #realestate, #porn, #software, etc.) in the campaign period.  
Regarding RQ5, neither the most popular nor the most active bots tweeted more political 
content during the election campaign than during the non-electoral period. However, we need 
to be cautious and cannot generalize from the 400 most active and most popular bots, because 
they are not representative for the overall bot population. It may well be possible that bots did 
not include one of the 400 most used hashtags in their political tweets or that they actively 
disseminated electoral propaganda without following a political party and would therefore not 
be included in our data. 
 
6. Discussion  
Social bots in the digital public sphere pose at least three challenges for political 
communication research: theoretical challenges to established concepts of social science, 
empirical challenges of detection and the measurement of impacts, and methodological 
challenges to the general validity of popularity cues and social media analysis.  
In summary, we analysed Twitter follower accounts of seven German parties before and 
during the 2017 electoral campaign. The analysis confirmed previous studies by showing that 
the share of social bots among these parties’ Twitter followers increased from 7.1% before to 
9.9% during the election campaigns. Three research questions resulted in findings diverging 
from previous studies: the share of active social bots did not increase during the election 
campaigns; AfD did not have more bot-followers than the other parties – on the contrary, it had 
the smallest share. The bots that we identified distributed almost no hashtags connected to 
German politics. These findings have significant implications.  
Connecting our findings to Ferree et al.’s (2002) four normative models of the public 
sphere, the potential damage caused by social bots in election campaigns covers a spectrum of 
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problems. From a representative-liberal perspective, the results show that bots caused a 
quantitative misrepresentation of popularity, because roughly 10% of Twitter followers were 
bots disguised as humans. In particular, in the case of SPD and Linke, the share of bots among 
followers increased by more than 8% during the campaigns. Thus, their follower growth of 22% 
each appears bigger than it really was if we only accept humans as authentic followers. Thus, 
social bots did manipulate popularity cues, disturbing the principles of proportionality and 
transparency during the campaigns. However, their impact remains purely in numbers, because 
we found hardly any political content spread by bots that related to the election. From a 
participatory-liberal and discursive perspective, it is interesting that the share of bots increased 
during election campaigns. In this tradition, the focus is much less on elections than on popular 
inclusion and authentic debate with genuine contributions at all times. The share of active bots 
(bots that like, share, comment and discuss) was very low: 2% and less in both waves. While 
the proponents of participatory-liberal and discursive understandings of public spheres would 
not exculpate bots as non-authentic participants in political debate, the low bot activity and their 
predominant distribution of non-political content would certainly be a consolation for them. 
From a constructionist perspective, the low bot activity is a greater reason for concern. Seeing 
it as crucial to include previously silent, marginalised voices in public discourse, the presence 
of software actors deliberately designed to manipulate popularity cues or contributions totally 
undermines the notion of a public sphere, whether during an election campaign or at any other 
time, whether or not they are active.  
Another interesting, perhaps peculiar pattern that begs for theoretical reflection relates 
to right-wing populist AfD. In line with current literature pointing to the rather thin empirical 
evidence for echo chambers (Dubois & Blank, 2018; Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017), the increase of 
multi-party followers in the electoral period indicates that echo chambers are indeed rather 
unlikely in the broader population of Twitter followers of German political parties in general. 
It rather seems that people who already follow one or more parties on Twitter, tend to expand 
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their following to more parties during the campaigns. Thus, to some extent, the parties in our 
sample share the same followers, and the number of followers increases in the second wave, 
because followers follow more parties during the campaigns than before. AfD, however, varies 
significantly from this pattern: AfD has by far the largest share of active followers (about twice 
as many as the other parties) as well as by far the highest share of single-party followers (45%, 
so about half of the AfD followers follow AfD only). Also, bots among AfD followers were 
particularly active. This can be read as an indicator that echo chambers are more likely to be 
found among AfD followers, may they be bots or humans. AfD followers seem to be much less 
interested in other political parties and to a much stronger degree form networks of like-
mindedness. 
From our descriptive data on bot presence and activity we cannot judge whether they 
caused any actual harm to the campaigns and the electoral process. We should also not forget 
about human actors who actively manipulate public discourse on Twitter. Other reports on the 
same election, that focused on other data (hashtags), found that “traffic about the far-right 
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) accounts for a surprisingly large portion of Twitter activity 
given that party’s share of voter support” (Neudert, Kollyani & Howard 2017: 1). What we can 
say for sure is that bots were clearly present, and their omnipresence on social media platforms, 
combined with their role in other campaigns, should keep social media researchers alert, 
providing a sound reason to closely monitor their activities. 
Methodologically, social bots challenge the validity of social media studies: if a large 
part of likes, tweets, shares and comments originates from bots, how can results from 
quantitative studies measuring political actors’ interactivity and popularity on social media be 
validated? The findings show that even the increase in followers needs further differentiation: 
Are new followers really ‘new’? Are they even persons? We propose that a standardised test 
for bot activity should become part of empirical studies about political communication on social 
media, in order to ensure results’ validity. To address this challenge, social scientists must 
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cooperate with computer scientists and push for more and better tools to monitor bot activity 
on social media platforms. This also entails a more critical stance towards the validity of data 
from social networks – a key question for research quality, and not only in political 
communication. When large numbers of interactions on social media platforms are generated 
by bots, this must be reflected in the results and conclusions of studies based on this data type, 
for instance, network analyses of political actors or analyses of campaign communication on 
social media platforms. 
As with all single-case studies, this analysis has limitations. We examined only one 
election campaign, in one country, on one platform, with one bot detection tool. Future studies 
should compare various countries and compare their findings with different bot detection tools. 
One could also start with hashtags instead of follower accounts. Analysing hashtags would by 
default include exclusively active accounts that actually tweet, so that Botometer should 
perform better in such a design. Bot-detection is neither 100% accurate nor could it, in our 
study, deliver scores for about half of the accounts in our dataset. Building social bots that 
mimic human behaviour and building tools to identify them is a cat-and-mouse game. There is 
uncertainty about the accurate identification of bots; followers with a score around 0.6 remain 
hard to classify. The grey area is even larger when including Twitter accounts that produced an 
error: almost 89% of them had never sent a tweet (“no timeline error”). Is the sole purpose of 
these dead accounts or bots to make parties appear more popular than they really are? How 
many of them sent tweets but removed them before we could analyse the account? How many 
of them did not follow any political party but tweeted in favour of them? How many of the 
accounts with strict privacy settings, which we were not authorised to analyse, were bots 
actively tweeting?  
Clearly, we need more empirical research into bots, their activities and impacts. Future 
studies should ask how Internet users make sense of and construct perceptions of reality from 
their online interactions. How much do they know about social bots’ presence and activity? Are 
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they aware that they are interacting with social bots? Do they recall instances of interaction 
with bots? What are their perceptions of and opinions about social bots? Because people know 
what they know and what to think about from mass media (Luhmann, 2000), scholars should 
also analyse how journalists cover social bots. Are bots on media agendas? How is coverage 
about bots framed (as a technological phenomenon or a social issue)? Finally, researchers must 
remain alert to social bots and their influences on established theoretical concepts, digital 
empirical data and current methods when analysing digital communication. 
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Abstract 
Incidental exposure to shared news on Facebook is a vital but understudied aspect of how 
citizens get involved with politics. This experiment investigates the influence of recommender 
characteristics (tie strength, political knowledge, political similarity) and different media 
sources (tabloids, legacy and digital-born outlets) including multiple mediators (e.g., social 
pressure, outlet credibility) on incidental exposure to political news on Facebook. A 3x3 multi-
stimulus between-subject experiment with two additional quasi-factors and 135 different 
stimuli was conducted using a representative sample (N = 507). Results showed that strong ties 
and recommenders with high knowledge increase news exposure, but the impact of knowledge 
is limited to recommenders with similar political opinions. Similar effects occur for different 
media types, which also have an independent impact on news exposure. Structural equation 
modeling reveals that media source effects are mediated through media perceptions, whereas 
recommender effects work via the desire for social monitoring and perceived issue importance. 
 
KEYWORDS: incidental news exposure, news sharing, social ties, Facebook, experiment 
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In today’s high-choice media environment, it has become easier for citizens to only 
select news that is in line with their political leanings (Stroud, 2010) or to avoid political news 
altogether (Prior, 2007). In such a setting, incidental news exposure (INE) may become 
increasingly important to ensure that citizens encounter counter-attitudinal information or at 
least remain connected to the political public sphere. Social network sites (SNS) have been 
accused of further limiting the chances of INE through algorithmic curation (Thorson & Wells, 
2015), but have also been hailed as a promising new source of INE (Lee & Kim, 2017): Even 
Facebook users who have not intentionally subscribed to a news outlet or whose previous 
Facebook behavior has not marked them as a suitable target for sponsored posts by news 
organizations may encounter news articles in their newsfeed via social curation (Thorson 
& Wells, 2015), i.e., because someone in their personal network has shared an article. Though 
these personal news recommendations on Facebook are particularly important for citizens who 
do not follow news and politics on their own, we still know very little about the factors which 
turn incidental contact with news on Facebook into incidental news exposure.  
Based on a multiple stimuli experimental study (N = 507), the article addresses this 
research gap by investigating which personal news recommendations the recipients are more 
likely to follow. Drawing on the concept of informational utility (Knobloch-Westerwick & 
Kleinman, 2012), we assume that incidental news contact is more likely to become incidental 
news exposure if recipients attribute a higher degree of utility to the recommended content. As 
Facebook provides a social environment for news use, the recipient of personal news 
recommendation is likely to draw cues for informational utility from the recommender. 
Following the lead of Turcotte, York, Irving, Scholl, and Pingree (2015) who investigated the 
impact of personal news recommendations by Facebook friends perceived as opinion leaders 
on intentional news exposure, we assume that recipients use informational utility cues based 
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on how politically knowledgeable or politically similar the recommender is (politico-social 
cues). However, we also look in more detail at informational cues based on the closeness of 
the relationship to the recommender (social cue) by contrasting close and weak ties. In addition, 
we investigate whether the media outlet as the source of the recommended article also provides 
relevant cues for its potential informational utility (media cues). And finally we uncover the 
underlying mechanisms that encourage people to read shared news articles on Facebook (e.g., 
social pressure, social monitoring, issue importance, or outlet curiosity).  
 
Literature Review 
Given the importance of an informed citizenry for democracy, the decline in the overall 
reach of the news media and its detrimental effects on political knowledge and participation 
(Prior, 2007) have become a growing cause for concern. The now dominant online media have 
been both feared for reducing intentional news exposure by allowing users to focus more easily 
on their own, often apolitical, interests (Scheufele & Nisbet, 2002) and praised for increasing 
the chances of incidental news exposure due to the sheer vastness of political information 
available online (Tewksbury, Weaver, & Maddex, 2001). A number of studies have focused 
on the impact of INE via SNS on political knowledge and political participation: Kim, Chen, 
and Gil de Zúñiga (2013) pointed out that INE was more beneficial for those who are already 
interested in politics, further widening knowledge and participation gaps. By contrast, 
Valeriani and Vaccari (2015) reported that INE helps reduce participation gaps. These 
contradictory results indicate, first, a lack of differentiation between incidental news contact 
(INC) and INE, and second, a need to better understand how (social media) users select news 
following INC, i.e., which factors then encourage INE through which underlying mechanisms, 
particularly on SNS (Karnowski, Kümpel, Leonhard, & Leiner, 2017).  
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Recommender Cues as a Heuristic for News Exposure on Facebook 
Beyond sponsored posts by news companies, INC and INE on Facebook are mostly 
social experiences: They can occur when someone from a user’s social network recommends 
an article by sharing it. A promising way to determine whether such an article is then selected 
is the informational utility approach. Atkin (1973) proposed that information is perceived as 
more useful – and thus more likely to be read – the better it meets the individual’s needs for 
surveillance, performance, guidance and reinforcement information that support his or her 
cognitive, affective, behavioral or defense adaptation to uncertainty. However, news products’ 
informational utility can only be assessed after consumption. Hence, heuristics triggered by 
informational cues play a decisive role in deciding whether to select a specific news item or 
not (Marewski, Galesic, & Gigerenzer, 2009). While the informational utility concept has 
successfully been applied to explain, for example, selective exposure to online sources 
(Knobloch-Westerwick, Carpentier, Blumhoff, & Nickel, 2005), this articles explores whether 
the additional information on recommenders embedded in shared news on Facebook also 
provides users with cues relating to the informational utility of the recommended articles, and 
how these relate to an individual’s information needs as proposed by Atkin (1973).  
The impact of these informational cues related to the recommender should be 
comparatively strong as news exposure on Facebook is a far more social experience than in 
traditional media: Whereas concrete newspaper articles or newscast items might become the 
topic of interpersonal conversations from time to time, on Facebook a direct response or 
interaction following a news recommendation is far more likely. In addition, others can monitor 
whether the user has followed their recommendation whenever he/she reacts to the article (e.g., 
by commenting on it).  
Still, Facebook friendship networks consist of a wide range of different types of 
relationships – close friends, co-workers, distant relations, etc. – in other words both strong ties 
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and weak ties (Granovetter, 1973). For the question of INE via news recommendations, weak 
ties on Facebook are important because they potentially offer more (politically) diverse and 
new information compared to strong ties (Bakshy, Rosenn, Marlow, & Adamic, 2012). 
However, recent large-scale data analysis suggests that strong ties exert more influence than 
weak ties over the behavior of others in an individual’s personal network (Bond et al., 2012). 
This would suggest that Facebook users are also more likely to read articles recommended by 
close friends. 
There are two psychological mechanisms which may explain this influence of tie 
strength on news recommendations. According to Nadkarni and Hofmann (2012), Facebook 
use is driven by two main motives: the need to belong and the fear of ostracism. Social networks 
are used for “social grooming” (Tufekci, 2008), i.e., for fostering relationships to satisfy one’s 
need to belong. On the one hand, Facebook can thus be a positive tool for social monitoring, 
its use even increasing the “inquisitiveness” about one’s social network (Karakayali & Kilic, 
2013): Facebook users want to learn more about their own social network, their actions, 
interests and opinions, as this information is useful for maintaining or even intensifying the 
relationships. Just as the posted profile information, status updates and holiday pictures, news 
recommendations by friends can actively be used for this form of digital social monitoring. By 
reading the recommended article, the user can expect to learn more about the political opinions 
and interests of their friends which may be useful for future interactions by reducing 
communicatory uncertainty and thus fulfill the need for performance information (Atkin 1973). 
News recommendations by strong ties should thus have a greater informational utility as they 
allow users to increase their knowledge of the people they often interact with or value highly.  
However, there is also a downside to this usefulness of Facebook for social monitoring: 
It occurs in both directions. Facebook users know that their own actions are also monitored by 
their social network (Marder, Joinson, & Shankar, 2012). Looking at Facebook chats, Mai, 
INCIDENTAL NEWS EXPOSURE ON FACEBOOK AS A SOCIAL EXPERIENCE 
cxcv 
Freudenthaler, Schneider and Vorderer (2015) found that fear of isolation and ostracism 
increased the perceived social pressure to respond to messages. Similarly, users may feel social 
pressure to comply with news recommendations. Even though there is no direct social control 
– the recommending friend can only see whether friends have followed their recommendation 
if they react to it – being on Facebook creates a feeling of co-presence. This feeling of being 
observed (Marder et al., 2012) on Facebook may motivate users to follow the recommendations 
of a close friend and read the article simply to maintain the relationship, not because they are 
interested in his/her opinions and interests in the specific situation (i.e., social monitoring). 
Thus, we propose that both, social monitoring and social pressure, mediate the effect of tie 
strength. 
H1: Recommendations by strong ties lead to higher news exposure than 
recommendations by weak ties and articles without recommendation. 
H2: The effect of tie strength on news exposure is mediated via (a) an increased 
motivation for social monitoring and (b) greater perceived social pressure. 
The informational cues provided by the news recommendation of a friend, however, are 
not limited to these social cues related to how useful the article might be to manage personal 
relationships. The recommender may also trigger social cues related to how useful the 
recommended article might be for political questions (i.e., politico-social cues). According to 
the informational utility approach, people perceive news to be more useful if it provides them 
with information to satisfy guidance needs, i.e., to learn about and understand developments 
that may affect them and develop an opinion on them (Atkin, 1973). The usefulness of the 
information for guidance is perceived as higher if it comes from (or is recommended by) 
someone with expertise in the relevant field (Metzger & Flanagin, 2013). Especially on 
Facebook, where users feel (more) overloaded with news and information than, for example, 
while watching television (Hargittai, Neuman, & Curry, 2012), politico-social cues gain 
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importance. Turcotte et al. (2015) demonstrated that opinion leaders’ news recommendations 
on SNS increased the trust in the recommended news outlet and led to more intentional news 
exposure (news seeking) in the recommended news outlet than recommendations by persons 
not perceived as opinion leaders. An article shared by a friend who is perceived to be 
knowledgeable about the subject should thus have greater informational utility for the recipient 
because it signals that the article is perceived as relevant and recommendable by someone who 
has a comparatively high level of knowledge on the topic allowing the recipient to apply the 
expert heuristic.  
H3: Recommendations by Facebook friends perceived to be highly knowledgeable 
about the topic of the news article lead to higher news exposure than those by less 
knowledgeable friends and articles without a recommendation. 
According to partisan selective exposure theory, people employ a confirmation bias 
when selecting news and are more willing to expose themselves to attitude-consistent than to 
attitude-discrepant information as this fulfills their need for reinforcement (Knobloch-
Westerwick, Johnson, & Westerwick, 2015; Metzger & Flanagin, 2013). Hence, knowing 
whether the friend shares the same political leanings could serve as a further heuristic to help 
decide whether the article contains useful information and should be read. The results of large-
scale data analyses support this proposed mechanism on SNS – at least for political issues. 
Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic (2015) analyzed the subsequent usage of 7 million shared news 
articles on Facebook and found that only 20 to 30% of all clicked-on news articles were from 
politically dissimilar ties; the majority of articles that were ultimately read were recommended 
by like-minded ties. 
H4: Recommendations by Facebook friends perceived as having a similar opinion on 
the topic of the news article lead to higher news exposure than those by friends with a dissimilar 
opinion and articles without a recommendation. 
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Within the rationale of confirmation bias, it seems likely that the expected effect of the 
perceived knowledge of the recommender (see, H3) is not independent of the perceived opinion 
similarity. Users might expect news recommendations by friends with high topical knowledge 
to be even more useful when the recommended information is likely to be not only of superior 
quality but also to confirm existing beliefs. In contrast, news recommended by friends with 
high knowledge but a dissimilar opinion might still be perceived as useful for guidance needs 
and for specific goals such as preparing for a debate on the topic (Hart et al., 2009). At the 
same time, however, those recommendations could pose a serious threat to opinion 
reinforcement as they can be expected to contain strong counter-arguments to one’s own 
opinion and should thus be selected less (Hart et al., 2009). We investigate this possible 
interaction by asking whether the effect of the perceived knowledge of the recommender 
persists regardless of the expected utility to reinforce existing opinions. 
RQ1: Does a friend’s perceived political knowledge interact with perceived opinion 
similarity in predicting news exposure? 
To better understand why political knowledge and similarity of the recommending 
friend might affect the recipient’s news exposure, we will also take a look at the role of 
perceived issue importance as both as an independent outcome of news recommendations and 
as a mediator for news exposure. Traditionally, perceived issue importance was seen – on an 
aggregate level – as being driven by the media agenda in agenda setting processes. When taking 
a more fine grained look, however, it emerges that the perception of the relevance of a specific 
issue is not universal, it differs between social groups, or more precisely, issue publics, which 
are each more likely to select articles on “their” issues (Bolsen & Leeper, 2013). Furthermore, 
people are aware of these differences in issue importance between different groups and will 
adapt their assessments of issue importance accordingly: They are aware that some issues are 
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more important to themselves personally than to their social group or to society at large and 
vice versa (Glynn, Ostman, & McDonald, 1995). 
Moreover, recent research has pointed out that it does not require exposure to complete 
news items for changes in perceptions of issue relevance to occur. According to Stoycheff, 
Pingree, Pfeifer, and Sui (2018), agenda setting can also occur as agenda cueing when cues 
such as the number of posts about a topic are used to evaluate the relative importance of this 
topic. Still, given the social nature of INE on social networks, citizens’ perception of issue 
importance should be affected by the way in which it is brought to their attention, i.e., who 
“shared” and thus recommended the article. By sharing an article, the recommending friend 
clearly indicates that he or she believes this an important issue. If this friend is knowledgeable 
on the topic or has similar opinions on it, recipients should be more likely to trust his or her 
issue assessment and thus adjust their own perception of issue relevance which in turn should 
increase news exposure. 
Though these news recommendations should affect all perceptions of issue importance, 
we assume that their impact should be felt more when assessing issue importance for oneself 
and for one’s social group as people are focused on their own self-representation and the 
contact with their immediate social group on Facebook (Alhabash & Ma, 2017).  
H5: Recommendations by friends that are perceived as having high knowledge or a 
similar opinion on the topic, and the interaction of both increase perceived issue importance 
for (a) society, (b) one’s own social environment and (c) oneself. 
Perceived issue importance or topic relevance has also long since been identified as a 
main driver of news selection (Rubin, 1994) and might thus mediate the recommender effects 
on news exposure: As the recommenders’ high topical knowledge or opinion similarity 
increase the perceived issue importance, this could encourage news exposure. It remains to be 
seen, however, whether it is the perceived general relevance or the perceived personal 
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relevance of an issue that guides news selection (Bolsen & Leeper, 2013). Thus, we ask more 
broadly which kind of issue importance mediates the effects of the politico-social 
characteristics of the recommender. 
RQ2: Does the perceived importance of an issue for a) society, or b) one’s own social 
environment or c) oneself mediate the effects of the friend’s perceived political knowledge, of 
the friend’s perceived opinion similarity, and of their interaction on news exposure? 
 
Media Cues as a Heuristic for News Exposure 
Recipients have developed news preferences outside of Facebook, e.g., based on their 
political views (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009), their preference for entertainment rather than news 
(Aalberg, Blekesaune, & Elvestad, 2013) or for negative content and tabloid packaging 
(Kleemans, Hendriks Vettehen, Beentjes, & Eisinga, 2011). Since media outlets share the links 
to their news articles on Facebook, the users’ news preferences should guide their news 
selection on the social network site, too. Therefore, we expect that recipients’ news exposure 
differs for media source cues from legacy, tabloid and digital-born media according to their 
preferences.  
Three possible underlying psychological mechanisms can explain how media source 
cues structure Facebook users’ news exposure: They signal the credibility and societal 
relevance of political information, but also spark curiosity about an unknown outlet. First, if a 
reader perceives an outlet to be very credible, they are more likely to read articles from this 
source (Choi, Watt, & Lynch, 2006). Legacy news media (e.g., newspapers of record, such as 
the New York Times) are perceived to be highly credible sources of political information. By 
contrast, citizens consider the tabloid media (e.g., The Sun) to have significantly lower 
credibility (Urban & Schweiger, 2014). Experimental data confirm that users rely on media 
source cues to estimate the credibility of the information offered. The higher perceived 
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credibility of legacy media increases the likelihood that SNS users will select articles from 
quality media rather than tabloids (Winter & Krämer, 2014).  
Second, users may choose to read a news story because of the societal relevance of the 
news outlet. In most countries, one or more news outlets are perceived as central sources whose 
news coverage is followed by a large share of the population, by political elites, or by other 
news media (Nielsen, 2012). Although articles from digital-born news providers look very 
similar to the products of mainstream media when shared on Facebook, the recipients lack 
previous experience with them, so their brand logo cannot serve as a media source cue on the 
potential credibility or societal relevance of the outlet.  
Third, a shared article from an unknown source might spark curiosity. Stumbling over 
an unknown outlet raises arousal and thus curiosity as a coping mechanism. As they are easily 
able to find out more about the outlet – it is literally only one click away – their interest in 
reading the article increases (Silvia, 2008). Articles from an unknown source might thus be 
read out of curiosity about the newly discovered outlet.  
Since legacy media are perceived to more credible and relevant, we expect legacy media 
to have a positive mediation effect via perceived credibility and societal relevance on reading 
intention compared to digital-born outlets and tabloids. We also expect outlet curiosity to 
positively mediate user’s intention to read shared articles from digital-born outlets compared 
to legacy outlets and tabloids. 
H6: News exposure to recommended articles differs by the type of media outlet. 
H7: The effect of media type on news exposure is mediated through (a) perceived 
credibility of the outlet, (b) perceived societal relevance of the outlet and (c) curiosity about 
the outlet 
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Method 
Design and sample 
We conducted a randomized 3x3 between-subject multi-stimulus online experiment 
with two additional quasi-factors in Germany in March 2017. In all conditions, participants 
saw a mock-up Facebook stream containing a teaser for a political news article. First, we varied 
the type of centrist media as the source of the article (legacy newspaper vs. unknown digital-
born outlet vs. tabloid newspaper). Second, tie strength manipulated whether the article was 
shared and recommended by a close friend of the participant (a strong tie), by a distant friend 
(a weak tie), or whether the article appeared without any recommendation in the Facebook 
stream. The recommender’s political knowledge and opinion similarity were both measured as 
non-manipulated quasi-factors, i.e., as perceived by the participant receiving the 
recommendation.  
Using an online access panel provided by the survey company Respondi, we recruited 
an interlocked quota sample representative in terms of age and gender of German Facebook 
users between 18 and 69 (following the official Facebook definition we defined users as those 
using their Facebook profile at least once a month). We tried to reach a statistical power (1-β) 
of .95 which would require 560 finished interviews for medium effect sizes (d = .5) given our 
complex design. However, necessary data cleansing due to failed awareness checks left us with 
N = 507 finished interviews (completion rate: 31.05%) which equates to a power of .92 
assuming no missing values on covariates or quasi-factors. The average age was M = 38.45 
(SD = 12.49). Similar to the German Facebook population, there were slightly more men (n = 
268, 52.9%) than women in the sample and about half of the participants reported holding at 
least a high school degree (n = 281, 55.9%). Participants received vouchers for the completion 
of the survey. 
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Procedure and manipulation 
After receiving their consent, age, gender, education, residency and frequency of 
Facebook use were measured. Then, participants answered questions on their interest in 
different topics. Next, we manipulated the tie strength, depending on the randomly assigned 
experimental group: we either prompted participants to think of a person to whom they feel 
close and with whom they have relatively frequent contact via Facebook or of a person from 
the participant’s distant network (weak tie condition): “Please think of a person who is close to 
you (you only know distantly), with whom you feel personally strongly connected (feel loosely 
connected) and with whom you have regular (rare) contact via Facebook, e.g., through seeing 
his or her Facebook posts or through private messages. This could be a friend, a relative or 
your partner (former school friend, distant acquaintance or a former workmate), for example.” 
To amplify the manipulation, participants wrote down the name of the person and rated how 
close they feel to the person and how often they had contact with them via Facebook. We 
presented the name of this person in each question and told respondents that they should keep 
them in mind before the stimulus was shown next. 
The stimuli for all conditions consisted of three parts (see Online Appendix B). The 
first part told participants to imagine that the following two posts originated from the chosen 
person, displaying the name again. Participants in the “no recommendation” condition saw the 
same reminder, but were told that only the first post originated from the imagined person. The 
second part was an apolitical post by the imagined recommender about vacation pictures. This 
part was constant in all conditions to increase the realism of the Facebook stream. The third 
part consisted of a posted news article showing the headline, a picture, and a short teaser. For 
tie strength, the weak and strong tie condition saw the news article as a shared post with a 
recommending comment as it typically appears on Facebook. The profile picture and the name 
of the recommender were pixelated so that participants could imagine the profile picture and 
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the name of the chosen person. For participants in the no recommendation conditions the news 
article appeared without a recommendation as an original post by the media outlet. For the 
media source cue, we varied the logo, name, and URL of the media outlet from which the news 
article was initially posted using their real Facebook pages. 
To enhance our external validity, we used three multi-stimulus factors. First, we used 
two different but comparable media outlets per media type: Süddeutsche Zeitung (645,099 fans 
as of 15 March 2017) and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (458,649 fans) as legacy outlets and 
Telepolis (20,574 fans) and Krautreporter (86,879 fans) as unknown digital-born media. The 
only exception is the tabloid condition, because Bild Zeitung (2.280.155 fans) is the only 
national tabloid. Second, the news article dealt with one of five comparable topics (regulation 
of monopolies, elections in Serbia, transparency of lawsuits, water protection, and broadband 
expansion), all of which were political topics, hard news, moderately relevant, and without 
issue ownership of a specific party. Third, we used two comparable sentences for the 
recommendation of the news article by the Facebook friend: “Finally a report that summarizes 
the whole issue. It’s worth it!” and “Finally an article that puts the topic straight. Readable!” 
Due to these multi-stimulus factors, our experiment used 135 different stimuli for the nine 
experimental conditions. 
We measured our mediators and dependent variable after the participants had seen the 
stimulus. Next, we asked for quasi-factors and manipulation checks. Lastly, the participants 
answered some basic questions on their general media use before debriefing. 
 
Measures 
Dependent Variable. The intention to read the news article was measured through four 
items using 6-point scales from 1 to 6 (e.g. “I would like to read what the news article 
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contains.”). The items showed high reliability (Cronbach’s α = .97) and were summarized to 
an index (M = 3.87, SD = 1.45). 
Politico-social quasi-factors. Regarding the topic of the news article, we measured 
perceived opinion similarity between the participant and the recommender using a single item 
on a 7-point scale from 1 to 7 (“Please remember the topic of the news article. Would you say 
that you and [name] have rather the same or rather an opposite opinion on that issue,” M = 
5.11, SD = 1.32). With a second single item using a 7-point scale, the participant assessed the 
perceived knowledge of the recommender on this topic (“What do you think, how much 
knowledge has [name] about the topic of the news article?”, M = 3.80, SD = 1.64). 
Politico-social cue mediators. The perceived importance of the topic of the news article 
was measured on three dimensions using three items on 6-point scales for each dimension: 
perceived importance of the topic for the society (e.g., “The topic is important for the whole 
society,” α = .94, M = 4.14, SD = 1.13), for the own social environment (e.g., “The topic is 
relevant in my social environment,” α = .97, M = 3.27, SD = 1.35), and for oneself (e.g. “The 
topic is significant to me”, α = .97, M = 3.43, SD = 1.44). 
Social cue mediators. Perceived social pressure to read the article was measured with 
three items (e.g., “I would have read the article because my social environment would expect 
it of me.”) on 6-point scales and summarized to an index (α = .90, M = 1.71, SD = 1.03). 
Motivation for social monitoring was assessed with three items (e.g., “I would have read the 
article because I could better assess what opinion [name] has on this topic.”), again using 6-
point scales and computing an index (α = .97, M = 3.22, SD = 1.54).  
Media cue mediators. The participants were asked to choose the one media outlet they 
had seen in the stimulus from a list of twelve names. The perceived credibility of the outlet was 
measured with five items adapted from Tsfati (2010), each of which used 6-point scales (e.g., 
“The media outlet is credible”, α = .98, M = 3.08, SD = 1.53). Societal relevance of the outlet 
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was asked with four items, again on 6-point scales (e.g. “Issues concerning the whole society 
are the focus of the media outlet”, α = .93, M = 3.81, SD = 1.30). In addition, we gauged 
participants’ outlet curiosity using one item (“I would have read the article because I did not 
know the outlet and was curious what kind of outlet it is”, M = 2.25, SD = 1.42). Only 
participants who correctly remembered the media outlet were asked their perceptions of the 
outlet to which they were exposed (n = 254, 50.1%). However, our analyses still include those 
participants that could not remember the outlet because we assume that media cues could be 
effective even without a correct recall of the outlet. Participants with missing values on these 
mediators will only be excluded pairwise when testing the media cue mediators.  
Control variables. We measured Facebook usage with two items allowing us to 
calculate the Facebook use per week in hours (M = 6.25, SD = 8.77). To measure the previous 
topic interest, we used a battery of ten items on 7-point scales. Five of them asked for the 
participants’ interest in each of the five topics we used for the news article, and five were on 
other topics for distraction (M = 4.27, SD = 1.67). Lastly, we asked whether the participants 
are following any news site on Facebook: 59.8% (n = 303) reported that they did not follow 
any news site. We performed a simultaneous confirmatory factor analysis with all our measures 
showing that all items loaded on the expected factors (RMSEA = .030, CFI = .987, SRMR = 
.034). 
Manipulation check and tests of internal validity 
We asked the perceived social utility of information of the chosen recommender at the 
end of the questionnaire with four items on 6-point scales (e.g. “I like to be up to date regarding 
[name]”, α = .97, M = 3.83, SD = 1.68). An independent t-test confirmed that information from 
strong contacts (M = 5.14, SD = .84) had a significantly higher social utility than information 
from weak contacts (M = 2.43, SD = 1.15, t(370) = 26.03, p < .001, d = 2.69). We also asked 
about participants’ familiarity with different media outlets revealing that we succeeded in 
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selecting media outlets with differing degrees of familiarity for the manipulation: 90% knew 
the screened legacy outlet and 95.3% knew the tabloid, but only 10.2% were familiar with the 
digital-born outlet (χ2 (df =2, n = 507) = 337.60, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .82). 
Furthermore, we tested the internal validity of the experiment. First, we confirmed that 
the manipulation of the tie strength had no unintended spillover effects on users’ intention to 
read or on measured mediators of the control group. Second, we checked whether our multi-
stimulus factors worked successfully. There were no differences in the dependent variable or 
any of the mediators between the two recommendation sentences nor between the summarized 
media outlets per media type. In addition, the multi-stimulus factor topic showed no main effect 
on the dependent variable nor on the social, and media cue mediators nor interaction effects 
with our independent variables on these outcomes. That is, the results do not vary 
systematically by the five topics of the news articles. However, regarding our three politico-
social mediators, the water protection issue was seen as significantly more important than the 
other topics. Therefore, we tested for metric invariance between this topic and all other topics 
displaying satisfying invariance (n = 507, RMSEA = .061, CFI = .957, SRMR = .059) and an 
alignment procedure showed no differences in the factor loadings. Thus, we summarized the 
topics as intended for the following data analyses but will control for the higher issue 
importance of the water protection topic in the mediation analysis. 
 
Results 
To test our proposed main and interaction effects (H1, H3, H4, RQ1, H6), we computed 
a factorial between-subject ANCOVA with the independent variables tie strength, knowledge 
of the recommender, opinion similarity, media type, and all possible interactions between them; 
the covariates previous topic interest, Facebook use per week, and the general following of any 
news site on Facebook; and reading intention as the dependent variable (see, Online Appendix 
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A for descriptive data and Table 1 for model coefficients). The recommender’s level of 
knowledge and opinion similarity were integrated by using median splits (ndissimilar (1-5) = 151, 
53.9%; nsimilar (6-7) = 129, 46.1%; nlow knowledge (1-3) = 118, 42.1%; nhigh knowledge (4-7) = 162, 57.9%). 
Due to missing values on covariates and quasi-factors, our sample size decreased to n = 382 
for this analysis. That is, the statistical power is reduced to .79 to find effects with a medium 
size (d = .5) but is still high enough to find strong effects (d = .8) with 1-β = .99. The model 
explained 27% of the variance (R2 = .27, R2adjusted = .21) and was significant (p < .001). 
 
  
Table 1. ANCOVA test of between subjects effects for reading intention by media type, tie 
strength, opinion similarity, knowledge recommender, their interactions and covariates 
 
Factor 
 
df 
 
F 
 
p 
 
ηp2 
Adjusted model 29 4.45 < .001*** .27 
CV Previous topic interest 1 30.26 < .001*** .08 
CV Facebook use per week 1 4.05 .045* .01 
CV Following any news site (yes = 1) 1 9.12 .003** .03 
Media type 2 4.20 .016* .02 
Tie strength 1 7.08 .008** .02 
Opinion similarity (high = 1) 1   .41 .525 .00 
Knowledge recommender (high = 1) 1 9.41 .002** .03 
Media type * tie strength 2 .14 .870 .00 
Media type * opinion similarity 2 .34 .717 .00 
Media type * knowledge recommender 2 .71 .490 .00 
Opinion similarity * knowledge recommender 2 12.30 .001** .03 
Note. R2 = .27, R2adjusted = .21, model is fully saturated but only significant (p < .05) factors 
or factors of interest for the hypotheses are displayed, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, n 
= 382 
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For tie strength (H1), we revealed a significant main effect (F(1, 352) = 4.20, p = .016, 
ηp2 = .02). Simple effects displayed that articles recommended by close friends led to a 
significantly (p = .024) higher reading intention (M = 4.21, SE = .11) than those recommended 
by distant contacts (M = 3.77, SE = .13) or not recommended articles (M = 3.79, SE = .13, 
p = .035, all simple effects analyses included the three covariates and used the Šidák correction, 
all reported p-values are two-tailed). There were no differences between articles that were not 
recommended or recommended by distant contacts (p = .99). While we did not find a main 
effect of opinion similarity (H4, F(1, 352) = .41, p = .53), we detected a significant main effect 
for the recommender’s level of knowledge (H3, F(1, 352) = 9.41, p = .002, ηp2 = .03). Simple 
effects showed that recommendations from friends perceived to have high levels of knowledge 
about the topic led to a significantly (p = .007) higher intention to read an article (M = 4.24, SE 
= .11) than recommendations from friends perceived to have low levels of knowledge (M = 
3.73, SE = .13) and articles that were not recommended (M = 3.79, SE = .13, p = .020); there 
was no difference between low levels of knowledge and no recommendation (p = .987). 
For the media type (H6), we found a significant main effect (F(2, 352) = 4.20, p = .016, 
ηp2 = .02). Simple effects showed that the intention to read articles from legacy newspapers 
(M = 4.22, SE = .13) was significantly (p = .030) higher than for tabloids (M = 3.76, SE = .13), 
but there were no differences between legacy and digital-born outlets (M = 3.92, SE = .13, 
p = .28) or between tabloids and digital-born outlets (p = .76).  
We found a significant interaction between opinion similarity and recommender’s level 
of knowledge (RQ1, F(2, 352) = 12.30, p = .001, ηp2 = .03). Simple effects showed that the 
aforementioned main effect of knowledge is mainly shaped by the condition of high opinion 
similarity (Msimilar high knowledge = 4.58, SEsimilar high knowledge = .15, Msimilar low knowledge = 3.50, SEsimilar 
low knowledge = .20, p < .001) whereas knowledge does not have an effect when opinions are 
dissimilar (Mdissimilar high knowledge = 3.90, SEdissimilar high knowledge = .15, Mdissimilar low knowledge = 3.97, 
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SEdissimilar low knowledge = .15, p = .747). To secure our finding, we performed an additional 
moderation analysis with PROCESS using the metric, mean-centered values for 
recommender’s level of knowledge and opinion similarity, excluding the conditions with no 
recommendation from the analysis (new n = 289) and controlling for the influence of tie 
strength. This analysis confirmed the significance of both the recommender’s level of 
knowledge (b = .20, p = .006) and the interaction between knowledge and opinion similarity 
(b = .08, p = .039). As Figure 1 illustrates, the effect of knowledge depends on at least a 
moderate opinion similarity. The Johnson-Neyman significance value is -.77 for the mean-
centered opinion similarity, equating to a value of 4.39 on the non-centered 7-point scale. 
 
 
 
 
Additionally, there were no interactions between media type and tie strength 
(F(2, 352) = .14, p = .87), media type and opinion similarity (F(2, 352) = .34, p = .717), or 
media type and recommender’s level of knowledge (F(2, 352) = .71, p = .49). That is, the 
recommender cues work the same for the three different media types. 
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Figure 1. Effect of the knowledge of the recommender by opinion similarity controlled for 
tie strength. The variables knowledge of the recommender and opinion similarity were mean 
centered before calculating its interaction. n = 289 
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To test for the proposed mediation processes (H2, RQ2, H7) and the experimental effect 
on issue importance (H5) beyond the already described main and interaction effects, we 
performed a structural equation model in R’s lavaan package with the MLR estimator using tie 
strength, opinion similarity, recommender’s level of knowledge, its interaction, and media 
source as exogenous variables, the social, politico-social and media cue mediators as latent 
endogenous variables; and reading intention as the final endogenous variable. Again, we 
excluded the conditions without recommendation, controlled for the same three covariates, and 
used the metric mean-centered values for recommender’s level of knowledge, opinion 
similarity and its interaction. We split the categorical independent variable media type into 
dummies using legacy outlets as the respective baseline. In addition, we controlled for the topic 
of water protection to account for its greater perceived issue importance (CFI = .977, RMSEA 
= .034, SRMR = .032). 
The results (see Figure 2 for the structural model and Table 2 for statistical tests on 
indirect effects) show that tie strength influenced the two social mediators. Strong ties 
increased social pressure (b = .48, p < .001) and social monitoring (b = .90, p < .001), but only 
social monitoring is associated with reading intention (b = .40, p < .001). The indirect effect of 
tie strength via social monitoring (H2a) is significant (unstandardized coefficient = .36, p < 
.001). 
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Figure 2. Estimated structural model. Displayed are only significant (p < .05) unstandardized 
coefficients. Black paths were hypothesized, grey paths are additional signficant coefficients. 
Measurement model, covariates and correlations between mediators are included but not 
shown for clarity reasons. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, n = 332, CFI = .977, RMSEA 
= .034, SRMR = .032. 
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Table 2. Indirect and total effects of media type, tie strength, opinion similarity, knowledge 
recommender and the interaction between opinion similarity and knowledge recommender 
on reading intention 
 
 
Unstandardized  
coefficient  
[95 % CI] 
 
p 
Tie strength (0 = weak, 1 = strong)   
     Indirect: tie strength via social monitoring (H2a) .36 [.21, .51] < 
.001*** 
     Total: tie strength on reading intention (H1) .44 [.16, .73] .002** 
Knowledge recommender   
     Indirect: knowledge via social monitoring (non-
hypothesized) 
.08 [.03, .12] < 
.001*** 
     Indirect: knowledge via issue importance self (RQ2c) .03 [.00, .07] .056† 
     Total: knowledge on reading intention (H3)  .15 [.05, .24] .003** 
Opinion similarity (OS) * knowledge recommender (KR)   
     Indirect: OS * KR via issue importance self (RQ2c) .03 [.01, .06] .041* 
     Total:  OS * KR on reading intention (RQ1) .07 [.01, .13] .037* 
Legacy media (0) vs. tabloid (1)   
     Indirect: legacy vs. tabloid via societal relevance outlet 
(H7b) 
-.48 [-.86, -.09] .015* 
     Total: legacy vs. tabloid on reading intention (H6) -.48 [-.81, -.15] .005** 
Legacy media (0) vs. digital-born (1)   
     Indirect: legacy vs. digital born via societal   relevance 
(H7b) 
-.25 [-.51, .00] .055† 
     Total:  legacy vs. digital-born on  reading intention (H6) -.37 [-.67, -.07] .015* 
Note. Only significant (p < .05) ore marginally significant (p < .06) coefficients are 
displayed. Non-significant coefficents and included covariates are not shown for clarity 
reasons. † p < .06,   * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, n = 332 
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The recommender’s level of knowledge affected all three politico-social mediators 
(H5a issue importance society: b = .08, p = .035, H5b issue importance social environment: b 
= .19, p < .001, H5c issue importance self: b = .14, p = .001). Only issue importance for oneself 
in turn correlates with reading intention (b = .24, p = .018). However, the indirect effect of 
knowledge via issue importance for oneself was only marginally significant (unstandardized 
coefficient = .03, p = .056, RQ2c). Instead, the recommender’s knowledge showed an indirect 
effect on reading intention via social monitoring (unstandardized coefficient = .08, p < .001). 
Opinion similarity showed no effects, but the interaction between knowledge and similarity 
increased the perceived issue importance of the social environment (H5b, b = .08, p = .006) 
and oneself (H5c, b = .13, p < .001). However, only the indirect effect on reading intention via 
issue importance for oneself was significant (unstandardized coefficient = .03, p = .041, RQ2c). 
Media type had no influence on the social or politico-social mediators; it only exerted 
effects on the media mediators. Tabloid articles led to a significantly lower perception of outlet 
credibility (b = -2.29, p < .001) and societal relevance of the outlet (b = -1.23, p < .001) than 
those from legacy media. Among these mediators, only the indirect effect on reading intention 
via the societal relevance of the outlet was significant (unstandardized coefficient = -.48, p = 
.015, H7b). Digital-born media were perceived as less credible (b = -.86, p = .003) and less 
societally relevant (b = -.65, p = .003) than legacy outlets, but only the indirect effect via 
societal relevance was at least marginally significant (unstandardized coefficient = -.25, p = 
.055, H7b).   
 
Discussion 
Facebook (and other SNS) have been seen as promising sources of INE to assure an 
informed citizenry (Lee & Kim, 2017). However, the inherently social character of INE on 
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Facebook may lead to changes in the heuristics used by citizens to decide which of the news 
articles that they incidentally stumble upon they will actually read.  
According to our experiment, there are three paths that encourage news exposure based 
on INC among Facebook users. First, social cues of the recommender increase reading 
intention via social monitoring: If the recipient feels close to the recommending friend, he or 
she will read the recommended article to increase their knowledge of the recommender. 
Although respondents feel stronger social pressure to read articles recommended by close ties, 
this does not produce greater intentions to read. More importantly, recommendations from 
weak ties do not motivate recipients to read the recommended article compared to articles that 
are not recommended. In other words, though weak ties are expected to be more diverse and 
should thus have a higher potential to recommend counter-attitudinal information, Facebook 
users are less likely to follow their recommendations, regardless of their political knowledge 
or the similarity of their opinions, or how respectable the recommended media source is. This 
phenomenon is further enhanced by the Facebook algorithm that assures that recommendations 
from weak ties as well as recommendations that do not match a user’s interests are less likely 
to appear in their news stream. Hence, INE on Facebook can only have a positive impact on 
exposure to political news, and in particular on exposure to politically diverse news, if users 
have close ties to people who are interested in politics and have different political outlooks.  
The second path reflects the importance of opinion leaders for INE in a social setting 
such as Facebook (see also Turcotte et al., 2015): Following recommendations by friends with 
high levels of topical knowledge and similar political opinions, participants believed the issue 
of the recommended article was more relevant to them personally and were hence more likely 
to read it. This, again, may facilitate exposure to like-minded news articles, but not cross-
cutting exposure. Interestingly, political similarity alone does not predict reading intentions: 
according to our data, people are not motivated by a simple confirmation bias. They will not 
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read just any article because they expect it to confirm their views; they will read articles by 
recommenders with similar opinions and high political knowledge, which are more likely to 
contain useful arguments supporting their views. They are motivated by the expected utility for 
opinion confirmation. Our results may thus represent a next step towards developing a 
theoretical understanding of how opinion leadership works in SNS.  
The third path relates to traditional media source cues: articles by legacy and (to a lesser 
degree) digital-born news outlets are perceived to have more societal relevance than tabloid 
articles and are thus more likely to be read when recommended. Contrary to expectations, 
perceptions of credibility differ by outlet type but have no impact on reading intention. This 
finding contradicts of a number of previous studies on the importance of credibility for news 
selection (Choi et al., 2006), but might be explained by the particular usage situation on a social 
network. As news selection on Facebook is a social experience, respondents apparently place 
more importance on whether an article is likely to contain relevant than credible information. 
This would indicate that when using Facebook, users are more concerned with what people are 
talking about than whether is true or not. This notion is corroborated by our finding that reading 
intentions, as well as perceptions of credibility and societal relevance, are higher for unknown 
digital-born outlets than for tabloids. Though legacy outlets are seen as more credible and 
societally relevant, Facebook users appear to give unknown sources considerable “benefit of 
the doubt” (at least compared to tabloids). This has important implications for the likelihood 
of mis- and disinformation by unknown sources being spread on Facebook. In addition, the 
non-significant interaction between tie strength and media cues indicates that recommender 
cues work the same for different types of media: recommendations also have a substantive 
impact on exposure to tabloids, even though they are seen as significantly less credible than 
legacy media. In fact, a recommended tabloid article is just as likely to be read (M = 4.03, SE 
= .18) as an article without a recommendation from legacy media (M = 4.02, SE = .23). 
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Apart from the effects on reading intention, our study allowed a more detailed look at 
how agenda setting effects may occur via agenda cueing on SNS. According to our study, SNS 
posts may not only affect perceptions of issue importance in general as found by Stoycheff et 
al. (2018), their impact differs depending on the recommender’s socio-political characteristics 
and the scope of issue relevance: For evaluating societal issue importance, users followed the 
recommendations of highly knowledgeable, but not necessarily politically similar friends. In 
other words, they trusted perceived experts. However, indirect effects on reading intentions 
were limited to recommendations by highly knowledgeable, politically similar friends which 
increased the perceived issue relevance for oneself. Thus, future studies on agenda setting (or 
agenda cueing) in SNS should include different social- and socio-political characteristics to 
further distinguish the conditions for changes in perceived issue importance of different scopes. 
These interpretations have limitations. First, our manipulation of tie strength did not 
use the real profiles of participants’ Facebook friends but worked via imagination. However, 
the significant manipulation check and the main effect of tie strength showed that this 
manipulation worked. Still, one could argue that the entire experimental situation was rather 
artificial as the post itself did not appear in participants’ real Facebook stream but as a simple 
screenshot of a stream, and participants were asked to imagine it was their own news feed. 
Thus, our experimental setting reduces the ecological validity of our results compared to the 
study by Turcotte et al. (2015) in which participants were deceived into thinking the friend 
actually posted the news article on Facebook. Second, our dependent variable only measured 
the intention to read the article, rather than real usage. Third, the five topics we used for the 
news articles were non-polarized. More polarized topics may lead to stronger effects of opinion 
similarity regardless of the perceived knowledge of the recommender. Fourth, our mediation 
analyses should be interpreted carefully as the mediator outcomes are only partly explained by 
our experimental manipulations but also by personal predispositions. That is, the explained 
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variance in news exposure by our mediation model originates only partly from our 
experimental factors. Lastly, we conducted our experiment in Europe, in a media system in 
which the audience is well aware of the differentiation between media types with respect to 
credibility and societal relevance. Thus, replications in different media systems are needed to 
confirm whether the media source still plays a role independent of personal recommendations. 
Despite these limitations, this study showed that personal news recommendations 
motivate individuals to get involved with political news – if news are recommended by close 
friends or by contacts with high levels of knowledge and similar opinions on the topic. INE via 
Facebook may thus help keep people connected to the political public sphere, particularly those 
who are not connected via traditional media. However, our results also suggest that though 
news contact on Facebook may be “incidental” in the sense of “unintentional,” it does not occur 
“by chance,”, i.e., not all Facebook users will benefit in an equal manner. First, the likelihood 
of unintentionally encountering news (particularly diverse news) will depend for each user on 
their choice of Facebook friends (who may vary in their news-sharing habits) as well as their 
past reactions to shared news articles: The less they click on recommended articles, the less 
they will see news recommendations from friends in the future due to the news feed algorithm. 
Second, people do not treat all “incidental” news recommendations the same. Their news 
exposure following incidental news contact depends on social and political preferences, they 
prefer to maintain existing strong relations with others and to engage with news they expect to 
confirm their existing beliefs (by preferring recommendations from like-minded, 
knowledgeable friends).  
In sum, INE via Facebook has the potential to maintain a normatively desirable 
connection to the public sphere, but this is limited by the configuration of Facebook’s algorithm 
and the motivations of its users. As our study shows, people tend to follow INE 
recommendations by more homophile strong ties and knowledgeable, politically similar 
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contacts, i.e., INE on Facebook can easily be transformed into a form of self-reinforcing 
selective exposure. Thus, future research should continue to explore the potential of INE via 
Facebook and other social media platforms, but should pay close attention to its preconditions 
and circumstances because not all kinds of INE will contribute equally towards ensuring a well-
informed public. 
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Supplemental materials.  
Appendix A 
 
Table Online Appendix A. Descriptive statistics for reading intention by factors media type 
and tie strength controlled for covariates 
 
Media type 
 
Tie strength 
 
M 
 
SE 
 
95 % CI 
 
n 
Legacy Weak 4.08 .20 [3.69, 4.47] 43 
 Strong 4.41 .20 [4.02, 4.80] 50 
 Without recommendation 4.02 .23 [3.56, 4.48] 30 
 Overall 4.22 .13 [3.97, 4.47] 123 
Digital-born Weak 3.65 .23 [3.19, 4.10] 37 
 Strong 4.19 .19 [3.82, 4.55] 55 
 Without recommendation 3.93 .23 [3.49, 4.37] 32 
 Overall 3.92 .13 [3.65, 4.18] 124 
Tabloid Weak 3.57 .22 [3.15, 3.99] 38 
 Strong 4.03 .18 [3.68, 4.37] 57 
 Without recommendation 3.42 .20 [3.02, 3.81] 40 
 Overall 3.76 .13 [3.51, 4.00] 135 
Overall Weak 3.77 .13 [3.52, 4.01] 118 
 Strong 4.21 .11 [3.99, 4.42] 162 
 Without recommendation 3.79 .13 [3.54, 4.04] 102 
 Overall 3.96 .07 [3.81, 4.11] 382 
Note. Previous topic interest, amount of Facebook use, and general following of any news 
site were included as covariates to estimate the means, CI = confidence interval. 
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Appendix B 
Original stimulus (example)     English translation 
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